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vForeword
In June 2013, the ILO identified “Protecting workers from unacceptable forms of work” as one of the eight areas of critical importance (hereinafter 
ACI 8) for priority action by the Organization during 2014–15. Unacceptable 
forms of work are described as comprising conditions that deny funda-
mental principles and rights at work, put at risk the lives, health, freedom, 
human dignity and security of workers or keep households in conditions 
of poverty.*
ACI 8 is intended to strengthen the effectiveness and impact of the ILO’s 
action to promote respect for the fundamental principles and rights at work 
by eliminating egregious labour practices and to make sustainable changes to 
the conditions that produce and perpetuate such practices. This ACI seeks to 
accelerate the transition to decent work by bolstering the synergies between 
the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998) 
and the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization (2008). 
While the concept of unacceptable forms of work is relatively new in 
ILO discussions, the multiple and interrelated policy areas that address it are 
not new. These include measures relating to the promotion of freedom of asso-
ciation and the right to effective collective bargaining, the abolition of child 
labour and forced labour, the promotion of non-discrimination and equality, 
as well as occupational safety and health measures and working time arrange-
ments that protect workers’ health and safety, and well-structured minimum 
wage regulation coupled with effective wage protection measures that shield 
workers and their families from income insecurity.
* ILO: The Director-General’s Programme and Budget proposals for 2014–15, Report II (Supplement), 
International Labour Conference, 102nd Session, Geneva, 2013, para. 49.
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ACI 8 has tried to help develop a shared understanding of what consti-
tutes unacceptable forms of work, what causes them, how to address them, and 
what is the concept’s added value. The present study is an important part of 
this effort. It compares the concept of unacceptable forms of work to relevant 
concepts developed by academia and selected international organizations. It 
also proposes a model to capture the multidimensional nature of unacceptable 
forms of work in different socio-economic and cultural contexts, and suggests 
effective approaches to labour market regulation in addressing these forms 
of work. 
Manuela Tomei
Director, Conditions of Work and equality Department 
(WORKQUALITy)
vii
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Executive summary
Unacceptable forms of work (UFW) have been identified by the Inter-national Labour Organization (ILO) as work in conditions that deny 
fundamental principles and rights at work, put at risk the lives, health, free-
dom, human dignity and security of workers or keep households in conditions 
of poverty (ILO, 2013a, para. 49). This notion of UFW has emerged as an area 
of critical importance for the Organization just prior to the ILO’s centenary. 
The attempt to identify UFW – and to eliminate them – is a recognition 
of the complexity of improving contemporary working life in the early twen-
ty-first century. It has become apparent to both researchers and policy-makers 
that in countries around the world there are cohorts of working people that are 
profoundly adrift from decent work. These working lives are singled out in the 
national and international debates through a range of terminology: precarious 
work, vulnerable workers, informal employment, etc. The diverse terminology 
betrays a degree of confusion about how to identify, categorize, and improve 
these working relations. each of the relevant debates, however, conveys a set 
of guiding insights: that certain workers are labouring in unacceptable con-
ditions; that these working relationships are growing in many countries both 
in the global South and in the advanced industrialized economies; that these 
forms of work are centred among groups who are already at risk of social and 
economic disadvantage and exclusion – for example, women, the young, eth-
nic minorities, migrant workers; and that policies to improve these forms of 
work are both urgently needed and potentially an entry point for a broader 
social and economic upgrading.
yet, there is an evolving awareness among researchers and policy-makers 
that one of the central tools for the improvement of working life – labour 
market regulation – is both intricate and challenging. Recent work recognizes 
that regulation is essential to equitable and prosperous societies, yet complex 
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and unpredictable in its effects. Policy bodies once suspicious of labour market 
regulation have emerged from the global economic crisis with a new-found 
appreciation of its worth. The World Bank, for example, accepts the need 
for labour markets to be regulated in the interests of prosperity and equity: 
central dimensions of regulatory frameworks are no longer portrayed as in- 
evitable inhibitors of jobs and growth (see, in particular, World Bank, 2012). 
yet a rapidly evolving academic literature highlights and explores regulatory 
indeterminacy (Deakin and Sarkar, 2008) – the tendency of regulatory inter-
ventions to generate divergent results in different socio-economic settings. 
This insight has birthed a literature that is identifying and examining the 
facets of this complexity: fragmentation that propels certain working rela-
tionships beyond legal frameworks, de jure or de facto, flawed enforcement 
mechanisms, etc. (see Lee and McCann, 2011; McCann et al., 2014).
At this key juncture in its history, then, the ILO faces an urgent chal-
lenge. In 1998, the Organization identified a set of fundamental rights and 
principles: universal demands that must be respected in all working relations. 
A decade later, the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization 
stressed the indivisibility of the Organization’s objectives, confirming a sus-
tained loyalty to the long-standing concerns of wages, working hours, safety 
and health, etc. As the ILO approaches its centenary, it is compelled to face 
a complex, yet inescapable, challenge: to secure the objectives of the twin 
Declarations it must identify and eliminate the most unacceptable forms of 
work. The notion of UFW, then, does not replace the Decent Work Agenda. 
It enhances the Agenda, sharpening its strategic focus and demanding priori- 
tization of efforts and resources. 
yet the Organization recognizes that there is presently a need for further 
refining the key dimensions of UFW and for better understanding the causes 
of this phenomenon and how it manifests itself in different economic or regu-
latory contexts (ILO, 2014a, p. 19). To bridge these knowledge gaps, the ILO 
has called for “a more refined understanding concerning the dimensions and 
descriptors of [unacceptable forms of work] to guide practical action by the 
ILO and its constituency” (ILO, 2014b, p. 2). 
This study contends that to fully realize the potential of the concept 
of UFW it is essential to engage with academic and policy discourses that 
pursue similar objectives (for more detail, see Chapter 1). A range of policy 
and academic work – drawing on diverse concepts and methodologies – con-
siders how to identify and eliminate forms of work that are unacceptable. The 
study assesses the most significant of these discourses as a basis for develop-
ing a meaningful model of UFW. The report takes as the central purpose of 
identifying UFW to devise targeted social and economic policies that aim to 
eliminate or transform jobs that are entirely unacceptable. The aim is there-
fore to construct a robust conception of UFW that can be operationalized 
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for research and policy intervention. Among the relevant discourses, fur-
ther, the study has a particular focus on renditions of unacceptability in 
legal and regulatory spheres and therefore regulatory concepts, mechanisms, 
and outcomes. 
Chapter 1 reviews the most important concepts in modern academic 
and policy literatures that designate certain forms of work as either desirable 
or unacceptable. The chapter argues that these existing models (e.g. Decent 
Work, Vulnerability, Forced Labour) are crucial to developing a robust concept 
of UFW. Chapters 2 and 3 propose a novel multidimensional model of UFW. 
Only a multidimensional concept, it is argued, can capture the complexity of 
unacceptability in contemporary working life. Chapter 2 outlines the substan-
tive facet of this model by elaborating 12 dimensions of unacceptability. These 
dimensions are designed to be globally relevant and to map to existing labour 
law schema, in particular to those embedded in the ILO’s international labour 
standards. each dimension is categorized into a set of indicators that can be 
used to identify UFW. The indicators are intended to be used at local levels 
by researchers and policy-makers, including the social partners, to construct 
models of UFW that are suited to distinct regional, national, sectoral, or occu-
pational contexts. Chapter 3 identifies criteria for determining which forms 
of UFW are the priority for regulatory intervention in a particular context. 
It then proposes a strategic approach for regulation of UFW that is designed 
to ensure that regulatory interventions will have system-wide and sustainable 
impacts. The chapter incorporates examples of regulatory interventions that 
have successfully targeted and transformed UFW in order to provide actual 
illustrations of a strategic approach. As a contrast, it also recounts a regulatory 
effort that is likely to be less successful in transforming UFW. The goal for 
policy-makers, the study concludes, is to design and implement regulatory 
interventions that are integrated and dynamic, and that therefore will have the 
broadest and most sustainable effect. 

1Discourses of  
unacceptability
Introduction
This chapter assesses the most significant regulatory discourses that designate 
certain forms of work as “unacceptable”. each of these discourses has a cen-
tral concept (Decent work, Good jobs, Precarious work, Vulnerable workers, 
Informal work, and Forced labour) that helps in identifying what makes work 
unacceptable. Some (like Decent work and Good jobs) provide an imagery of 
working life that is the antithesis of unacceptable work. The others explicitly 
identify forms of work of concern for policy-makers or ripe for regulatory 
intervention. This chapter analyses the merits and limitations of these con-
cepts as a basis for developing a meaningful concept of UFW.
Three criteria were used to select the discourses evaluated in this chap-
ter: relevance to identifying unacceptable work; take-up by policy-makers 
or key policy institutions; and currency within the relevant (legal, regula-
tory, and sociological) academic literature. The first two discourses, Decent 
work and Good jobs, reflect the international debate about core development 
issues, namely the creation of employment and the quality of work. As such, 
they provide an overarching imagery of desirable work (see figure 1.1). The 
next four discourses, Precarious work, Vulnerable workers, Informal work, 
and Forced labour (see figure 1.2), centre on specific and interrelated mani-
festations of unacceptable work that have salience at the transnational levels 
– european Union (eU), International Labour Organization (ILO), World 
Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB) – and across countries from a broad 
range of economies, from least developed to most advanced. These concepts 
are the most significant to the global debates on the emergence and endur-
ance of unacceptable forms of work. 
1
Unacceptable forms of work
2
Figure 1.1 Key discourses of the quality of work
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Figure 1.2 Key discourses of unacceptability
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1.1. Decent work
“Decent work” has become the guiding contemporary image of an acceptable 
working life. Initially articulated by the Director-General of the International 
Labour Office in his report to the 1999 International Labour Conference 
(ILO, 1999), decent work embodies a commitment to “promote opportunities 
for women and men to obtain decent and productive work, in conditions of 
freedom, equality, security and human dignity” (ibid.). The concept was situ- 
ated at the convergence of four principles – also singled out as the “strategic 
objectives” of the ILO: the promotion of rights at work, employment, social 
protection, and social dialogue (ibid.).1
The Decent Work Agenda (DWA) was part of the ILO’s broader efforts 
to refashion its policy concerns, objectives, and functions in response to a set 
of socio-economic trends that had transformed the international policy land-
scape (most prominently intensifying economic globalization, the end of the 
Cold War, the growing hegemony of neoliberal economics, and the spread of 
various forms of non-standard or informal work) (ibid.; Rodgers et al., 2009; 
Vosko, 2000 and 2002; Helfer, 2006). 
Subsequently, decent work, which can be understood as an aspiration 
for working life or as a route out of poverty, has become a prominent theme 
of broader global labour, social, and development policy agendas. The DWA 
highlighted the links between the work of the ILO and of other develop-
ment actors (Rodgers et al., 2009; Trebilcock, 2005). As a result, its influence 
on related policy agendas steadily heightened, culminating in 2007 in an 
endorsement by the United Nations General Assembly in the revision of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (see further MacNaughton and 
Frey, 2010). The revision of the MDG framework added under Goal 1 (“eradi- 
cate extreme poverty and hunger”) a new “decent work target” (Target 1.B), 
which calls on the relevant actors to “achieve full and productive employment 
and decent work for all, including women and young people”.2 This target 
marked recognition of the role of decent work in the alleviation of poverty 
while confirming the relevance of the ILO as a development actor (Rodgers et 
al., 2009; MacNaughton and Frey, 2010).
Other supranational policy actors have either formally endorsed the 
DWA or borrowed its language. eCOSOC’s Committee on economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (CeSCR) has interpreted the right to work in Article 6 of 
the International Covenant as a right to decent work.3 In 2006, the european 
Commission made a formal commitment to promote decent work (CeC, 
2006), which has since featured across the work of eU institutions both inter-
nally, in social and employment policies, and externally as part of the Union’s 
trade and development agendas (see further CeC, 2008). More recently, 
decent work has been integrated into the evolving debates on “green jobs” in 
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sustainable development, including as the subject of a General Discussion at 
the 2013 International Labour Conference (ILO, 2013c; see also UNeP et al., 
2008; United Nations, 2012). In addition, the DWA has influenced the work 
of the UN Country Teams and the UN Development Assistance Frameworks. 
For instance, there has been a Decent Work Pillar in UNDAFs, agreed with 
the UNCT (e.g. Albania).
At the country level, the DWA has been implemented by the ILO through 
the design and monitoring of Decent Work Country Programmes (DWCPs).4 
The programmes were first introduced in 2004 as a tool for mainstreaming 
decent work in national development strategies and have since been deployed 
in countries that include Bangladesh, Brazil, Cambodia, Indonesia, Nicaragua, 
and the United Republic of Tanzania (see further ILO, 2011a). The DWCPs 
are informed by international and national development agendas and by the 
priorities of national constituents. In each country, the DWCP establishes pol-
icies and identifies the strategies that are required to realize these objectives, 
and agreed with the government and with employers’ and workers’ organiza-
tions. Although the content of each DWCP varies, the programmes identify 
a number of priorities, specify intended outcomes, and outline an implemen-
tation plan that establishes outputs, activities, and allocated resources (ibid.). 
Performance under the DWCP is subject to a review and evaluation process 
that gauges the relevance of the ILO’s work to national constituents, the align-
ment of this work with the priorities of the United Nations, the coherence and 
effectiveness of the strategies used, and their likelihood to generate long-term 
sustainable development. 
The ILO has also designed indicators to monitor progress towards decent 
work. A Tripartite Meeting of experts held in September 2008 adopted a set 
of decent work indicators. The ILO then launched Monitoring and Assessing 
Progress on Decent Work (MAP) (2009–2012), an eU-funded project to identify 
decent work indicators at the national level, based on the Tripartite Meeting 
indicators, and to collect data for use in analyses of decent work relevant to 
national policy-making. The MAP project covered nine countries (Bangladesh, 
Brazil, Cambodia, Indonesia, Niger, Peru, Philippines, Ukraine and Zambia) 
and involved government agencies, National Statistical Offices, workers’ and 
employers’ organizations, and research institutions. In-depth country studies are 
prepared that examine decent work according to the indicators, assess national 
progress towards decent work, and formulate recommendations on how decent 
work statistics could be improved. Draft profiles are discussed and endorsed by 
tripartite constituents. The results are used as inputs into the design of national 
policies and programmes, including Decent Work Country Programmes.
The concept of decent work has also galvanized scholarly work. In this 
context, it has had a particular influence on the academic literature on labour 
regulation, where it is regularly used to evaluate the strength and scope of 
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domestic regulatory frameworks and policy discourses (e.g. Owens, 2002; 
Hepple, 2001; Boulin et al., 2006; Bletsas and Charlesworth, 2013).
Unacceptability in the decent work paradigm
The ILO’s conception of decent work can be taken to denote the antithesis of 
unacceptable work. As such, decent work illuminates the project of mapping 
the forms and locations of unacceptability. In this regard, the notion of un- 
acceptability derived from decent work can be understood to have a substan-
tive and a functional dimension. 
A multidimensional model and the international floor of rights
On the substantive level, the notion of unacceptable work derived from the 
decent work model is work that is unproductive, unfree, performed in condi-
tions of inequality, insecure, or in violation of human dignity. The strategic 
objectives add regulatory detail: unacceptable working relationships do not 
respect work-related rights, are excluded from social protection regimes, and 
do not offer opportunities for social dialogue. 
This elaboration of unacceptable work enriches the other versions iden-
tified in this chapter by placing social dialogue at the heart of decent work: 
[T]he best solutions arise through social dialogue in its many forms and levels, 
from national tripartite consultations and cooperation to plant-level collective 
bargaining. engaging in dialogue, the social partners also fortify democratic 
governance, building vigorous and resilient labour market institutions that 
contribute to long-term social and economy stability and peace (ILO, 1999, p. 16).
Jobs in which workers have no access to voice mechanisms, then, are 
excluded from the ambit of decent work. The prominence of social dialogue in 
decent work is an important corrective to other elaborations of unacceptable 
work, which tend to neglect the collective dimensions of decency. 
More broadly, the influence of decent work on labour and development 
agendas is in part attributable to the elasticity of this concept. Decent work is 
applicable to countries across the range of levels of economic development. In 
this regard, the concept is abstract and subjective:
Decent work is not defined in terms of any fixed standard or monetary level. 
It varies from country to country. But everybody, everywhere, has a sense of 
what decent work means in terms of their own lives, in relation to their own 
society. … The immediate objective is to put in place a social floor for the global 
economy… (Somavia, 2000, pp. 2–3, quoted in Vosko, 2002, pp. 26–27). 
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These observations suggest that notions of unacceptable work should 
allow for a degree of variation to respond to socio-economic and cultural con-
texts. This insight informs the conception of UFW elaborated in Chapter 2. 
yet, its association with the ILO’s “core rights” strategy initially threat-
ened the breadth of the decent work concept. The identification of certain 
principles and rights as fundamental in the 1998 Declaration on Fundamen-
tal Principles and Rights at Work tied the DWA to the core labour standards 
on freedom of association and collective bargaining,5 forced labour,6 child 
labour,7 and discrimination8 (see further Alston and Heenan, 2004; Alston, 
2005; Fudge, 2007). This compression of the normative dimension of decent 
work exposed the ILO to the charge of having curbed the domain of inter- 
national legal policy to the most egregiously exploitative conditions (Alston 
and Heenan, 2004; Alston, 2005). A related criticism, advanced most force-
fully by Alston (2005), was that the Declaration bifurcated an indivisible 
international labour (and human) rights corpus by privileging certain of its 
elements (see also Langille, 2004; Fudge, 2007). 
As a consequence, the DWA was criticized for neglecting labour 
rights beyond the core. It was thought to be unresponsive to many of the 
urgent social problems encountered in the rapidly globalizing economies of 
the early twenty-first century (see in particular Rittich, 2006). The report 
of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization was 
singled out as conspicuously centred on the core standards and less atten-
tive to international and domestic legal frameworks on conditions of work: 
health and safety, wages, working time, and work/family reconciliation 
(Alston and Heenan, 2004; Rittich, 2006; McCann, 2012). In response, 
an argument was advanced that non-core protections were effectively sus-
tained by the core standards, as an outcome of the “procedural” right to 
collectively bargain (Langille, 2004), while the promotion of social dialogue 
was observed to provide protection against vulnerability and contingency 
(Sen, 1999). 
Subsequently, the ILO ultimately stressed the interdependency of the 
four pillars of decent work. The 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair 
Globalization, while reframing the Organization’s objectives, was character- 
ized as “drawing on and reaffirming” the 1998 Declaration.9 In the 2008 Declar- 
ation, the strategic objectives are emphasized to be “equally important” (I.A) 
and “inseparable” (I.B). Further, the Declaration sharpens the strikingly nar-
row conception of social protection in the Decent Work report, which had 
equated it primarily with social security systems and, to a lesser degree, safety 
and health (ILO, 1999; McCann, 2012). The 2008 Declaration explicitly 
situates working conditions within the domain of social protection. In this 
regard, it reverts to the language of the Declaration of Philadelphia, in a call 
for “policies in regard to wages and earnings, hours, and other conditions of 
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work calculated to ensure a just share of the fruits of progress to all and a 
minimum living wage to all employed and in need of such protection”10 
(see further McCann, 2012).
The 2008 Declaration confirmed that decent work embraces a broad 
range of policy fields. This breadth is reflected in the decent work indicators 
agreed at the 2008 Tripartite Meeting of Experts.11 The indicators integrate 
ten statistical and legal dimensions of decent work: employment opportun- 
ities; adequate earnings and productive work; decent working time; combin-
ing work, family, and personal life; work that should be abolished (forced 
labour, hazardous child labour, and other worst forms of child labour); sta-
bility and security of work; equal opportunity and treatment in employment; 
safe work environment; social security; and social dialogue and employers’ 
and workers’ representation. Key elements of the indicators are captured in the 
multidimensional model of UFW outlined in Chapter 2. 
The 2008 Declaration also confirmed that decent work is associated with 
the range of international labour standards. As such, unacceptable forms of 
work can be understood as working relations that exist either below or outside 
this normative floor. Decent work may therefore be conceived of as subject 
to a defined set of parameters.12 International labour standards establish the 
Note: Entitlements drawn from Conventions Nos 1, 14, 30, 47, 106, 132. Conventions classified by the ILO 
as revised, outdated, shelved or withdrawn are excluded. See further http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/
introduction-to-international-labour-standards/international-labour-standards-creation/lang--en/index.htm.
• 40 hours
•  48 hours including 
overtime
•  24 hours weekly rest
• 8 hours
• 3 working weeks
•  e.g. Right to transfer 
when unfit
• Additional compensation
Decent work
Daily
hours
Weekly
hours
Annual
leave
Night
work
UFWUFW
Figure 1.3 Working time dimensions of decent work
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parameters of decent work. Conversely, the boundaries of unacceptable work 
can be drawn in part by reference to the minimum requirements of these 
standards. The relationship between decent and unacceptable work hinges 
on the content of the relevant standards. Certain of the international norms 
contain entitlements that are concrete and specific. The right to a weekly rest 
period of 24 hours is one illustration.13 Others are procedural or program-
matic: the right to be subject to a minimum-wage setting mechanism,14 for 
example, to the progressive realization of the 40-hour week,15 or to a national 
work/family policy that counters discrimination and work/family conflict.16 
Figure 1.3 above provides an illustration of decent work/UFW in the working 
time dimension. This elaboration of unacceptable forms of work is returned 
to in Chapter 2.
Decent work beyond the employment relationship
The functional dimension of decent work extended international labour 
policy beyond both the conventional employment relationship and the formal 
labour market. The concept was fashioned to encompass a broad range of 
workers (ILO, 1999) and its expansive scope was recognized (Sen, 2000). 
Decent work embraces working lives beyond those of wage workers in formal 
enterprises. Further:
All those who work have rights at work. The ILO Constitution calls for the 
improvement of the “conditions of labour”, whether organized or not, and 
wherever work might occur, whether in the formal or the informal economy, 
whether at home, in the community or in the voluntary sector (ILO, 1999, p. 3).
This dimension of the decent work concept is critical for investigating 
both where unacceptable forms of work are to be found and the policy and 
regulatory interventions that are required to ameliorate or eliminate these 
working relationships. 
Decent work in the informal economy
The breadth of the decent work concept in part reflected a contemporary 
trend towards extending protections beyond the employment relationships 
conventionally recognized by labour law systems. This objective had 
previously been pursued in the stalled efforts to adopt an international 
instrument on “contract labour” (see ILO, 2003a). The expansive concept of 
decent work also confirmed the ILO’s evolving preoccupation with workers 
in the informal economy (see further Vosko, 2002): 
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The ILO is concerned with all workers. Because of its origins, the ILO has paid 
most attention to the needs of wage workers – the majority of them men – in for-
mal enterprises. But this is only part of its mandate, and only part of the world 
of work. Almost everyone works, but not everyone is employed. Moreover, the 
world is full of overworked and unemployed people. The ILO must be concerned 
with workers beyond the formal labour market – with unregulated wage work-
ers, the self-employed, and homeworkers (ILO, 1999, p. 3).
Decent work, then, should be pursued not only in formal employment 
relationships; it should also be expected in work arrangements that are, owing 
to their exclusion – de jure or de facto – from the lattice of regulatory regimes 
that encircle labour market participation, considered to be informal (on the 
definition of informal work, see further ILO, 2002). This embrace of the infor-
mal sector propelled the ILO more firmly into the priorities and forums of 
development policy. It was applauded as a novel commitment to marginal-
ized workers and the heightened influence of the NGOs that represent them 
(Vosko, 2002; Sen, 2000). (On the interface of labour law and development, 
see further Teklè, 2010; Sankaran, 2012.) The ILO has continued to focus on 
informal work, both in the 2002 Conclusions concerning decent work and the 
informal economy (ILO, 2002) and in current efforts towards standard-setting 
(see further section 1.5). The concept of decent work has also been used in vig-
orous academic projects to develop strategies for informal workers (Carr and 
Chen, 2004). Informality is considered in more depth in section 1.5 below).
The regulatory demands of decent work
This functional aspect of decent work has also inspired efforts to clarify the 
regulatory determinants of unacceptable work: to determine how regulation 
generates, or fails to quell, unacceptable work. The DWA, which is regarded as 
a “soft” law approach, has been criticized as either timid or uncertain in its pre-
scriptions on implementation mechanisms (Mundlak, 2007; MacNaughton 
and Frey, 2010). MacNaughton and Frey (2010), for example, lament that 
“[b]y turning to soft promotional approaches, the ILO appears to transform 
binding legal obligations into mere policy or programmatic goals” (p. 348). 
Most pertinent for present purposes is decent work’s regulatory “message” 
to domestic social and development policy frameworks, and in particular its 
demands for mechanisms to regulate labour markets. 
The achievement of decent work depends to a substantial extent on pol-
icy regimes that operate beyond the conventional boundaries of labour law 
and even of legal regulation. At the outset, Sen (2000) noted that the concept 
of decent work situates working life “within a broad economic, political and 
social framework” (p. 125) and that “[p]rotection against vulnerability and 
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contingency is … to a great extent, conditional on the working of democratic 
participation and the operation of political incentives” (ibid.). yet labour mar-
ket regulation, broadly defined, inevitably plays a pivotal role (for arguments 
towards a broad conception of the field of labour regulation, see Mitchell, 
1995; Arup et al., 2010).
The regulatory demands of decent work have been explored in scholarly 
work (e.g. Owens, 2002; Boulin et al., 2006; Bletsas and Charlesworth, 2013). 
Most recently, they have been central to the research agenda of Regulating for 
Decent Work, an international network of researchers and policy-makers who 
investigate contemporary labour regulation from multiple disciplinary per-
spectives (economics, law, industrial relations, development studies, political 
science) (see Lee and McCann, 2011; McCann et al., 2014). The recent work 
of the network has built on innovations in empirical research that have con-
firmed that the impacts of labour regulations are difficult to predict a priori. 
This work has most recently drawn on Deakin and Sarkar’s (2008) notion of 
“regulatory indeterminacy” to capture uncertainty in the protective capacities 
of labour law, and to elaborate the pressures that drive and underpin regu-
latory indeterminacy in contemporary labour markets. Three key variables 
have been identified: (1) the accelerating fragmentation of labour markets into 
diverse forms of employment; (2) complex interactions between labour market 
institutions; and (3) impediments to effective implementation of labour norms 
(McCann et al., 2014). These insights are returned to in Chapter 3.
1.2. Good jobs
employment in advanced economies is increasingly portrayed as a disjuncture 
between “good” and “bad” jobs. This project has been driven by the recogni- 
tion that Western labour markets have become increasingly polarized since 
the 1970s into poor-quality, insecure and low-wage employment, on the one 
hand, and more secure and rewarding forms of employment, on the other. In 
the United States, for example, 25 per cent of the workforce was employed in 
low-wage jobs by 2005 (Mason and Salverda, 2010). This outcome has been 
associated with a “hollowing out” of the occupational structure through the 
expansion of good jobs in managerial, professional and technical occupations, 
a disproportionate expansion of bad jobs, in sales and services occupations, 
and a decline in middle-level jobs (clerical, skilled and semi-skilled manual 
occupations) (Kalleberg, 2011). Researchers have ascribed these changes to 
a set of intersecting pressures that are shaping industrialized societies. These 
pressures include declining unionization, deregulation, internationalization, 
intensified competition and financialization, employer strategies towards seek-
ing greater flexibility in work relationships, and the increased labour market 
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participation of women and of migrant workers (e.g. Appelbaum and Schmitt, 
2009; Kalleberg, 2011).
This good jobs/bad jobs classification increasingly features in scholarly 
literatures and influences policy discourses. The investigation of employment 
polarization initially exposed a “conceptualization deficit” (Findlay, Kalle-
berg and Warhurst, 2013, p. 442) that demanded more elaborate typologies 
of good and bad jobs (see Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 2009). This good/bad 
jobs discourse is associated with a literature that has revived the investiga-
tion of job quality since the mid-2000s (e.g. Green, 2006; Grimshaw, Lloyd 
and Warhurst, 2008; Kalleberg, 2011; Osterman and Shulman, 2011; Findlay, 
Kalleberg and Warhurst, 2013; for earlier scholarship on job quality, see e.g. 
Davis and Taylor, 1972; Terkel, 1972; Donaldson, 1975; Oldham and Miller, 
1979; Westley, 1979). Researchers have been prompted to elaborate the char-
acteristics of good jobs and bad jobs, in the process generating sophisticated 
typologies of each. These efforts are a crucial contribution towards conceptu-
alizing UFW.
Towards multidimensional models of good jobs
In its origins, the good jobs literature reflected disciplinary diversity: the eco-
nomic literature highlighted wages and fringe benefits, psychologists focused 
on job satisfaction, etc. (Kalleberg, 2011; Findlay, Kalleberg and Warhurst, 
2013). Modern analyses tend to reflect on the nature of good/bad jobs from 
an interdisciplinary perspective. As a result, the literature has evolved to 
offer richer models of objectionable and desirable jobs. It now embodies a 
multidimensional ethos: “[j]obs are made up of bundles of rewards, and the 
multidimensionality of job quality is reflected in definitions that recognize the 
diverse aspects of what constitutes a ‘good’ job” (Kalleberg, 2011, p. 5).
Modern typologies capture objective features of jobs. Most indices, for 
example, include wages, measuring either hourly wages, annual earnings, 
or both (e.g. Tilly, 1997; Clark, 2005; Davoine, erkel and Guergoat, 2008). 
Working time tends to feature in these classifications, to embrace both the 
duration of working hours and, increasingly, their flexibility (e.g. Tilly, 1997; 
Clark, 2005). More recent academic literature, however, has been directed 
towards identifying dimensions of job quality beyond the field’s traditional 
preoccupation with wages and hours (Brown et al., 2007). Some researchers 
within the “good jobs” tradition focus on skills development: Holman (2013), 
for example, includes opportunities to develop or deploy skills commensurate 
with the demands of the job. Job content, worker autonomy, the rhythm of 
work, and work intensification have also become the subject of vigorous ef- 
forts to design indicators capable of capturing these dimensions of working life 
(e.g. Green, 2006 and 2008; Gallie, Felstead and Green, 2004). 
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Modern typologies also increasingly capture subjective components of 
jobs, through attentiveness to workers’ choices, values, and constraints (see 
in particular Cooke, Donaghey and Zeytinoglu, 2013). There is a growing 
interest in measuring subjective elements of job quality, in particular job sat-
isfaction (Clark, 2005; Tsitsianis and Green, 2005). Subjectivist models focus 
on employee work preferences and perceived fulfilment (Brown et al., 2007; 
Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 2009). The broadest typologies therefore capture 
job quality in relation to individuals’ life stages, values, and job opportun- 
ities. As Findlay, Kalleberg and Warhurst note, these dimensions are capable 
of objective definition, but how they align with individual circumstances 
and preferences is subjective and relative: “determined by the individual 
in the socio-economic context” (Findlay, Kalleberg and Warhurst, 2013, 
p. 445). Cooke, Donaghey and Zeytinoglu, for example, have constructed 
a typology of worker-types among which the definition of a “good job” var-
ies: workers who fit their work around their lifestyle, their lifestyle around 
their work, or who “make do on both or either count” (Cooke, Donaghey 
and Zeytinoglu, 2013).
As a result of these advances in the research, in recent typologies good 
jobs are expansively defined to embrace a range of aspects of job quality. This 
expansion is captured in Kalleberg’s influential classification of good and bad 
jobs (synthesized in Kalleberg, 2011). This classification identifies “character-
istics that most people would agree are necessary for a job to be considered a 
good job (or, at least, not a bad job)” (ibid., p. 9) (see table 1.1).
These criteria are not exclusive: Kalleberg (2011) stresses that the absence 
of one does not produce a bad job and that all are not necessarily present in a 
good job. He also highlights the long-term benefits of good jobs:
Table 1.1 Good jobs: A multidimensional typology
A good job:
•	 provides wages high enough to satisfy a person’s basic needs;
•	 provides fringe benefits to accommodate those needs;
•	 pays relatively high earnings and provides opportunities for increased earnings over 
time;
•	 provides fringe benefits (e.g. health insurance, retirement benefits);
•	 allows the worker opportunities for autonomy and control over work activities;
•	 gives the worker some flexibility and control over scheduling and terms of 
employment;
•	 provides the worker with some control over termination of the job.
Source: Kalleberg (2011), p. 9.
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Good jobs provide a foundation for a high quality of life, healthier workers, 
and stronger families and communities. Workers who have job security and 
who have reasonable expectations regarding future job opportunities are more 
likely to be able to put down roots in a community, conceive and raise children, 
buy a house, and invest in family lives and futures. The amount of control that 
a person is able to exercise in the workplace has far-reaching effects on one’s 
psychological functioning and non-work life (ibid., p. 2).
The broadened approach to the notion of “bad jobs” is reflected in 
figure 1.4, which also reflects the collective dimension.
Bad jobs
Security
No job security
No pay security
Temporary contracts
No control over
job termination
Working time
Long hours
Unpredictable hours
No choice over hours
No exibility to deal with 
non-work obligations
Voice and
representation
No consultation
or voice opportunities
Skills and
development
Little opportunity
for skills development
No opportunities
for training
No opportunities
for promotion
Work organization
Limited task discretion
Limited task control
Minimal demands
(e.g. low task complexity,
low cognitive demands)
High workloads
Intense physical
demands
Wages and
payment systems
Payment too low
to satisfy basic needs
Fringe benets too low to 
satisfy basic needs 
(e.g. health insurance, pensions) 
Few pay enhancements
(e.g. compensation pay,
group pay)
Figure 1.4 Bad jobs: A multidimensional model
Notes: These job dimensions are derived, with slight adaptation, from Holman (2013). The factors identified 
under each dimension are derived from Parker and Wall (1999); Bryson, Cappellari and Lucifora (2004); 
Wooden (2004); Williams, McDaniel and Nguyen (2006); Humphrey, Nahrgang and Morgeson (2007); 
Parent-Thirion et al. (2007); Podsakoff, LePine and LePine (2007); Gallie (2013); Holman (2013).
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The World Bank’s “good jobs for development”: A global model?
Although increasingly expansive, good/bad jobs typologies are subject to a 
number of constraints. These models do not tend, for example, to incorporate 
the capacity of workers to enforce their legal rights. The good jobs literature 
does not attend to the insights of legal doctrinal-theoretical scholarship and 
can overstate the promise of regulatory interventions.17 This literature has not 
strongly integrated the social location of the worker or the social context of 
the job, although there is increasing recognition of both dimensions. Find-
lay, Kalleberg and Warhurst (2013), for example, recognize that job quality 
“[i]s a contextual phenomenon, differing among persons, occupations and 
labour market segments, societies and historical periods”. Taxonomies of 
good jobs, further, have been criticized for valorizing the “standard” model 
of employment associated with post-Fordist manufacturing (Loughlin and 
Murray, 2013).
A key question is whether models of unacceptable jobs generated by the 
good/bad jobs literature are suited to low-income settings. This line of research 
has tended to focus on advanced industrialized economies, and therefore to 
highlight job dimensions of most relevance to more affluent settings. Typolo-
gies of “good jobs” are therefore ripe to be extended to low-income countries. 
In this regard, the World Bank has recently offered a contribution that 
implicitly extends the good jobs discourse to the global context.18 Its World 
Development Report 2013 (WDR 2013) – entitled Jobs – marked a signifi-
cant advance in the policy discourses of the Bank, by acknowledging that 
growth does not inevitably translate into employment (see Bakvis, 2012; see 
generally McCann, 2015). WDR 2013 configures the Bank’s central objec-
tive as developing private employment creation: “[j]obs are the cornerstone 
of development, and development policies are needed for jobs” (World Bank, 
2012, p. 3). 
In elaborating on this objective, WDR 2013 acknowledges a broad set of 
social objectives for employment: for the individual, earnings, benefits, self- 
esteem, and happiness; for society, raised living standards, productivity, and 
social cohesion. To build on these insights, the Report introduced the novel 
concept of “good jobs for development” (GJD), defined as those jobs that have 
“the highest payoff to society”:
[S]ome jobs also have spillovers on the living standards of others, on aggregate 
productivity, or on social cohesion. When spillovers are positive, the job has a 
greater value to society than it has to the person who holds it (ibid., p. 159).
The concept of GJD offers a more expansive imagery of contempor- 
ary labour relations than the Bank has previously recognized. Centrally, it 
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is linked to international norms that embody “basic human rights” (ibid., 
p. 125). Most strikingly, the notion of GJD explicitly demands that jobs that 
infringe universal rights should not be treated as jobs at all: “All countries 
have subscribed to a set of universal rights … Thus, some work activities 
are widely viewed as unacceptable and should not be treated as jobs” (ibid., 
p. 155). 
The human rights instruments that shape GJD are identified in 
WDR 2013 to embrace a wide range of international conventions, and 
regional regimes that include the european Convention on Human Rights, 
european Social Charter, and Inter-American Convention on Human Rights 
(ibid., p. 179). As a result, the Bank’s notion of GJD includes criteria familiar 
from standard good jobs taxonomies. Drawing on Article 23 of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, GJD incorporates “just 
and favourable” working conditions, protection against unemployment, and 
remuneration that ensures an existence worthy of human dignity for workers 
and their families. WDR 2013 also refers to ILO standards that include those 
on working time, social security, health and safety, and labour inspection 
(ibid., p. 156). A reference to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work extends the concept of GJD to freedom of association 
and collective bargaining. The Bank highlights, for example, the spread of 
collective bargaining in China, in the wake of recent legislative reforms 
(ibid., p. 266, box 8.3). 
The Bank’s notion of good jobs, however, is more expansive. GJD em- 
braces risks that the existing typologies of good/bad jobs tend to overlook, 
which are towards the harsher end of the spectrum of mistreatment. The 
pursuit of GJD precludes “activities that exploit workers, expose them to 
dangerous environments, or threaten their physical and mental well-being” 
(ibid., p. 14). It therefore precludes child prostitution, forced labour, hazard-
ous work, and discrimination. These dimensions of contemporary working 
relations are returned to in the remainder of this chapter in the discussion of 
research and policy discourses in which these risks are more central.
1.3. Precarious work
Precarious work in the European Union
Precarious employment has become a central focus in european Union (eU) 
employment policy. The european employment Strategy (eeS) establishes 
a framework for eU countries to coordinate their employment policies, and 
it incorporates Guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States – 
proposed by the european Commission, agreed by national governments 
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and adopted by the eU Council – that set common priorities and targets 
for national employment policies (european Council, 2010).19 The current 
Guidelines are aligned with the broader europe 2020 Strategy for “smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth”, which has set a target of 75 per cent of 
20–64 year olds in employment by 2020 (CeC, 2010). The Guidelines expect 
eU Member States to increase labour market participation, reduce structural 
unemployment, and enhance job quality. To this end, national policy-makers 
are called on to “tackle labour market segmentation with measures addressing 
precarious employment, underemployment and undeclared work”.20 
Most recently, the risks of precarious employment have been emphasized 
in eU-level efforts to accelerate job creation in the wake of the crisis. The 
“Employment Package”, launched in April 2012, is a set of policy documents 
that are intended to complement the Europe 2020 employment objectives and 
the Employment Guidelines.21 The european Commission’s guidance docu-
ment, Towards a job-rich recovery, identifies actions that demand particular 
emphasis in the post-crisis context. These include “restoring the dynamics of 
labour markets” by reforms that embrace “reducing the labour market seg-
mentation between those in precarious employment and those on more stable 
employment”.22 The Commission suggests:
There is … a need for measured and balanced reforms in employment protection 
legislation in order to … halt the excessive use of non-standard contracts and 
the abuse of bogus self-employment. More generally, all types of contractual 
arrangements should give jobholders access to a core set of rights (including 
pension rights) from the signature of the contract, including access to lifelong 
learning, social protection, and monetary protection in the case of termination 
without fault (CeC, 2012, pp. 10–11). 
eU institutions are concerned that precarious work does not provide 
individuals with the rights and protections that have traditionally been a fea-
ture of employment in eU Member States.
Precarious, non-standard, atypical and contingent work
While it is clear that key eU institutions consider precarious employment 
work to be unacceptable, the scope and substance of the concept have been 
open to debate. The meaning of the term “precarious work” has evolved in 
relation to a network of allied concepts, such as “non-standard”, “atypical”, 
and “contingent”, which have been used in part to denote jobs of dubious 
quality. each concept tends to emphasize different features of the work 
arrangement, and different terms have greater currency in specific institu-
tions and countries, and at specific times (Fudge, 1997; eSOPe, 2005; Fudge 
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and Owens, 2006). In Canada, initially “nonstandard employment” was the 
preferred term (economic Council of Canada, 1990), although subsequently 
“vulnerable workers” predominated (Law Commission of Canada, 2004; Law 
Commission of Ontario, 2012). In the european Union, “atypical” or “non-
standard” forms of employment have been the conventional nomenclature 
(Countouris, 2007; Broughton, Biletta and Kullander, 2010), although the 
term “precarious” is increasingly prominent (eSOPe, 2005). “Contingent 
work”, the term preferred in the United States, emphasizes the conditional, 
transitory, and insecure nature of certain kinds of work, including part-time, 
temporary, employee leasing, self-employment, contracted out, and home-
based employment (Polivka and Nardone, 1989). “Non-standard” work tends 
to be used in countries with advanced or emerging economies to refer to poor 
jobs; it is rarely used in lower-middle income and the least developed coun-
tries, where “informal employment” is preferred (Carré and Heintz, 2013, 
p. 2; Hewison and Kalleberg, 2013, p. 397).
There is a great deal of overlap between non-standard, atypical, con-
tingent, and precarious employment. All of these kinds of work tend to be 
low-paid, insecure, and relatively unprotected (Bernier, 2005; Gomez and 
Gunderson, 2005). The term “precarious work” is becoming increasingly 
prominent at the international level because it emphasizes the uncertainty, 
insecurity, and instability associated with an increasing proportion of work 
(Kalleberg, 2009 and 2012; Vosko, 2010; Standing, 2011). It is precisely these 
features that make some forms of work unacceptable.
As researchers in europe have noted, understanding precarious employ-
ment entails an analysis of standards of acceptability since the notion of 
“precarious” employment implies a normative evaluation of different forms 
of employment (eSOPe, 2005, pp. 38, 44). Moreover, there are three main 
difficulties in developing a rigorous theoretical and empirical concept of pre-
carious employment that can be operationalized (ibid., p. 45). First, there is 
no official statistical measure of precarious work. Second, existing categories 
of atypical work, such as part-time and temporary work, are not necessar-
ily precarious even though they contain substantial amounts of precarious 
employment. Third, there are significant cross-national differences in pre-
carious work even in countries with the same level of development (Rubery, 
1989; Broughton, Biletta and Kullander, 2010; Campbell, 2010). In part, the 
difficulty in achieving a common definition stems from the extent to which 
the form and nature of precarious work are context specific; what forms of 
work are precarious and in which ways depends upon the economic and 
social structures of the political systems and labour markets in which it is em- 
bedded (Vosko, Macdonald and Campbell, 2009; Arnold and Bongiovi, 2013; 
Kalleberg, 2012; Lee and Kofman, 2012). Social actors and strategic action 
also influence the extent to which specific forms of work are precarious. 
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A multidimensional approach to precarious work 
Some researchers regard the lack of a universally accepted definition of 
precarious work to be a problem (ILO, 2011b; Working Lives Research Insti-
tute, 2012; Kountouris, 2012).23 However, it has been possible to develop 
an approach to precarious work that both encapsulates the insecurity and 
instability associated with contemporary forms of work arrangements and is 
broad enough to capture precarious work across a wide range of economies. 
Although a multidimensional approach makes precarious work difficult to 
measure statistically, it provides: 
… a wider theoretical understanding of the phenomenon, as it clearly links pre-
carious employment with a very asymmetrical distribution of insecurity and risks 
among the economic actors and makes this process dependent upon both systemic 
and agency factors, i.e. upon structural conditions and strategic actions. Power 
relations, which are surely fundamental from an explanatory stand point, are thus 
brought to the core of the process of unequal insecurity and risk distribution 
(eSOPe, 2005, p. 48).
The benefits of a multidimensional dimensional approach outweigh the 
difficulty in devising precise statistical measures. 
A major step towards developing a comprehensive approach to precarious 
employment was made by Gerry Rodgers, who identified the need to look at 
the different forms of employment in terms of multiple dimensions of inse-
curity. He focused on: (1) the degree of certainty of continuing employment; 
(2) control over the labour process, which is linked to the presence or absence of 
trade unions and professional associations and relates to control over working 
conditions, wages and the pace of work; (3) the degree of regulatory protec-
tion; and (4) income level (Rodgers, 1989). Subsequent researchers added 
variability as a component of income insecurity (Fuller, 2009), and health 
as a fifth dimension of insecurity (Vosko, 2006). Since employment is often 
a requirement for entitlement to many forms of labour and social protection 
many researchers have moved beyond employment to look at other statuses, 
such as own-account (or solo) self-employment (Fudge, 2006; Vosko, 2006).
It is possible to build upon Rodgers’ multidimensional approach to 
insecurity to develop a “legal conceptual framework for … precariousness in 
work relations”, which has five key legal determinants: (1) immigration status 
precariousness; (2) employment status precariousness; (3) temporal precarious-
ness; (4) income precariousness; and (5) organizational control precariousness 
(Kountouris, 2012, pp. 21, 27). The first refers to the vulnerability that work-
ers face on the basis of precarious migrant statuses, which include refugees, 
irregular migrants, rural migrants who are not registered, and workers who are 
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part of managed temporary migration programme (Fudge, 2012). employ-
ment status, which includes informal, voluntary, undeclared work, and 
self-employment, is very important as the initial legal classification has a range 
of ramifications for the worker in terms of access or entitlement to labour and 
social protection (McCann, 2008; Kountouris, 2012, p. 28). Although labour 
protection has traditionally been limited to employees under an employ-
ment contract and other workers have been excluded, research demonstrates 
that many self-employed workers, especially those who are own-account, are 
precarious (Fudge, 2006; Cranford and Vosko, 2006; Benjamin, 2011). Tem-
poral precariousness refers to the uncertainty in obtaining and scheduling 
work, such as experienced by day labourers, and workers on zero hours or 
casual contracts, as well as to time limits on the duration of employment, 
such as fixed-term and seasonal work, or work through an employment agency 
(McCann, 2008; Kountouris, 2012, p. 30). Income precariousness is multi-
dimensional (including amount, frequency of payment, security of payment, 
and whether or not it is continuing), and context specific (Vosko, 2006). 
Organizational precariousness refers to the extent to which the legal system 
provides mandatory norms that workers can use to control employer requests 
to make their schedules, working relations, and income more flexible (Koun-
touris, 2012, p. 34). 
These legal markers of precarious work are very helpful also in identify-
ing unacceptable forms of work. However, they are not definitive, since the 
effectiveness of legal claims depends upon the institutional, including legal, 
framework in which they are lodged and the availability of social actors to 
assist in claims making. 
Towards a predictive model: Social location and social context  
These multidimensional approaches to precarious work highlight the broad 
range of labour market insecurities associated with different forms of work 
arrangements and the legal determinants of precarious work. However, they 
do not account for the social processes and relationships that influence who 
becomes a precarious worker and the nature of the work. In order to illumi-
nate these broader social processes, Leah Vosko integrated social context and 
social location into a multidimensional approach to precarious employment. 
She defines precarious employment:
… as work for remuneration characterized by uncertainty, low income, and lim-
ited social benefits and statutory entitlements. Precarious employment is shaped 
by the relationship between employment status (i.e. self-employed or paid 
employment), form of employment (e.g. temporary or permanent, part-time or 
full-time) and dimensions of labour market insecurity, as well as social context 
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(e.g. occupation, industry, and geography) and social location (or the interaction 
of social relations, such as gender, and legal and political categories, such as cit-
izenship) (Vosko, 2010, p. 2). 
The dimensions of insecurity that Vosko identifies overlap with the 
typology of work security identified by the ILO and further developed by 
Guy Standing (ILO, 2005a; Standing, 2008). But the distinctive contribution 
of her conception is its attention to how characteristics of workers interact in 
specific labour and product markets to produce precarious work outcomes. 
Social location refers to the demographic characteristics of workers who 
research has identified as disproportionately found in precarious work (Lam-
phere, Zavella and Gonzales, 1993). Social location is linked to processes of 
marginalization that undermine social cohesion. Key worker attributes, often 
identified as vulnerabilities, linked to precarious work include sex, age, family 
status, youth, ethnicity, caste, race, immigration status, linguistic group, and 
skill and ability levels (eSOPe, 2005, p. 32; Arnold and Bongiovi, 2013). 
These attributes take on significance in specific labour markets, which are, in 
turn, shaped by the broader social context. Ascriptive characteristics such as 
sex, race, ethnicity, and place of origin are used to channel people into pre-
carious work. For example, women workers are disproportionately found in 
precarious work, often as a consequence of their care and household respon-
sibilities (Fudge and Owens, 2006). Migrant status is also a marker used to 
match people to jobs, and migrant workers are disproportionately found in 
work that is considered dirty, dangerous, and demeaning (Anderson, 2010; 
Fudge, 2012). A recent study of precarious work in the eU found that undoc-
umented migrants generally were found in the most precarious work and 
female migrants, in particular, are seen as at high risk of being in precar- 
ious work (Working Lives Research Institute, 2012, pp. 49–63). Temporary 
or new migrants are recruited into jobs in the agricultural, hospitality, and 
food-processing sectors in the global North and West, while in the Gulf States 
construction is dependent upon temporary migrant workers (Anderson, 2010). 
The social context, especially regional and local product markets, as well 
as governance regimes, shapes how different groups of workers are positioned 
in local labour markets in ways that increase the risk of precariousness in work 
(see figure 1.5). Sectors such as hospitality, construction, agriculture, retail, 
personal care, and cleaning are associated with job instability, low income, the 
absence of trade union representation, the absence of job-related benefits, and 
ineffective or non-existent labour regulation (evans and Gibb, 2009, p. 12; 
Working Lives Research Institute, 2012, p. 44). Some forms of work arrange-
ment predominate in certain sectors: for example, bogus self-employment 
in construction and seasonal and casual work in agriculture and hospitality 
(Working Lives Research Institute, 2012, pp. 26–27). Small firms with few 
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employees are more likely than large firms to provide jobs with low wages, 
fewer benefits, and no union representation (Vosko, 2006). Unions face real 
challenges in representing workers in small and medium-sized enterprises 
(Serrano et al., 2010). 
Figure 1.5 Social context, social location and precarious work
Research in europe discovered that “the incidence of precarious employ-
ment or low quality jobs” was higher than one-quarter in the five countries 
(France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom) they studied, 
and that it was closer to one-third in Spain (eSOPe, 2005, p. 68). Other 
advanced economies, such as Canada and the United States, have witnessed 
the growth in precarious employment (Vosko, 2006; Kalleberg, 2009). Since 
the financial crisis in 1997, the Republic of Korea has experienced an increase 
in precarious work, which has accelerated since 2000 (Shin, 2013). While the 
research on precarious work has tended to focus on countries with advanced 
economies, recently the lens of precarious work has been used to examine 
work in several South and South-east Asian countries (Indonesia, Thailand, 
the Philippines, Viet Nam, Sri Lanka, and India) with different historical 
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trajectories, cultural traditions, and levels of development (Hewison and 
Kalleberg, 2013, pp. 396–397).24 Although the focus in these countries has 
been on the informal sector, which ranges from more than 60 per cent to 90 
per cent, these researchers found that precarious work was spreading through-
out the small formal sector (ibid., p. 397). 
Labour market and social welfare institutions influence whether work 
is precarious, what forms precarious work takes, and how it can be best 
addressed. In some cases, the broader social context can alleviate work-related 
precarity (Working Lives Research Institute, 2012, p. 83). Using data from the 
2006 eurobarometer survey, together with country-level data from a variety 
of sources, Fullerton, Robertson and Dixon (2011) found that “insecurity is 
higher in those countries with high unemployment, low union density, low 
levels of part-time and temporary employment, relatively little social spending 
on unemployment benefits as well as in the post-socialist countries” (Work-
ing Lives Research Institute, 2012, p. 83). This finding suggests that “flexible 
employment practices”, such as casual and part-time work, “do not necessarily 
cause workers to feel insecure in their jobs” (ibid.). Similarly, the negative 
consequences of precarious work can be exacerbated by the social status of the 
workers. Viet Nam and China, countries in which rural–urban migration is 
mediated by the household registration system, highlight this connection. A 
range of significant social goods and entitlements, from access to housing and 
health care to contract type and union organizing, are dependent upon this 
system, which is a means of exercising control over internal migrants (Lee and 
Kofman, 2012, p. 395; Hewison and Kalleberg, 2013, p. 400). 
In a Precarious Work and Social Rights (PWSR) survey across 12 Mem-
ber States of the european Union, over 260 labour law and relations experts 
were asked to indicate the extent to which different forms of contract were 
seen as precarious and the degree of precariousness associated with them 
(Working Lives Research Institute, 2012).25 The strongest perceptions of pre-
cariousness were associated with informal or undeclared work, followed by 
bogus self-employment and then casual employment and zero hours contracts. 
Part-time work and fixed-term work, by contrast, were rarely considered to be 
very precarious (ibid., p. 77).
Precarious work and unacceptable work 
The multifaceted approach to precarious work identifies a spectrum of work 
arrangements in terms of the security of the work and the adequacy of the 
income generated. There are a number of negative consequences of precar- 
ious work for individual workers, their families, their communities, and social 
cohesion more generally since a cohesive society works towards the well-being 
of all its members, fights exclusion and marginalization, creates a sense of 
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belonging, promotes trust, and offers its members the opportunity of upward 
mobility. either singly or combined, some of these consequences make many 
forms of precarious work unacceptable. Thus, although it has tended to be 
used primarily in countries with advanced economies, the concept can be 
applied across countries with different levels of development and contexts in 
order to identify unacceptable forms of work.
Precarious work arrangements are associated with unsafe and unhealthy 
conditions at work. Temporary workers are less likely than permanent employ-
ees to receive adequate work-related training, more likely to be occupied in 
lower-skilled jobs that are associated with poor health outcomes, and their 
occupational safety and health is poorly monitored by inspection systems 
(Lewchuk, Clarke and de Wolff, 2011; Benach and Muntaner, 2007; Lewchuk 
et al., 2003; Quinlan, 1999; Bohle et al., 2004). Sectors of employment identi-
fied with insufficient health and safety protection include: domestic care work, 
the cleaning sector, kitchen work, retail and supermarket staff (particularly in 
relation to psychological stress), and construction (Working Lives Research 
Institute, 2012, p. 105). As well, workers in precarious forms of work tend 
to experience poor emotional and mental health as a result of the insecurity 
and instability associated with their work. They also enjoy less autonomy and 
control over the labour process and work schedules than their more secure 
counterparts, features of jobs that are associated with more work-related stress 
(Lewchuk, Clarke and De Wolff, 2011). 
Precarious work is associated with several short-term and long-term 
costs when it comes to an individual’s ability to establish and maintain stable 
families and households. Low income and job insecurity make it more diffi-
cult for people to form households and have children. Precarious work also 
“deprives people of the stability required to take long-term decisions and plan 
their lives” (ILO, 2011b, p. 14). Certain forms of precarious work, especially 
part-time work, enable women workers to accommodate family and house-
hold responsibilities with earning an income, while other forms, such as zero 
hours, casual, and on-call work, make it harder for women to balance these 
competing demands.26 
Precarious employment status has the effect of hollowing out employ-
ment and labour laws, lowering the floor of employment entitlements, and 
shifting risks from employers to workers. Bogus self-employment and truly 
ambiguous employment relationships tend to disenfranchise workers “from 
any protection afforded by labor or employment law” (Kountouris, 2012, 
p. 28). These forms of precarious work are likely to increase as firms external-
ize many activities to contractors and the solo (own-account) self-employed 
(Casale, 2011). Many workers on casual and zero hours contracts are unable 
to qualify for a range of work-related entitlements that depend upon continu- 
ous service. In most jurisdictions, self-employed workers are not entitled to 
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use collective bargaining legislation to assist them in unionizing or to bar- 
gain collectively. 
Instead of being a stepping-stone to better work, increasingly young and 
other workers are confined to low wage and insecure jobs (eSOPe, 2005, 
p. 32; Working Lives Research Institute, 2012, p. 100). There are few routes 
out of precarious work for the majority of workers caught in it; training and 
job ladders are rare in this kind of work. In some countries, such as Tunisia 
and egypt, precarious work “is not primarily a job or job quality issue, but 
rather a political concern that speaks to the crisis of social reproduction and 
the ability of people to manage their everyday lives” (Lee and Kofman, 2012, 
pp. 390–391).27
A broad understanding of precarious work is helpful for discerning the 
dimensions that make work unacceptable. The notion of vulnerability, which 
is examined in the immediately following section, can, when linked with the 
idea of precariousness, assist in developing a predictive model of unacceptable 
forms of work. 
1.4. Vulnerability
The language of “vulnerability” has intensified in the research and policy 
literatures over the last decade. This concept now accompanies – and often 
parallels – the range of notions of precariousness. As mentioned in section 1.3 
above, the terminology of “vulnerability”, “vulnerable workers” and “vulner-
able employment” has had most resonance in the market-oriented regimes of 
the advanced industrialized economies. In the United Kingdom,, the notion 
of vulnerable work began to emerge in the policy debates in the mid-2000s: its 
earliest appearance was in a Department of Trade and Industry policy state-
ment in March 2006, Success at work: Protecting vulnerable workers, supporting 
good employers (DTI, 2006). Notions of vulnerability began to emerge in the 
same era in Canada: as the subject of a series of studies by a prominent social 
policy think tank, the Canadian Policy Research Network (CPRN) (see, in 
particular, Saunders, 2003); in a report by the Law Commission of Canada, 
the federal law reform advisory body (Law Commission of Canada, 2004; 
see also Rittich, 2004); and in judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada 
(Fudge, 2005). Vulnerable work has since become a regular topic of the policy 
debates on labour market restructuring and regulatory reform in Canada, most 
recently in an assessment by the Law Commission of Ontario (2012) of the 
protections available to vulnerable workers under provincial employment laws.
Vulnerable work has only more recently began to feature in the research 
and policy debates in lower-income countries. Bocquier, Nordman and Ves-
covo (2009), for example, have developed indicators of “vulnerability in 
Discourses of unacceptability
25
employment” to investigate the links between these indicators and wage 
income in the economic capitals of West Africa. More recently, Mowla (2011) 
has examined the determinants of vulnerable employment in egypt. At the 
policy level, the ILO has proposed a notion of “vulnerable employment” (ILO, 
2009a and 2010) that is included as one of the four indicators of the “decent 
work target” in the Millennium Development Goals (Target 1.7 – see sec-
tion 1.1 above) (on the ILO definition, see further below). The term has also 
become increasingly prominent in the debates on the Asian region in the wake 
of the global financial crisis, including a series of studies issued by the Asian 
Development Bank (e.g. Édes, 2009; Hurst, Buttle and Sandars, 2010; Huynh 
et al., 2010; ILO and ADB, 2011). Édes (2009), for example, has singled out 
vulnerable employment as a major challenge in the region. 
Defining vulnerable work: Towards a continuum of vulnerability
Research on vulnerability has mirrored the evolution of the precarious work 
literature by progressing from constrained models – centred on a narrow set 
of characteristics – to more expansive typologies that recognize a continuum 
of vulnerability (see, in particular, Bewley and Forth, 2010). Notions of vul-
nerability have always been more expansive than concepts that are grounded 
exclusively in the form of the employment relationship, such as “non-stand-
ard” or “contingent” work (Fudge, 2005; see further section 1.3 above). Most 
notably, models of vulnerable work explicitly recognized the power relations 
inherent in the wage-work bargain. The UK Commission on Vulnerable 
employment definition refers to “precarious work that places people at risk 
of continuing poverty and injustice resulting from an imbalance of power in 
the employer-worker relationship” (TUC, 2008, p. 12);28 Bewley and Forth 
(2010) view adverse treatment as “one possible (although not inevitable) con-
sequence of the power imbalances which may exist within the employment 
relationship” (p. 1); and Fudge has noted that the term has been used by the 
Canadian Supreme Court to emphasize the dependency of the employee 
(Fudge, 2005).29 
yet the early classifications of vulnerable work tended to hinge on a small 
set of discrete job characteristics, centrally wages, union representation, and 
the duration of the employment contract. Hudson (2006), for example, iden-
tified the vulnerable as those earning below one-third of median hourly wages 
who do not have their terms and conditions negotiated by a trade union. Poll-
ert has used a similar definition (ibid.).30 The ILO definition contrasts with 
these models, since it was designed to capture vulnerability in lower-income 
settings (ILO, 2009a). yet, it is also fairly narrow as it relies on employ- 
ment statuses drawn from the International Classification by Status in Employ-
ment (ICSe)31 to define vulnerable workers as (1) own-account workers32 
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Limited access  
to benefits
• Health care
• Sick leave
• Vacation pay
• Pension coverage
• Access to training
• Representation/ 
voice
Social location
• Age
• Gender
• Financial circumstances
• Skill level
• Immigration status
• Ability
• Ethnicity
Social context
• Sector
• Labour market
• Product market
• Firm size
Legal protection
• Exclusion
• Low awareness
• Limited access  
to redress mechanisms
• Unlikely to complain
Working conditions
• Insufficient hours
•Low/unpredictable wages
• Deductions/unpaid work
• Abuse/discrimination
• Control over working 
conditions
Contractual status
• Part-time
• Self-employment
• Temporary contracts
(fixed-term, casual, etc.)
• No written contract
• Subcontracted
Vulnerable
work
and (2) contributing family workers33 (see e.g. ILO, 2009a and 2010).34 The 
ILO model has been influential on the work of a range of international agen-
cies. Research produced by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), for example, 
adopted the ILO’s definition to reveal a shift to vulnerable employment in 
developing Asia in the wake of the global economic crisis (Huynh et al., 
2010; see also ADB, 2013).
These earlier concepts of vulnerability have the merit of being relatively 
easy to operationalize for measurement, and have been used in efforts to esti-
mate the size of the vulnerable workforce. The findings suggest that a fairly 
substantial segment of the global workforce is in a position of vulnerability. In 
Sources: Saunders (2003); TUC (2008); Hudson (2006); Weil (2009); Bewley and Forth (2010);  
Law Commission of Ontario (2012).
Figure 1.6 Dimensions of vulnerability
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the United Kingdom, the Policy Studies Institute (PSI) estimated 7.4 million 
people, or one-third of all employees to be encompassed by Pollert’s defini-
tion of vulnerable work, and one-fifth of employees (5.3 million) by its own 
(narrower) definition (Hudson, 2006, p. 7).35 The TUC has produced a lower 
estimate, of around 2 million workers (TUC, 2008, p. 3).36 The ILO has esti-
mated that vulnerable work accounts for half of global employment (50.1 per 
cent), or around 1.53 billion workers (ILO, 2012). 
Conceptions of vulnerable work have since become more elaborate 
(and more complex). The early models were criticized for neglecting crucial 
dimensions of vulnerability (Bewley and Forth, 2010). As Bewley and Forth 
have commented, “[i]t is apparent that vulnerability should be considered a 
continuum, rather than a discrete state and that an individual’s position on 
that continuum is likely to be determined by a wide range of factors, both 
within and outside the workplace” (2010, p. 5). 
In response to such criticisms, more expansive conceptions of vulnerable 
employment have been developed. The more refined of the available models 
are capacious and therefore able to embrace a range of substantive job factors, 
worker characteristics, and dimensions of the broader social context. 
Figure 1.6 above illustrates a range of dimensions of vulnerability that 
have been identified in the recent research literature.
Dimensions of unacceptability in concepts of vulnerable work
Research and policy elaborations of vulnerable work offer useful insights for 
the investigation of unacceptable work and the factors that generate it. Key 
aspects of vulnerability distinguish it from the other accounts of unaccept- 
ability that are reviewed in this chapter. Notions of vulnerability are particu-
larly revealing in their capacity to encompass social context and social location 
and to capture the complexity of contemporary modes of informalization.
Social location, social context and a predictive model
At the core of the vulnerability literature is a quest to capture the potential 
for poor employment outcomes. Definitions of vulnerable work are tailored 
to this objective. Thus the UK Department of Trade and Industry defines a 
vulnerable worker as “someone working in an environment where the risk of 
being denied employment rights is high and who does not have the capacity or 
means to protect themselves from that abuse” (DTI, 2006, p. 25, italics ours; 
see also Bewley and Forth, 2010, p. 1; TUC, 2008, p. 12). Animated by these 
definitions, the more sophisticated models of vulnerability are instructive for 
the design of research and policy interventions on UFW. These models sug-
gest predictive methodologies for identifying demographic characteristics and 
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labour market locations that are at risk of generating unacceptable forms of 
work. The more refined of the available typologies of vulnerability account 
for both the social location of the worker and the social context of the labour 
relation (see section 1.3 above). Thus Bewley and Forth identify five features 
that “may be expected to make the adverse treatment of employees by their 
employers either more or less likely” (Bewley and Forth, 2010, p. 5):37 (1) the 
external labour market; (2) the external product market; (3) the employer or 
firm; (4) the job; and (5) the employee (ibid.). 
The literature on vulnerability, like the literature on precarious work, 
makes a distinctive contribution by accounting for worker characteristics and 
status. It reveals the vulnerable to be disproportionately located among low-
skilled workers and members of historically disadvantaged groups (including 
women, recent immigrants, ethnic minorities, aboriginal peoples, young work-
ers, and the disabled) (Fudge, 2005; Hurst, Buttle and Sandars, 2010; Law 
Commission of Ontario, 2012). Through statistical analysis of nationally rep-
resentative survey data drawn from the 2008 Fair Treatment at Work Survey 
(FTWS), Bewley and Forth found conventional measurements of vulnerability 
based on job characteristics to be less informative about vulnerability to adverse 
treatment than the characteristics of the worker. Particularly at risk were indi- 
viduals experiencing financial difficulties, younger workers, workers with dis-
abilities, and non-heterosexuals. These factors also feature in the research that 
is emerging from lower-income settings. The Asian Development Bank has 
highlighted that vulnerability in the wake of the global crisis is centred among 
young urban workers, migrants, and informal workers (Édes, 2009). Édes 
also highlights that in Cambodia, workers who lost their jobs in the garment 
industry after the crisis were typically single females in their twenties who sub-
sequently found work in the entertainment industry, risking exploitation and 
abuse. The ADB has also found that women migrant workers across the region 
are disproportionally represented in vulnerable employment (ADB, 2013). In 
egypt, Mowla (2011) has found the primary determinants of vulnerability38 
to include gender and education: female workers and those with low levels 
of education were found to be more likely to be in vulnerable employment. 
Similarly, Sparreboom and de Gier (2008), in their comparative study of Paki-
stan, Namibia, and Brazil, found the determinants of vulnerable employment 
to include gender (female), youth, and low educational attainment.
The vulnerability literature has been criticized, particularly when jux-
taposed with models of precariousness, for overemphasizing such supply-side 
factors among the determinants that impede workers from accessing better 
jobs. In evaluating early incarnations of vulnerability, Fudge (2005) high-
lighted the potential for supply-side bias. Although vulnerability models are 
analytically useful, Fudge cautions about the potential for perverse policy out-
comes (ibid.). As she notes, vulnerability appears to offer a route to a particular 
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genre of policy intervention: those targeted directly (and perhaps exclusively) 
at workers in most need of protection. Definitions of vulnerability weighted 
towards worker demographics, she suggests, have resonance with historical 
reform efforts to protect groups of particularly vulnerable workers, arche-
typically women and children (Fudge, 2005, citing Fudge and Vosko, 2001, 
p. 160). However, these strategies are not self-evidently the most effective for 
preventing or reducing unacceptable work. More sophisticated accounts of 
vulnerability recognize these risks. Thus Rittich has observed that “being or 
becoming a vulnerable worker is not simply a matter of the characteristics 
of the individual worker” (Rittich, 2004, pp. 1–2, quoted in Fudge, 2005, 
p. 164), and the recent report of the Ontario Law Commission stresses that 
“vulnerability” refers “not to the workers themselves but to their circumstances 
in the working environment and other aspects of their lives” (Law Commis-
sion of Ontario, 2012, p. 11). 
Notions of vulnerability also integrate social context by embracing the 
characteristics of the product and labour markets in which a job is located. 
Weil (2009) has investigated the sectoral distribution of workplace vulner- 
ability in the United States, finding it to be concentrated in a small number of 
sectors: retail; food and drinking services; accommodation (hotel and motel); 
agriculture; retail and leisure; and hospitality. Weil argues that the complex 
constellations of firms in these sectors help to shape the dynamics of vulner-
ability. Vulnerability is also attributable to the growing use of arrangements 
that distance the worker from the hirer of his or her labour: subcontract-
ing, temporary employment, self-employment, and third-party management 
(ibid.). Similarly, in the Asian region, Hurst, Buttle and Sandars (2010) have 
found vulnerable workers in value chain sectors to be particularly likely to be 
hired through temporary agencies.
Vulnerability and informality
The more expansive conceptions of vulnerability have potential to capture the 
contemporary dynamics of informal employment as it is evolving in high- and 
low-income countries (see further section 1.5 below). Some of the available 
typologies explicitly adopt narrower definitions of informal work, in particular 
those that equate informality with irregular employment. The UK Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry definition, for example, includes undocumented 
migrant labour (DTI, 2006, pp. 30–31). More expansive models of vulner-
ability capture complex notions of labour market informality through their 
attention to the enforcement or implementation of regulatory frameworks. 
Regulatory determinants of unacceptable work are particularly prom-
inent in the literature on vulnerability. In this regard, vulnerable work has 
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been elaborated to embrace circumstances in which the worker is (1) unaware 
of his or her legal entitlements; (2) unable to enforce those entitlements due, 
for example, to limited access to legal fora; or (3) unlikely to enforce legal en- 
titlements or to complain if rules are violated (e.g. Saunders, 2003; DTI, 2006; 
Weil, 2009). This approach chimes with recent research efforts that reveal 
the significance of enforcement mechanisms to the effective functioning of 
regulatory frameworks (Piore and Schrank, 2008; Pires, 2011; Weil, 2008; 
Howe, Hardy and Cooney, 2013). These models also have the capacity to cap-
ture the modes of informalization dominant in the advanced industrialized 
economies, and in particular the ineffective enforcement of statutory labour 
standards. These observations are reflected in the suggestions on regulatory 
interventions outlined in Chapter 3. 
1.5. Informal work
Defining informal employment
Labour economists and development specialists have linked informal work 
with poverty, low job quality, and insecurity (Kucera and Xenogiani, 2009; 
Chen, 2007). In many countries, particularly those with developing and 
transitional economies, the informal economy has been the main source of 
employment growth (Bacchetta, ernst and Bustamante, 2009). However, how 
to define informal employment has a long and contentious history (Carré and 
Heintz, 2013; Hill, 2010; Routh, 2011; Chen, 2012; Williams and Lansky, 
2013). Not only is the concept of informality treated differently under differ-
ent theories,39 it is used to capture different things, primarily enterprises, jobs, 
or activities (Williams and Lansky, 2013). In part, the different definitions 
were designed to serve different goals. 
The ILO’s original definition was developed in the context of assisting 
national statistical offices to collect data on employment within the informal 
sector (ILO, 2012). The Resolution concerning statistics of employment in 
the informal sector, adopted by the 15th International Conference of Labour 
Statisticians (ICLS) in 1993 (ILO, 1993b), set out guidelines for defining the 
informal sector, and classifying employment within it. It  focused on the type of 
enterprise and its legal status (Williams and Lansky, 2013, p. 356). The scope of 
the Resolution’s conception of the informal sector is captured in Paragraph 5(1):
The informal sector may be broadly characterised as consisting of units engaged 
in the production of goods or services with the primary objective of generating 
employment and incomes to the persons concerned. These units typically oper-
ate at a low level of organization, with little or no division between labour and 
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capital as factors of production and on a small scale. Labour relations – where 
they exist – are based mostly on casual employment, kinship or personal and 
social relations rather than contractual arrangements with formal guarantees.
Paragraph 6 provides a more precise definition:
1. For statistical purposes, the informal sector is regarded as a group of produc-
tion units which … form part of the household sector as household enterprises 
or, equivalently, unincorporated enterprises owned by households…
2. Within the household sector, the informal sector comprises (i) “informal 
own-account enterprises”…; and (ii) the additional component consisting of 
“enterprises of informal employers”…
3. The informal sector is defined irrespective of the kind of workplace where 
the productive activities are carried out, the extent of fixed capital asset used, 
the duration of the operation of the enterprise (perennial, seasonal or casual), 
and its operation as a main or secondary activity of the owner.
This definition is sensitive to establishment size and type. But the prob-
lem with it is that by excluding the formal sector it misses forms of informal 
employment, such as zero hours contracts or bogus self-employment, that are 
not confined to the informal sector (ILO, 2012, p. 20). Nor does it capture 
work within a private household or subsistence activities such as farming and 
fishing (Williams and Lansky, 2013, p. 357).
The International Labour Office (ILO), the International expert Group 
on Informal Sector Statistics, and the global network Women in Informal 
employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIeGO) worked together to 
develop a job-centred approach to informal employment, which they regarded 
as complementing the 1993 definition of employment in the informal sector. In 
2003, the 17th International Conference of Labour Statisticians adopted Guide-
lines concerning a statistical definition of informal employment (ILO, 2003b; see 
Chen, 2012, p. 7; ILO, 2012). The Guidelines offer the following definition: 
3. (1) Informal employment comprises the total number of informal jobs …. 
whether carried out in formal sector enterprises, informal sector enterprises, or 
households, during a given reference period.
(2) … informal employment includes the following types of jobs:
(i)  own-account workers employed in their own informal sector enterprises;
(ii)  employers employed in their own informal sector enterprises;
(iii)  contributing family workers, irrespective of whether they work in formal 
or informal sector enterprises;
(iv)  members of informal producers’ cooperatives;
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(v)  employees holding informal jobs … in formal sector enterprises, informal 
sector enterprises, or as paid domestic workers employed by households;
(vi)  own-account workers engaged the production of goods exclusively for 
own final use by their household…
Under these guidelines, informal employment includes self-employment 
in the informal sector, which is based on the ICLS’s earlier definition of infor-
mal enterprises, plus employees in informal jobs, which are generally defined 
as jobs that lack a core set of legal or social protections, regardless of whether 
those jobs are located in the formal or informal sector. 
Using this measure, the Department of Statistics at the ILO (2012) found 
that in 15 out of 47 medium- and low-income countries, informal employ-
ment represents at least two-thirds of non-agricultural employment. Informal 
employment is particularly widespread in Africa, the Asian regions and Latin 
America and the Caribbean, with a cross-country average of between 40 and 
50 per cent. estimates for Central and South-eastern europe (non-eU) and 
CIS and the Middle east are relatively lower, but still hover between 15 and 
30 per cent. estimates of informal employment in China range between 
46 and 68 per cent (Lee and Kofman, 2012, p. 393), whereas informal employ-
ment is estimated to be as high as 73 per cent in Viet Nam and 86 per cent in 
Cambodia (Arnold and Aung, 2011). Informal employment is also very high 
in India, at over 80 per cent (Kalleberg and Hewison, 2013, p. 281). 
The enterprise- and jobs-centred definitions dominate the literature on 
informality in developing and emerging economies. In developed countries, 
where informal employment typically occurs in the “underground economy”, 
an activity-centred definition has been more common (Williams and Lan-
sky, 2013, p. 357). The activity-oriented definition centres on “unobserved” 
activities and comes from the Handbook on measuring the non-observed 
economy.40 The Handbook’s definition of informal employment is based, in 
turn, on the System of National Accounts 1993 definition of “underground 
production”, which is “all legal production activities that are deliberately con-
cealed from public authorities for the following kinds of reasons: to avoid 
payment of income, value added or other taxes; to avoid payment of social 
security contributions; to avoid having to meet certain legal standards such as 
minimum wages, maximum hours, safety or health standards, etc…” (OeCD 
et al., 2002, p. 139). The chief characteristic of this activity-based conception 
of informal employment is that it is “hidden from or unregistered with the 
authorities for tax, social security and/or labour law purposes” (Williams and 
Lansky, 2013, p. 357). However, if the activity itself is illegal, then it is treated 
as criminal, and not as informal employment. 
Since the International Labour Conference adopted its Resolution con-
cerning decent work and the informal economy in 2002, the ILO has been 
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using the term “informal economy” to refer to “all economic activities by 
workers and economic units that are – in law or in practice – not covered or 
insufficiently covered by formal arrangements” (Williams and Lansky, 2013, 
p. 359). The benefit of this approach is that it captures the wide diversity of 
informal employment across countries of every level of development. 
Unacceptable informal work 
In its “White Report” for the ongoing standard-setting exercise on Transi-
tioning from the informal to the formal economy, the ILO acknowledged that 
workers in the informal economy differ widely in terms of factors such as 
income, employment status, type and size of enterprise, urban/rural location, 
etc. (ILO, 2013e). In part, this heterogeneity can be explained by the various, 
and sometimes incommensurable, approaches to the concept of informality, 
which were reviewed in the preceding discussion. Despite this variety, it is 
possible to identify some features that render certain forms of informal work 
unacceptable. Chen (2012, p. 8) provides a typology, reproduced in table 1.2, 
that breaks down informal work arrangements by type and degree of eco-
nomic risk (job and earnings) and of authority (over the establishment and 
other workers). High levels of risk combined with little authority are likely 
to result in unacceptable work. In its World of Work Report 2014, the ILO 
reported that “[m]ore than half of the developing world’s workers, a total 
of 1.45 billion”, work in vulnerable employment, which is defined as “own 
account or as contributing (unpaid) family workers in a family enterprise” 
(ILO, 2014c, p. 9). These two groups are “are more likely than workers in 
formal wage employment to be trapped in a vicious circle of low-productivity 
employment, poor remuneration and limited ability to invest in their families’ 
Table 1.2 Employment statuses of informal work arrangements
Informal self-employment
•	 employers in informal enterprises
•	 Own-account workers in informal 
enterprises
•	 Contributing family workers (in 
informal and formal enterprises)
•	 Members of informal producers’ 
cooperatives (where these exist)
Informal wage employment*
•	 employees of informal enterprises
•	 Casual or day labourers
•	 Temporary or part-time workers
•	 Paid domestic workers
•	 Contract workers
•	 Unregistered or undeclared workers
•	 Industrial outworkers (also called 
homeworkers)
* Employees hired without social protection contributions by formal or informal enterprises or as paid domestic 
workers by households. Certain types of wage work are more likely than others to be informal. 
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health and education, which, in turn, reduces the likelihood that current and 
subsequent generations will be able to move up the productivity and income 
ladders” (ibid.). 
Women in Informal employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIeGO) 
has begun to develop markers for informal employment, which are designed to 
help identify which forms have a high degree of exposure to economic risk. 
They were developed “to apply to all types of work arrangement in the full range 
of enterprises (small, large, formal/informal)” (Carré and Heintz, 2013, p. 9). 
A provisional list of markers of informal work includes: unemployment insur- 
ance/income replacement (for wage workers, at this point not for the self-em-
ployed); health insurance; pension coverage (with subsidy from employer, from 
the State); rights under employment and labour law (coverage); paid time off 
(e.g. vacation days, sick days, holiday pay); medical leave eligibility (unpaid or 
paid); periodicity of pay (hourly, daily, monthly); and volatility of hours (ibid.). 
By combining these markers with a notion of vulnerability that incorp- 
orates social location and social context, it is possible to identify unaccept-
able forms of informal work. In its discussion of the recent trends in global 
employment trends, the ILO recounted that “women continue to face a higher 
risk of informal employment than men, as they often have less legal and social 
protection. Being young in the labour market also increases the risk of infor-
mality. Finally, self-employed people face much higher risk of informality in 
developing countries, in part because the legal framework is weak in many 
such countries and also due to their engagement in low-productivity activities 
(e.g. street vending)” (ILO, 2014d, p. 24).
In their review of the literature on informal employment in Africa, 
Heintz and Valodia found that in those countries that disaggregate statis-
tics by sex, a larger share of women’s employment was in the informal sector 
(Heintz and Valodia, 2008, p. 8). Moreover, in the majority of sub-Saharan 
African countries most workers in the informal economy earned extremely 
low incomes (ibid., p. 17).
In India, rural workers who migrate to urban areas are overrepresented 
amongst own-account workers, such as street vendors and waste pickers where 
they have no access to labour and social protection (Sankaran, Sinha and 
Madhav, undated). Women, who are often intra- or inter-national migrants 
and who are drawn from groups that are subordinated on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, caste, or language, predominate within domestic work where they 
are profoundly isolated since they are required to live in their employer’s home 
and work excessive hours (Razavi, 2007). 
Child labour tends to predominate in the informal economy. Child 
labour is the subset of children’s work that is injurious, negative, or undesir-
able to children and, as such, constitutes an unacceptable form of work.41 It 
is more extensive in some regions than others. Although the largest absolute 
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number of child labourers is found in Asia and the Pacific, sub-Saharan Africa 
has the highest rate of child labour (ILO, 2013g).42 Agriculture accounts for 
59 per cent of all those in child labour and over 98 million children in absolute 
terms, and it is one of the three most dangerous sectors measured in terms of 
work-related fatalities, non-fatal accidents, and occupational diseases. Child 
labour in agriculture consists primarily of work on smallholder family farms, 
although it also includes livestock production, fishing, and aquaculture. The 
ILO estimates that in 2012, a total of 54 million child labourers were working 
in the services sector, with another 12 million in industry. Domestic work, 
which involves a total of 11.5 million children, is the primary location of 
child labour in the services sector, which also includes primarily informal 
work in hotels and restaurants, in street selling and other forms of commerce, 
in car repair shops, and in transport (ibid., p. 23). Child labour in industry is 
concentrated in informal settings in construction and manufacturing. Child 
labourers are primarily unpaid family workers, a category that accounts for 
more than two-thirds of child labourers (68 per cent). Less than a quarter are 
in paid employment (23 per cent), with only 8 per cent of child labourers in 
self-employment (ibid.). With the exception of domestic work, which takes 
place in private homes and, typically, outside the reach of workplace inspec-
tions, boys outnumber girls in child labour in all sectors.
Informalization and unacceptable forms of work
Informalization is “the process by which employment is increasingly unregu- 
lated and workers are not protected by labour law” (Benjamin, 2011, p. 99). 
Initially observed by Castells and Portes, the link between informalization 
and labour market flexibility was taken up by Guy Standing (1999, p. 585), 
who argued that there has been an “informalization” of employment in devel-
oped countries, such that “a growing proportion of jobs possess what may be 
called informal characteristics, i.e. without regular wages, benefits, employ-
ment protection, and so on”. Later he expanded the concept to include three 
forms of informalization. The first predominates in low-middle income and 
the least developed countries, especially in Latin America and South Asia, and 
“it consists of the movement of petty production activities in the slums, into 
low productivity, low income livelihoods to achieve survival” (Arnold and 
Bongiovi, 2013, pp. 295–296, referring to Standing, 2008). The second type is 
when firms use arrangements that distance, fragment, or fissure employment 
relations by, for example, using subcontractors or bogus self-employed work-
ers who are disguised employees. The third refers to contracting for work in 
ways that “avoid tax and social contributions” in order “to achieve systematic 
evasion of regulatory safeguards” (ibid.). These different forms of informal- 
ization reach across countries with different levels of economic development, 
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although some tend to predominate more in some economies than others. For 
example, the second type has been much more common in advanced econ- 
omies than other two forms (Arnold and Bongiovi, 2013, p. 296).
Across Latin American countries, informalization has led to a growing 
reliance on precarious forms of survival “particularly for the poorest house-
holds but also affecting other sectors. Household survival strategies include 
very unstable links with the labor market, combining, often within short 
time periods, wage labor and self-employment as well as temporary migration 
(domestic and international)” (Benería, 2001, pp. 35–36). Informalization 
has made work in India and in Africa, which have very small formal sectors, 
even more precarious, as growing numbers of workers are not protected by la- 
bour law (Sankaran, 2012; Benjamin, 2011; Maiti, 2013; Heintz and Valodia, 
2008; Chen and Doane, 2008). As well, countries with lower-middle incomes 
or that are the least developed continue to experience the growth of subsist-
ence activities generated by the inability of their economies to absorb the 
unemployed and underemployed (Benería and Floro, 2005; Tsikata, 2011). 
The most unacceptable forms of work are in the informal economy (Mar-
shall, 2013; Freije, 2001; ILO, 2002). Child labour, which is an unacceptable 
form of work, predominates in the informal sector. Moreover, there is also a 
significant overlap between informal employment and forced labour (ILO, 
2013h), which is the focus of the next section. 
1.6. Forced labour
Forced labour as unacceptable work 
The global struggle to eliminate forced labour is fundamental to the protec-
tion of workers from unacceptable forms of work (ILO, 2013j, para. 4). Not 
only are all forms of forced labour unacceptable, the indicators that have been 
developed to identify forced labour can also be used to discern forms of work 
that are unacceptable despite the fact that they might not meet the legal stand-
ard of forced labour. 
The principles embodied in the ILO forced labour Conventions are 
almost universally accepted and endorsed, and they are a key part of the fun-
damental rights of human beings (ILO, 2007).43 In 2014, the International 
Labour Conference adopted a Protocol to the Convention on Forced Labour, 
as well as Recommendation No. 203 on Supplementary Procedures for the 
Suppression of Forced Labour.44 The definition of, and indicators for, forced 
labour provide a great deal of assistance in identifying unacceptable forms 
of work. Not only is work that meets the legal threshold of forced labour 
clearly unacceptable, the approach to forced labour that conceptualizes it 
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as a continuum offers important lessons for how to identify unacceptable 
forms of work.
The Forced Labour Convention overlaps with other international instru-
ments that prohibit exploitative and coercive practices that are considered to 
be violations of international human rights. Slavery was defined in the first 
international instrument on the subject in 1926 as the status or condition of 
a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of own-
ership are exercised.45 Slavery is an extreme form of forced labour, and it was 
of particular concern in 1930, when forced labour was still prevalent in large 
parts of the colonized world (ILO, 2005b, p. 8). The use of forced labour by 
States during the Second World War and its aftermath led to the adoption of 
Convention No. 105, which was aimed at the abolition of compulsory mobil- 
ization and use of labour for economic purposes, as well as at the abolition 
of forced labour as a means of political coercion or punishment in various 
circumstances (ibid.). In the meantime, “the United Nations adopted its Sup-
plementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and 
Institutions and Practices similar to Slavery, which focuses more on structural 
issues such as debt bondage and serfdom, then widely prevalent in developing 
countries, but which many States were determined to eradicate through land, 
tenancy and other social reforms” (ibid.). While some of these “older” forms 
of forced labour persist, some, like bonded labour, which hinge on debt, have 
been adapted to new populations and sectors, and other distinctive forms have 
emerged. Forced labour overlaps with trafficking, which, since 2000, has its 
own international Protocol.46 
Forced labour is defined in Article 2(1) of Convention No. 29 as “all 
work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any 
penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily”. 
This broad definition was recently reaffirmed in the Protocol of 2014 to the 
Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (Article 1(3)). Over the past 80 years, ILO 
supervisory bodies have elaborated the definition in response to the different 
ways in which workers are coerced to work, and in doing so they have pro-
vided guidance on the two key elements of the definition: menace of penalty 
and freedom of choice (ILO, 2007, pp. 19–20). Menace of penalty includes 
penal sanctions, threat of violence and death, the denial of rights and priv-
ileges, denunciation to state officials, nonpayment of wages, enforcement of 
debt, and dismissal.47 Freedom of choice involves both the form and subject 
matter of consent as well as the role of external constraints or indirect coer-
cion (ibid., p. 20). A common misunderstanding is that those in forced labour 
had to be forced to work. When deception or fraud about the conditions or 
nature of the work is present, the initial consent of a person to do the work 
is rendered irrelevant (ibid., p. 20). The crucial question is whether or not the 
worker is free to leave work without repercussions. The Committee of experts 
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has also addressed the specific issue of consent regarding children (ibid., p. 21, 
para. 41).48 The Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182), 
specifically covers forced labour of children aged less than 18. Although forced 
labour takes a wide variety of different forms: 
… it displays many common features: perpetrators prey on vulnerable people 
who are unorganized and unable to defend and protect themselves; the means 
of coercion used may be overt in the form of physical restrictions or violence, 
but are often more subtle, involving deception and threats; and manipulation of 
wages, advance payments and debts for illegal job-related costs is widespread. 
Unclear or disguised employment relationships, particularly in the informal 
economy, represent a particular risk factor. Gaps in national legislation and law 
enforcement, and in coordination between countries, facilitate the crime (ILO, 
2013h, p. 2). 
The Protocol to the Forced Labour Convention explicitly recognizes the 
evolution in the context and forms of forced labour, and it regards trafficking 
as a contemporary form of forced labour.49
In the report Strengthening action to end forced labour, the ILO empha-
sized the link between forced labour and multiple simultaneous violations of 
labour law, identifying, in particular, the importance of the Labour Inspec-
tion Convention, 1947 (No. 81), and the Labour Inspection (Agriculture) 
Convention, 1969 (No. 129); the employment Policy Convention, 1964 
(No. 122); the Private employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181); 
and the employment Relationship Recommendation, 2006 (No. 198) (ILO, 
2013h, pp. 9–10).50 The Protocol and its attendant Recommendation, as well 
as the related reports and discussions, recognize the need to mobilize labour 
market institutions in order to fight forced labour.
Forced labour indicators and a continuum of forced labour 
The ILO has provided greater precision in the application of the concept of 
forced labour by developing indicators for forced labour and treating it as 
a spectrum of activities ranging from more or less coercive and exploitive.51 
The ILO’s 2009 report The cost of coercion identified a continuum of exploita-
tion “including both what can clearly be identified as forced labour and other 
forms of labour exploitation and abuse” (ILO, 2009b, pp. 8–9). It suggested 
the utility of considering slavery and slavery-like practices as one end of the 
spectrum and situations of freely chosen employment at the other end, with 
“a variety of employment relationships in which the element of free choice by 
the worker begins at least to be mitigated or constrained, and can eventually 
be cast into doubt” in between (ibid., p. 9). 
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The continuum approach to exploitation for identifying forced labour 
was also adopted in a report commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Founda-
tion into forced labour. Klara Skrivankova (2010, p. 19) argued that: 
… the continuum of exploitation captures not only the complex combination 
of situations that exist between decent work and forced labour (an environment 
that permits the existence of sub-standard working conditions), but also an indi-
vidual work situation, as it evolves over time. The continuum of exploitation aids 
understanding of the persistent problem of the changing reality of work, cap-
tures various forms of exploitation up to forced labour and assists in identifying 
ways of addressing it.
An advantage of the continuum approach is that it appreciates the 
extent to which individual work profiles and labour markets are not static, 
but dynamic. Another benefit is that it is compatible with drawing distinc-
tions regarding degrees of unacceptability, and it can be used to evaluate work 
across a range of different political economies. 
Coercion, control, and deception are the distinguishing features of 
forced labour. Coercion and control refer to specific employer practices, such 
as restrictions on freedom of movement, violence, retention of identity docu-
ments, threats and intimidation, and the manipulation of debt. These forms of 
coercion can also be involved in the recruitment process, which is often organ-
ized by recruitment agencies or labour brokers. Deception over the nature and 
terms of the job and fraudulent documentation are most likely to pertain to 
the process of recruitment, and here migrants (both inter- and intra-national) 
are especially vulnerable to forced labour. However, deception can also arise 
at the place of employment when contracts are substituted, wages are not paid, 
or fraudulent deductions are made. Coercion and deception in the context of 
forced labour ranges along a continuum from chattel slavery through debt 
bondage and excessive working hours in an employer’s private home with no 
time off for leisure, privacy, or wages to recruitment practices in which iden-
tity papers and wages are withheld. 
Vulnerability to forced labour
Notions of vulnerability that embrace characteristics of the product and 
labour markets in which work is situated assist in identifying the groups of 
workers who find themselves in forced labour and the sectors in which forced 
labour prevails. In the Preamble to the 2014 Protocol to the Forced Labour 
Convention, the International Labour Conference recognized that the num-
ber of workers who are in forced or compulsory labour in the private economy 
has increased, “that certain sectors of the economy are particularly vulnerable, 
Unacceptable forms of work
40
and that certain groups of workers have a higher risk of becoming victims 
of forced or compulsory labour”. Although anyone can be a victim of forced 
labour, members of the most vulnerable groups (such as children, migrant 
workers, domestic workers, agricultural workers, workers in informal employ-
ment, and members of indigenous communities) are the worst affected (ILO, 
2013h). There are a number of factors that increase vulnerability to forced 
labour, including “discrimination and social exclusion, the lack or loss of 
assets (including land) and of local jobs or alternative livelihoods, and inad-
equate skills or access to formal credit and social protection systems, which 
may be related to gender or indigenous status” (ibid., p. 26).
Several ILO standards explicitly prohibit forced labour or related prac-
tices among specific categories of vulnerable workers. These include: 
•	 The Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 
(No. 143), which calls for measures to suppress clandestine move-
ments of migrants in abusive conditions (Article 3) and provides that 
one of the purposes of those measures is to enable the prosecution of 
labour trafficking (Article 5); 
•	 The Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), 
which prohibits the exaction of compulsory personal services (Art- 
icle 11) and requires ratifying States to ensure that indigenous peoples 
are not subjected to coercive recruitment systems, including bonded 
labour and other forms of debt servitude (Article 20(3)(c)); 
•	 The Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182), which 
prohibits “all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the 
sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced 
or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment 
of children for use in armed conflict” (Article 3(a)) as worst forms of 
child labour against which Members have to take immediate and 
effective measures to secure their prohibition and elimination; and
•	 The Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), which, in rela-
tion to domestic workers, calls for measures to respect, promote, and 
realize the fundamental principles and rights at work, including the 
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour (Article 3(2)) 
(ibid., p. 9).
Migration, both within a country and across national borders, has ex- 
acerbated vulnerability to forced labour: “Almost half of all victims end up in 
forced labour following movement within their country (15 per cent) or across 
international borders (29 per cent)” (ILO, 2013i, pp. 2–3). Several factors, 
either individually or combined, that make migrants vulnerable to forced 
labour include: dependency on recruiters for information and access to migra-
tion channels; immigration status and ability to obtain lawful residence; and 
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physical as well as psychological isolation (Anderson and Rogaly, 2005, p. 43; 
ILO, 2013i). 
Vulnerability to forced labour increases when workers, such as domestic 
workers, are subject to multiple forms of dependency on employers (includ-
ing for housing, food, and work permits). Specific factors affecting children 
include the practice of sending them to live with relatives in urban centres, 
the lack of local schools, and low educational expectations for girls. The ma- 
nipulation of credit and debt, either by employers or recruiting agents, is a 
key factor in entrapping vulnerable workers in forced labour situations (ILO, 
2009b, para. 40). 
Forced labour is particularly widespread in domestic work, agriculture 
and horticulture, construction, garments and textiles under sweatshop condi-
tions, catering and restaurants, entertainment, and the sex industry – industries 
that lend themselves to abusive recruitment and employment practices (ILO, 
2005b, para. 250). It is also associated with certain business models and prac-
tices in these sectors (Allain et al., 2013). Long and complex supply chains 
involving multiple subcontractors or spanning several locations or countries 
present challenges to enforcing labour law and thus provide a fertile ground 
for forced labour to take root. Business practices that “include: excessive pres-
sure on employers to cut costs, especially in labour-intensive industries, or 
unrealistic production deadlines or targets imposed by buyers; …” contribute 
to forced labour (ILO, 2013h, p. 26).
Forced labour is an unacceptable form of work; it undermines a person’s 
human dignity and violates fundamental human rights. The forced labour 
indicators can be used to identify the kinds of conditions and features that 
make work unacceptable, and the continuum approach appreciates the range 
of different types of forced labour that persist and UFW on the margins of 
forced labour. effective enforcement of key labour standards and the mobil- 
ization of key labour market actors, such as labour inspectorates, employ-
ers’ and workers’ organizations, would help to eradicate forced labour (ibid., 
pp. 29–32). The connection between enforcing crucial labour law standards 
and eliminating forced labour will be taken up in the next chapter.
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the most significant academic and policy discourses 
pertaining to the quality of jobs in order to identify unacceptable forms of 
work, which deny fundamental principles and rights at work, put at risk 
the lives, health, freedom, human dignity and security of workers or keep 
households in conditions of poverty (ILO, 2013a, para. 49). Beginning with 
a discussion of discourses that create an imagery of decent and good jobs, 
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the focus of the chapter then shifted to discourses that identified features 
and dimensions of work that make it unacceptable. While some of the dis-
courses that can be used to identify deleterious aspects of work tend to be 
taken up in countries with specific levels of development and by different 
organizations (for example, precarious work is more frequently used to refer to 
work in advanced economies whereas informal work has broader application 
in low- and middle-income countries), the common features that make work 
unacceptable across countries with widely diverging levels of economic devel-
opment have been emphasized. The chapter has also identified where, and the 
extent to which, the different discourses that pertain to unacceptable forms of 
work overlap. Thus, this analysis provides a robust and comprehensive review 
of the conditions and features that make work unacceptable, and furnishes the 
basis of the multidimensional model of UFW developed in Chapter 2.
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Towards a multidimensional 
model of UFW: The substantive 
dimensions of unacceptability
Introduction
Chapter 1 of this study investigated the academic and policy literatures that – 
according to diverging criteria – identify and categorize central dimensions of 
working life as either desirable or unacceptable. These discourses were exam-
ined with the specific aim of identifying their conceptions of unacceptability. 
Chapters 2 and 3 draw on these typologies, with significant adjustments, to 
generate a novel model of unacceptable forms of work (UFW). 
The central feature of this model, outlined in detail in the following 
sections and in Chapter 3, is that it presents UFW as a multidimensional con-
cept. The model is therefore designed to capture the multifaceted nature – and 
the complexity – of unacceptability in contemporary working life. 
Unacceptable forms of work are configured along two axes (figure 2.1). The 
first comprises the substantive dimensions that make work unacceptable, which 
are the subject of this chapter. The second refers to a spectrum of unacceptability 
encompassing the set and magnitude of risks to which a worker is exposed, as 
well as violations of a worker’s human rights, and is examined in Chapter 3.
This multidimensional framework of UFW is meant to provide a common 
system of coordinates, similar to latitude, longitude, and elevation in phys- 
ical geography, which can be used to map the extent, depth, and contours 
of UFW across a wide variety of terrain. In effect, it is a diagnostic tool for 
evaluating whether or not a particular form of work is unacceptable. It can 
also be used to discern patterns and practices that are common to UFW, such 
as the groups of people involved in it or markets in which it is found, as dis-
cussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
This framework is also meant to be flexible enough to take into account 
the contingent nature of unacceptability. What is perceived as unacceptable 
2
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work can vary according to socio-economic and cultural context, although 
it is important to recognize a core of basic and universal human rights, such 
as the prohibitions against forced labour, discrimination, child labour, and 
denial of freedom of association, for all working people. Moreover, the inci-
dence and magnitude of unacceptable work differ from country to country, 
and often depend upon the level of economic development, the political gov-
ernance structures, and the health of civil society, as well as specific labour 
market institutions and social actors, especially the social partners. In light of 
this complexity, it is crucial to activate local knowledge and involve key labour 
market actors in mapping both the incidence and magnitude of unacceptable 
forms of work.
With regard to the substantive dimensions of unacceptability, the multi-
dimensional model of UFW diverges from the typologies assessed in Chapter 1 
in that it is explicitly designed to be globally applicable. The model is intended 
to be used in research and policy interventions in countries at a range of levels 
of development. To this end, it identifies a set of dimensions of unacceptability 
and related indicators. These dimensions and indicators are intended for use 
by local policy actors to identify UFW in the local context. 
The model is also a normative model, in that it can readily be mapped to 
existing regulatory schema, including the international labour standards (ILS). 
It includes both participatory and protective standards (Sengenberger, 1991). 
This facet of the model harks back to section 1.1, in which the implications 
decent 
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UFW
Substantive	dimension(s)
Magnitude		
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Figure 2.1 The dimensions of UFW
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of decent work as a normative model tied to the ILS were elaborated. Finally, 
the assumption that underpins this model is that the purpose of identifying 
UFW is to devise targeted social and economic policies that aim to eliminate, 
replace, or improve jobs that are entirely unacceptable. The aim is therefore 
to construct a robust conception of UFW that can be operationalized for 
research and for policy intervention.
2.1.  The substantive dimensions of UFW
The model of UFW outlined in this chapter contains 12 dimensions of un- 
acceptability. These dimensions have been selected from the academic and pol- 
icy discourses that were reviewed in Chapter 1, with significant refinements, 
to develop a globally applicable depiction of unacceptable work.52 The out-
come is the model of UFW in figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2 The substantive dimensions of UFW
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The 12 dimensions of UFW elaborate and expand upon on the models 
examined in Chapter 1. In this regard, the multidimensional model reflects the 
evolution of a number of these discourses (notably on precariousness, vulner-
ability, and informality), from a relatively narrow focus – centred on a limited 
range of characteristics – to more expansive typologies that recognize con- 
tinuums of unacceptability (see in particular section 1.6). These dimensions of 
UFW, further, construct a broader model than the earlier conceptions of UFW 
that are focused exclusively at the level of the job. The model captures the range 
of dimensions of working life, including the nexus of work and family, social 
protection, collective and individual aspects, job content, and the degree of 
legal protection afforded to workers to identify and enforce their entitlements. 
It also encompasses the four fundamental principles and rights at work. 
The various typologies of precariousness inform the Security dimension 
(D4 below) by encompassing, e.g., casualized forms of work. The multidimen- 
sional model, however, does not assume any contractual or temporal form 
of employment inevitably to generate precarious outcomes (the exception is 
day labour in Dimension 4 (D4)). It therefore recognizes that not all forms 
of employment that deviate from the standard employment relationship are 
unacceptable (see further section 1.2). The model also captures precariousness 
that is encased in a standard-form job. A similar observation can be made 
about the treatment of “informal work”, which is not assumed in this model of 
UFW to be inevitably or uniformly deleterious. In consequence, informality 
is not identified as a distinct dimension, to recognize that informalization is 
a dynamic process, rather than a static outcome (see further section 1.5). This 
approach recognizes that informal work can be a valid source of growth, and 
acknowledges that sophisticated formalization strategies can recognize and 
embrace the positive aspects of at least certain forms of informal work. Recent 
efforts to regulate domestic work, for example, recognize that it is both fre-
quently informal work, in at least some dimensions, and a highly significant 
source of female employment. These efforts also recognize the capacity for 
flexibility in the working hours of domestic workers that have the potential to 
accommodate their caring responsibilities. Specific legal frameworks are being 
devised, then, that aim to support compatible flexibilities for domestic workers 
and their employers (see further McCann and Murray, 2014; see also Fenwick 
et al., 2007). 
Certain elements of the multidimensional model are found across the 
pre-existing discourses of unacceptability. Regulatory protection (D10), for 
example, is emphasized in both the precariousness and vulnerability litera- 
tures. elements of Work organization (D12) are found most prominently 
in the good jobs/bad jobs and flexibility literatures. Certain elements of the 
multidimensional model, in contrast, are neglected in the existing typologies. 
The prominence of social dialogue in the decent work literature, for example, 
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is recognized in the inclusion of the collective dimensions of UFW in Rep-
resentation and voice mechanisms (D6). 
A number of aspects of the model are worth highlighting. First, it is 
centred on outcomes, rather than processes. As an illustration, the Health and 
safety dimension (D2) captures work that presents a risk to well-being, rather 
than the absence of risk assessment mechanisms. The dimensions are also 
elaborated irrespective of organizational or institutional origins. In certain 
settings, for example, health care (D8) is a contractual entitlement of employ-
ment, while in others it is a universal state entitlement. More broadly, no 
particular institutional arrangements are assumed to generate UFW (except 
for the absence of effective enforcement and implementation of legal stand-
ards, in Legal protection (D10)). 
2.2.  An indicators-based model of UFW
each dimension of UFW is categorized into a set of indicators, indicated in 
the typology below. 
These indicators are intended to be taken into account by researchers 
and policy-makers in constructing models of UFW that are suited to distinct 
regional, national, sectoral or occupational contexts. This model also accom-
modates the inclusion of additional indicators. This elaboration of UFW is 
therefore designed to be applied to countries at all levels of development. 
Some of the indicators are absolute (or fundamental), while others are sup-
plementary. Broadly, they tend towards a preference for objective elaborations 
of unacceptability (the exceptions are psychological risks (D2) and intense men-
tal demands (D12) – see further the discussion of job quality in section 1.2). 
Two features of the UFW indicators are worth highlighting:
 A dynamic model: The fundamental and supplementary indicators
It has already been noted that the multidimensional model of UFW is designed 
for policy-makers and researchers to elaborate typologies of UFW tailored 
to the relevant socio-economic context. Certain indicators, however, are des-
ignated as fundamental. These indicators identify work that is unacceptable 
and, therefore, they are an essential feature of all models of UFW. These indi-
cators are starred in the following typology (*). Notably, these include the 
fundamental principles and rights at work.
The fundamental indicators should therefore feature in all national and 
sectoral typologies of UFW, and they often indicate where the most urgent 
policy interventions are required. Other indicators are assumed to be con-
text-specific, and linked to levels of development. Models of UFW tailored 
Unacceptable forms of work
48
to the advanced industrialized countries, for example, would be expected to 
include all of the indicators. UFW is therefore a contextual model. It is also 
dynamic. The inclusion of fundamental and supplementary indicators pre-
sents a path for national policy actors incrementally to refine their economic 
and labour strategies towards the phased elimination of UFW.
UFW as a normative model
These dimensions of UFW are generated in part by the notion of decent work. 
In consequence, most dimensions can be linked to related international labour 
standards (ILS). The 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globaliza-
tion clarified that the realm of decent work is subject to boundaries set by the 
ILS. In this analysis, then, UFW are working relations that exist beyond the 
normative floor of the international standards (see section 1.1). For this rea-
son, where ILO Conventions relate to the dimensions of UFW they are cited 
in the typology below.53 
It should be noted, however, that the multidimensional model does not 
exclusively parallel the ILS. UFW, in this iteration, is a more elaborate con-
cept. The multidimensional model is applicable to countries in which the 
relevant ILO standards have not been ratified. It is also applicable to regula-
tory levels below those on which the ILS commonly operate: at the levels of 
sector, industry, and employer. 
The model of UFW elaborated in this chapter also responds to certain 
gaps in the body of the international standards. Most significantly for the 
identification of UFW in contemporary labour markets, the ILS do not at 
present provide a comprehensive framework for conceptualizing and address-
ing “non-standard” forms of employment, in particular, profoundly casualized 
forms of work, and informal work. The indicators respond to these limitations 
(see, e.g. “insufficient hours to satisfy basic needs” (D5)). More broadly, the 
indicators do not assume the worker to be an employee (although some of 
the indicators are suited to conventional definitions of wage work). Thus the 
indicators on income extend beyond wage earners to payments that take a 
different form (D2). This approach responds to the functional dimension of 
decent work (see section 1.1) by extending the ambit of the multidimensional 
model beyond both the conventional employment relationship and the formal 
labour market. As the ILO has observed:
In developing effective strategies, a number of international labour stand-
ards should provide the reference point and a benchmark for comprehensively 
addressing unacceptable forms of work. In addition to the eight fundamental 
and four governance Conventions, relevant up-to-date international labour 
standards concerning social security, occupational safety and health, wages, 
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working time and the employment relationship are among the most relevant. 
These standards and others should guide national action on measures to be taken 
to address unacceptable forms of work including through the promotion of their 
ratification and effective implementation (ILO, 2014b, p. 6).
It should be noted that this typology – and the distinction between the 
fundamental and supplementary indicators – is not intended to reclassify the 
international standards according to a novel hierarchy. The intention is rather 
to sequence policy and regulatory engagements with the demands of each 
standard. 
Dimensions of UFW
Dimension 1 Forced labour
* Worker subject to forced labour (including slavery, debt bondage, trafficking 
in persons, forced prostitution, forced overtime, etc.).54 
Dimension 2 Health and safety
*Risk to health and well-being (physical and mental).55
Dimension 3 Income
*Inadequate payment (too low to satisfy basic needs);56
* Insecure payments (e.g. wage arrears, irregular payments, unjustified deduc-
tions, performance of unpaid work, illegitimate/excessive recruitment fees, 
etc.).57
Dimension 4 Security
*Day labour (casual contracts, zero hours contracts, etc.);
Insecure employment (no certainty of continuing employment, termination is 
possible without a valid reason58 or without procedural59 or other60 protections);
No prospects for promotion; 
No opportunities for skills development or training.61 
Dimension 5 Working time
*excessive weekly hours;62
*Weekly rest of less than 24 hours;63
*Insufficient daily rest/family/community time;64
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*Forced overtime;65
*Insufficient hours (too few to satisfy basic needs);
* Unprotected night work (no health assessments, no capacity to transfer in 
essential circumstances, no additional compensation, etc.);66
*Paid annual vacation of less than three working weeks;67
Unpredictable schedules;68
Lack of influence over working hours (including the flexibility to deal with 
family and community obligations;69
Insufficient rest breaks during the working day.70
Dimension  Representation and voice mechanisms
* The right to freedom of association, the right to organize and the right to col-
lective bargaining are not respected;71
Lack of consultation, denial of participation, or failure to provide voice 
mechanisms.72
Dimension 7 Child labour
*Child labour.73
Dimension 8 Social protection (health care, pension 
coverage, paid sick leave, unemployment insurance, etc.)
*Social protection inadequate to satisfy basic needs.74
Dimension 9 Equality, human rights and dignity (irrespective 
of gender, ethnicity, race, nationality, caste, family status, 
age, disability, religion, sexual orientation, indigenous identity, 
HIV-status, trade union affiliation and activities, political 
opinion, contractual status/working arrangements, etc.)
* Discrimination in working life (including access to education and vocational 
training);75
*Unequal pay for work of equal value;76
*Abuse, violence and harassment;77
* Lack of respect for human rights,78 including the lack of respect for privacy 
(e.g. restrictions on transfer of earnings, privacy violated in employer-provided 
housing, confiscation of possessions, etc.);79 
Lack of respect for national, ethnic and social identities and cultures.80
Towards a multidimensional model of UFW
51
Dimension 10 Legal protection
*exclusion from legal protections;81
* Inadequate implementation/enforcement of legal protections (ineffective 
inspection systems, unspecified allocation of responsibilities in multilateral 
relationships, etc.);82 
* Inadequate regulation of the recruitment or placement of workers by employ-
ment agencies, labour providers, etc.;83
Lack of information on legal rights;84
No express contract.
Dimension 11 Family and community life
*No entitlement to paid maternity leave of at least 14 weeks;85
*No maternity protection;86
No parental leave;87
Work inhibits family or community life (e.g. engagements terminated be- 
cause a worker has family responsibilities,88 no flexibility to deal with family 
or community obligations89).
Dimension 12 Work organization
Lack of control over the work process (task, decision, timing, method, etc.);
excessive workload;
Intense physical and mental demands.
This indicators-based model, then, elaborates in detail the range of out-
comes to be tackled by policy-makers in the design and testing of regulatory 
interventions on UFW. As mentioned earlier, the classification of these indi-
cators as either fundamental or supplementary offers a dynamic model, which 
prompts policy-makers to sequence economic and labour strategies towards 
the phased elimination of UFW. In D10, for example, institutional deficien-
cies – legislative exclusions and flaws in implementation and enforcement 
mechanisms – are expected to be remedied before information deficits are 
tackled (lack of information on legal rights, absence of express contracts). Simi- 
larly, under D11, the expectation is that the most urgent protections on the 
birth of a child (maternity leave and protection) will be introduced prior to the 
entitlements that underpin broader elements of family and community life. 
This programmatic approach is further developed in the following chapter at 
the level of regulatory design and implementation. 
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Conclusion
This chapter has built on the study’s earlier analysis of the relevance of contem-
porary policy and regulatory discourses to UFW. Drawing on the most useful 
of the concepts and typologies highlighted in Chapter 1, it has proposed a 
“multidimensional model” of UFW and outlined its substantive dimensions. 
The central feature of this model is that it presents UFW as a multifaceted 
concept. Only such a model, it is suggested, is capable of capturing the diver-
sity and complexity of UFW as they emerge in different settings and of being 
applicable to countries at a range of levels of development. The chapter has 
identified 12 dimensions under which unacceptability can emerge: forced 
labour; health and safety; income; security; working time; representation and 
voice mechanisms; child labour; social protection; equality, human rights and 
dignity; legal protection; family and community life; and work organization. 
These dimensions are designed to capture the range of facets of working life: 
the collective and individual; the intersection of paid work and family life; 
the content and quality of a job; and the legal protection available to a worker 
whose rights have been infringed, etc. 
each of the 12 dimensions is captured in a set of indicators of un- 
acceptability, which are designated as either fundamental or supplementary. 
This classification renders the multidimensional model flexible and with the 
capacity to be adjusted to be relevant to a range of countries and sub-national 
settings. The fundamental indicators (e.g. coercion, risks to safety, health, and 
well-being, inadequate or insecure payments) denote unacceptability in all 
settings. They can therefore be taken to indicate where the most urgent policy 
interventions are required. The supplementary indicators are context-specific 
and expected to be contingent on levels of development. The multidimen-
sional model of UFW is therefore contextual and dynamic. The inclusion of 
fundamental and supplementary indicators presents a path for national policy 
actors incrementally to refine their economic and labour strategies towards the 
phased elimination of UFW. The chapter has also highlighted that the multi-
dimensional model is a normative concept that can, in many of its elements, 
be mapped to existing regulatory schema including the ILS. Regulatory 
standards and strategies are therefore available to be adopted and refined by 
policy actors at local level. The final chapter of this study further elaborates 
the dimensions of this model and considers the strategies of regulatory design 
and implementation that can curb or eliminate UFW.
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Tackling unacceptable forms 
of work: The spectrum of 
unacceptability and strategic 
regulation
Introduction 
This chapter develops a programmatic approach to answering the question of 
how to tackle UFW. Across this study, this task has been broken into three 
lines of inquiry. The first involved surveying the relevant academic and policy 
literature in order to identify the specific kinds of conditions, practices, 
and arrangements that make work unacceptable, which was the focus of 
Chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 2 identified the set of substantive dimensions of 
unacceptability. yet the incidence, form and magnitude of UFW differ from 
country to country, and depend upon factors such as the level of economic 
development, regulatory and institutional frameworks, and the presence and 
strategies of social actors. Chapter 2 explained that the indicators are intended 
to be used in the construction of models of UFW that are suited to local 
settings. This chapter explains how the multidimensional model can be used to 
identify UFW across a range of work arrangements and social and economic 
contexts. It identifies criteria for the second enquiry, to determine which forms 
of UFW are the priority for regulatory intervention in a particular context. 
This predictive model is discussed in section 3.1.
The third line of enquiry concerns regulatory design and implementation, 
which is part of broader debates about the modes of regulation best suited to 
contemporary labour markets. The goal is to design and implement regulatory 
interventions that are integrated and dynamic, and that will have the broadest 
and most sustainable effect. The broader literature about designing effec-
tive labour regulation is relevant to developing a programmatic approach to 
3
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tackling UFW (Lee and McCann, 2011; McCann et al., 2014; Marshall and 
Deakin, 2010; Deakin, 2011). The argument that labour law in general hin- 
ders economic growth is not well founded; labour laws can play an import- 
ant development role by, among other things, providing insurance against 
labour market risks, assisting market access, and overcoming information 
asymmetries and collective action problems (Deakin, 2011). Section 3.2 out-
lines a comprehensive framework for development-friendly labour law reform 
devised by Marshall and Deakin, and emphasizes how it can be adapted to 
focus on UFW. This discussion serves as a bridge to section 3.3, which out-
lines the components of a strategic approach to eliminating UFW. Section 3.4 
provides some examples of dynamic, integrated, and strategic approaches to 
combating UFW.
3.1.  Social location and social context: A predictive model
Chapter 2 outlined that UFW are configured along two axes. The first is 
the dimensions that make work unacceptable. The second axis comprises a 
spectrum of unacceptability, which encompasses the set and magnitude of 
risks to which a worker is exposed as well as violations of a worker’s human 
rights. The multidimensional model of UFW introduced in the previous 
chapter captures both axes and was represented in figure 2.1 (see Chapter 2, 
Introduction). 
The multidimensional model has already been explained to be a diag-
nostic tool that can be used to evaluate whether or not a particular form of 
work is unacceptable and to discern patterns and practices that are common 
to UFW. For instance, as discussed in Chapter 1, people who are members 
of groups that are differentiated along status markers such as sex and caste or 
migration status are more likely to be found in unacceptable forms of work, 
and certain types of work – such as forced labour and informal work – are 
more likely to be unacceptable. Moreover, some markets are structured in 
ways that increase the vulnerability of workers to poor outcomes and labour 
market risks (Weil, 2014); for example, transnational value chains involving 
goods and people can be used to shift risks down the chain and on to workers 
(Anner, Bair and Blasi, 2013). De facto and de jure exclusion from labour 
and social protection also contributes to making certain forms of work, such 
as domestic work, unacceptable (Mantouvalou, 2012; Mullally and Mur-
phy, 2014). Multiple labour law violations are correlated with forced labour 
(ILO, 2013h, p. 57). 
It was also noted in Chapter 2 that the incidence and magnitude of 
unacceptable work differs from country to country, and depends upon fac-
tors such as the level of economic development, governance structures, etc. 
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The presence of UFW also depends on the social actors, especially the social 
partners. It is therefore essential to involve labour market actors in mapping 
the incidence and also the magnitude of UFW.90 It is perhaps even more 
important to mobilize local actors in order to eradicate unacceptable forms 
of work.
The multidimensional model of UFW developed in Chapter 2 is atten-
tive to the identities of working populations, to labour markets, and to the 
ways in which they interact to produce UFW. It draws upon the concep-
tions of precarious and informal work, forced labour, and vulnerable working 
populations to develop predictive methodologies that identify demographic 
characteristics and labour market locations that are at risk of generating un- 
acceptable forms of work (see section 1.4). It focuses on “the specific vulner- 
abilities and unfreedoms ... that form part of the socio-economic background 
to the structure of labour markets” and that make some forms of work un- 
acceptable (Marshall and Deakin, 2010, p. 15). 
The typology outlined in table 3.1 is intended to capture both elements. 
As with the substantive dimensions outlined in section 2.1, these categories 
are intended to be indicative and to vary according to local circumstances.
Table 3.1 Dimensions of social location and social context
Social location: The interaction of 
social relations (e.g. gender, ethnicity, 
social class) and legal and political 
categories (e.g. citizenship) that shape 
the likelihood of workers to be involved 
in UFW
•	 Gender
•	 ethnicity
•	 National origin
•	 Citizenship and immigration status
•	 Social class
•	 Age
•	 Sexual orientation
•	 Family status
•	 Care obligations
•	 Ability
•	 Religion
•	 Caste
•	 Linguistic group
Social context: The labour market and 
social welfare institutions and features 
of the political economy that determine 
whether work is precarious and the 
forms that precarious work takes
•	 Sector
•	 Occupation
•	 Industry
•	 Labour market
•	 Product market
•	 Firm size
•	 Contractual form (e.g. temporary, 
part-time)
•	 Labour market institutions  
(e.g. regulatory regime, union density)
•	 Social welfare institutions  
(e.g. social spending)
•	 Geographical region
•	 Levels of atypical employment
•	 Levels of informality
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The operational implications of this model are depicted in figure 3.1. 
Moreover, as we discuss in the next section, a range – if not an unlimitedly 
diverse range – of institutional arrangements can be used to address UFW. 
Figure 3.1 Operational implications of UFW
Social	
location	
and	social	
context
Institutions		
and	practices Outcomes
3.2.  Designing effective labour regulation:  
Development-friendly legal reform
In a recent review of issues that impact upon the design of labour market 
regulation in poor countries, Marshall and Deakin (2010) emphasized that 
“proposals for law reform and institutional redesign should be compatible with 
local regulatory styles, as well as being politically viable” (p. 20). Marshall and 
Deakin’s (2010) framework for development-friendly labour law reform can 
be adapted for UFW. 
Marshall and Deakin developed a comprehensive list of factors to con-
sider as a starting point for labour law and policy, which is provided below in 
table 3.2. The general factors, which comprise the top half of the list, reflect 
the significance of considering path dependency, the institutional mix, and 
roles and resources of labour market actors in designing effective labour regu- 
lation. They also draw attention to the need to consider the interaction of 
contiguous and overlapping policy domains such as labour, social, and tax in 
order to develop an integrated, systemic, and coherent policy approach (see 
also Jütting and de Laiglesia, 2009, p. 150). 
The second half of Marshall and Deakin’s (2010) list refers to the specific 
criteria for labour law reform, which correspond to the functions of labour 
market regulation. These criteria overlap to a significant extent with the sub-
stantive dimensions of UFW identified in Chapter 2. economic coordination, 
risk distribution, and empowerment are ways of categorizing some of the 
dimensions that make work unacceptable, such as the separation of control/
profit from responsibility/risk in value chains, the shifting of risks to vulner- 
able workers, and the exclusion of workers from institutional support for voice 
and economic security. 
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Table 3.2  Checklist for developing and reforming development-friendly labour 
market regulation
Generic criteria 
Incentive compatibility 
 Ì Is the law compatible with the economic incentives of private parties? 
 Ì Does the law invite destabilization through, for example, incentives for avoidance or 
evasion of rules, free-riding, or destructive competition? 
Systemic fit
 Ì How far does the law work in conjunction with other regulatory mechanisms pres-
ent in the country in question, including, for example: 
•	 collective bargaining 
•	 diversity and discrimination laws 
•	 occupational regulation 
•	 activities of employers’ associations 
•	 the corporate governance and financial framework 
•	 competition law 
•	 tax law 
Context dependence 
 Ì Is the law compatible with the level of industrialization? 
 Ì Does it match the extent of wage dependency, and the mix of informal and formal 
workers? 
 Ì Does the law take into account the range of different working arrangements in the 
State, including dependent, semi-dependent, triangular and own account, as well as 
periods of unpaid work? 
Inclusivity of governance 
 Ì Does the law encourage participative decision-making, and broader social and civil 
dialogue, in the formulation of rules? 
 Ì Will the design of the law further its take-up, effectiveness and impact? 
Institutional capacity 
 Ì Does the State have the capacity to monitor and enforce the law? 
 Ì Do businesses have the capacity to observe the obligations imposed by this law?
 Ì Do business and employer representative organizations have the capacity to inform 
members about the law and assist with its enforcement? 
 Ì Do labour organizations have the capacity to inform members about the law and 
assist with its enforcement? 
 Ì Is there a place for the involvement of other bodies with an interest in poverty 
alleviation? 
 Ì Are there processes in place which will contribute to building the institutional 
capacity of each of these players? 
 Ì How can the capacity of these parties be improved through the design of institutions? 
 Ì Is there a mechanism for continual review of the effectiveness of rules, which con-
tributes to institutional learning and allows parties to share information about what 
works and what doesn’t? 
 Ì What links are there with international bodies, so that norms set at the inter- 
national level can be implemented at the local level, and complaints can be made 
to international or regional bodies?
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Specific criteria 
Economic coordination 
 Ì Does the law provide for appropriate allocation of decision-making powers within 
and between organizations? 
 Ì Does the law provide mechanisms for the internalization of external costs arising 
from the decisions and activities of individual organizations? 
 Ì Does the law provide a basis upon which coordination problems can be overcome 
in the provision of collective or public goods concerning matters such as training, 
occupational licensing and dispute resolution? 
 Ì Does the law encourage technological upgrading and improvements in job quality? 
Are there any additional incentives for compliance and “going beyond the law”? 
Risk distribution
 Ì Does the law recognize the unequal bargaining power of parties to work relationships? 
 Ì Does the law redistribute risk away from vulnerable parties, or does it compound 
their vulnerability? 
 Ì Does the law distribute risk in such a way that will create incentives to formality 
or, to the contrary, to avoid the law because risks are better dealt with by informal 
means? 
Demand management 
 Ì Does the law contribute to a level of income which will allow workers to meet basic 
household needs and to participate meaningfully in society?
 Ì Is the income level of the workers set by the law at a level which will stimulate local 
demand for goods and services? 
Democratization 
 Ì Does the law provide for the involvement of all workers and employers, either 
directly in workplace governance or through their representatives, in the formu- 
lation of rules governing work relationships? 
Empowerment 
 Ì How far does the law promote access to and participation in stable and well-remu-
nerated work relationships? 
 Ì How far does the law provide for economic security in the event of limits on the 
availability of stable and well-remunerated work?
Source: Marshall and Deakin (2010).
These criteria can be adapted for developing regulation that targets the 
most unacceptable forms of work. Regulation that addresses vulnerability, 
coercion, and deception is especially helpful in the context of combating 
the most unacceptable forms of work. So, too, is regulation that addresses 
breaches of fundamental rights such as hazardous forms of child labour and 
forced labour. The evaluation tool for identifying UFW both complements 
and supplements the more general framework for labour law reform; what it 
does is provide a specific focus on UFW, while at the same time ensuring that 
action targeting UFW is compatible with development.
Spectrum of unacceptability and strategic regulation
59
3.3.  A strategic approach to UFW 
What forms of unacceptable work should be targeted? The dimensions of un- 
acceptability that were outlined in Chapter 2 can be used by local labour 
market actors, including workers, workers’ representatives, employers, and em- 
ployer associations in tandem with regulators and policy-makers as objective 
indicators to determine whether or not work is unacceptable. The indicators 
were divided into those that are fundamental to any understanding of UFW, 
and those that should be tackled, if they are relevant, once the fundamental 
dimensions of unacceptability have been addressed. This distinction between 
fundamental and supplementary indicators reflects the fact that unacceptable 
work is located across a spectrum, and that its incidence varies from country 
to country. Thus, as was explained in Chapter 2, this distinction is designed 
to assist policy-makers in developing a dynamic strategy that allows for the 
sequencing of interventions to address UFW. The margins of what consti- 
tutes UFW, as well as the means available to tackle UFW, vary depending 
upon socio-economic and regulatory contexts, and this variance may compel 
decision-makers to define clear priorities in respect of combating UFW. 
The next step, then, is to adopt criteria to determine which forms of 
unacceptable work are the priority for regulatory intervention in a specific 
context. The dimensions of unacceptability allow for a degree of flexibility 
in the targeting of policy interventions in order for local actors to determine 
their own priorities. It is critical to engage workers and their representatives, 
employers and their organizations, and relevant civil society groups along with 
government officials not only in identifying unacceptable forms of work, but 
also where to target initiatives in light of available resources. Moreover, in 
targeting specific forms of unacceptable work in a local context it is important 
to develop a strategic approach. David Weil (2008) has provided four criteria 
for designing strategic enforcement policies for labour inspectorates. Although 
applicable across the labour market and focused on enforcement, Weil’s cri-
teria can be used to develop a strategic approach for tackling UFW. The four 
criteria are prioritization, deterrence, sustainability, and systemic effects. 
Prioritization suggests that policy-makers should target the most un- 
acceptable forms of work. The dimensions of, and indicators for, UFW devel-
oped in Chapter 2 assist in making this determination. Where forced labour is 
present, for example, it would be a clear target for regulatory intervention (see 
further Chapter 2, Dimension 1). Regulatory intervention should also target 
eliminating hazardous child labour (Dimension 7). But, it is also important to 
take into account the preponderance of different types of unacceptable work, 
as well as the types and magnitudes of risks and human rights violations 
involved in a specific form of work. Mobilizing local knowledge is critical in 
mapping the extent and severity of UFW in a specific context. Deterrence has 
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to do with influencing behaviour that results in unacceptable forms of work. 
Here the challenge is to develop techniques to achieve compliance that do 
not drain state resources. Hybrid forms of private–public co-regulation are 
critical in deterring conditions of work and work arrangements that lead to 
unacceptable outcomes (Lee and McCann, 2014, p. 24). Sustainability has a 
longer time horizon: it includes not only compliance with standards but also 
the adoption of practices that reduce the incidence and magnitude of UFW. 
Activating labour market actors, building the capacity of social partners, and 
incentivizing key players, like lead firms, is critical to developing sustainable 
forms of regulation. Weil’s final criterion – the potential for system-wide effects 
– is particularly crucial for deciding which form of UFW to target. This criter- 
ion shifts the focus from the behaviour of individual employers to a broader 
level, whether defined by geography, industry, or product market. It recog-
nizes that “[e]mployer practices in the workplace are an outgrowth of broader 
organizational policies and practices, often driven (implicitly or explicitly) by 
competitive strategies or forces” (Weil, 2008, p. 356). A strategic approach to 
targeting UFW needs to go beyond responding to particularly egregious ex- 
amples to changing the conditions that produce it.
A strategic approach to tackling unacceptable forms of work involves 
identifying not only the most unacceptable forms of work, but also “the like-
lihood that an intervention can actually affect behaviour (deterrence) or have 
lasting effects on conditions (sustainability)” (ibid., p. 354). The goal is for 
interventions to have system-wide effects. 
Drawing on these criteria, a strategic approach to tackling UFW requires 
careful attention to developing principled and effective policies and tools. 
Highly relevant in this regard are the principles that support innovative forms 
of regulation and preventative measures designed to support better enforce-
ment. Regulatory strategies for UFW should not undermine the existing 
corpus of labour law (McCann and Murray, 2014, p. 330). Implementation 
has to be progressive, in the sense of evolutionary, incremental, and empir-
ically tested. The broader goal is to build capacities and ensure that labour 
market actors internalize norms, thus ensuring the sustainability of regulatory 
interventions (Deakin and Sarkar, 2008). Since regulatory styles and labour 
market institutions differ across countries and are embedded in different net-
works and involve a range of different actors, it is critical to involve local labour 
market actors to develop effective intervention and regulatory mechanisms. 
Initiatives directed at UFW must be compatible with existing institutions and 
incentive structures.
Among the principles that underpin the strategic approach, two con-
cepts – points of leverage and institutional dynamism – are central features 
of dynamic regulatory strategies directed at UFW. Both of these notions are 
targeted at achieving systemic effects.
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Points of leverage
As outlined above, the systemic effects principle demands that policy-makers 
go beyond responding to particularly egregious labour practices. The focus 
should instead be on changing the conditions that produce deleterious forms 
of work. This insight can be developed for UFW to highlight the need to iden-
tify the targets of intervention. The aim for policy-makers is to identify points 
of leverage at which system-wide effects are most likely. These points of lever-
age may be found on various levels: at the level of geography, sector, product 
market, etc. Further, they are not possible to predict a priori but have to be 
identified within a particular country or sector with the input of local labour 
market actors. Finding effective points of leverage is particularly important in 
contexts in which resources for addressing labour market disadvantage are pro-
foundly constrained in order to reap the maximum benefit from policy reforms.
Institutional dynamism
The notion of institutional dynamism has been proposed by Lee and McCann 
(2014) to account for the capacity of legal frameworks to operate beyond their 
formal parameters. Institutional dynamism captures the influence of labour 
law norms beyond their formal reach (external dynamism). In this form, it 
embraces the processes through which labour norms take effect in informal 
settings (building norms of social behaviour, promoting awareness of statutory 
standards, etc.). Institutional dynamism also captures the capacity of regu-
latory regimes to host interactions between a range of institutions (internal 
dynamism). In the context of UFW, it is suggested that policy actors should 
remain alert to the dynamic capacities of labour regulation and labour market 
actors in order to trigger and magnify systemic effects. 
A focus by policy-makers on points of leverage and on institutional 
dynamism is most likely to be effective in eradicating UFW and generating 
substantial and sustained effects. The next section describes some examples 
of regulatory initiatives that address UFW in order to illustrate the types of 
interventions that are considered strategic in light of the criteria developed in 
this section. 
3.4.  Strategic regulation in action:  
Targeting unacceptable forms of work
To illustrate the strategic approach, this section evaluates four examples of 
regulatory initiatives that address UFW. The first three involve primarily regu- 
latory interventions that have successfully targeted and transformed UFW. 
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The first two, in particular, illustrate that many of the most unacceptable forms 
of work are outside of the traditional employment relationship, and involve 
own-account self-employment, casual work, and informal employment. To 
be effective in tackling unacceptable forms of work, regulation must extend 
beyond conventional employment relationships and formal employment to 
protect workers from unacceptable risks and degrading treatment. Sometimes 
it is possible to extend existing labour legislation. yet, in some cases it is not 
possible or effective simply to extend traditional or existing forms of labour 
law to these work arrangements. Different institutions may serve the function 
of labour law, although they might do so in different ways. The third form 
of regulation reviewed is a traditional technique of labour regulation – the 
establishment of mandatory minimum wages. The point of this example is to 
show how carefully crafted regulation can have broader system-wide effects. 
The final example is included to illustrate what happens when regulation fails 
to address the key factors that make a form of work unacceptable, as well as to 
suggest other options that may be more effective.
 Informal employment – Casual and self-employed workers:  
The Mathadi workers
A good example of innovative and strategic form of regulation that was suc-
cessful in ameliorating UFW is the Mathadi Act, 1969.91 It targets Mathadi 
workers, head-load carriers, who carry loads on their heads in ports and on 
docks, in market yards and wholesale markets, and for transport companies 
and retail merchants in the state of Maharashtra in India. The work is phys-
ically demanding and takes place in challenging outdoor conditions. Prior 
to the introduction of the Mathadi Act, this work was profoundly insecure. 
A form of casual day labour, Mathadi work was irregular and without fixed 
wages, overtime payment, and holiday or leaves. It exemplified an unaccept-
able form of informal employment; the workers fell outside the scope of social 
protection, were poorly paid, and had very limited access to medical care. 
The Mathadi Act regulates the engagement and conditions of employ-
ment of the workers as well as providing social protection and better access 
to medical services. It does so by establishing a tripartite (representation from 
workers, employers/users, and the government) Mathadi Board for each dis-
trict. each Board directly intervenes in the labour market by acting as the 
exclusive labour intermediary for the hiring of Mathadi workers, and it sets 
the relevant wage rate and social security/benefit levy (cess/tax) that the labour 
user must pay. The Act requires workers and users to register with the relevant 
Board, which receives the workers’ wages and disperses them according to the 
hours worked by each worker within a set period. The Boards also administer 
pension funds and workers’ compensation as well as providing medical care 
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and educational assistance for the workers and their families. By 2006, there 
were 150,000 registered workers (Agarwala, 2013, p. 160). 
The Board limits the number of workers it registers so as to reduce un- 
employment, although it does not directly address the insecurity of what still 
remains a form of casual work. It also sets wages at a level that provides a 
living wage, and the workers and their families now have access to social pro-
tection and health care. The Act has been successful in formalizing this form 
of employment, increasing wages for the workers, lifting them and their fam- 
ilies out of poverty, and providing insurance against a range of risks (Marshall, 
2014, p. 310).
The success of the regulation is dependent upon having functioning 
boards, which, in turn, depends on the strength and unity of the trade unions 
that organize Mathadi workers. It was worker unrest that originally led to the 
development and implementation of the Mathadi Act (ibid., p. 306). Since 
2006, union disunity and decline have weakened the effectiveness of some 
of the Boards (Agarwala, 2013, p. 160). As a result, a small proportion of 
Mathadi work is now outside the system and operates informally.92
What is distinctive about the Mathadi Act as a form of labour mar-
ket regulation is that each board ensures “that compliance occurs by acting 
as an intermediary in the hire and payment of workers” (Marshall, 2014, 
p. 310). What the legislation did was leverage the ability of unions to organ-
ize Mathadi workers along with the desire of labour users for a less chaotic 
labour market to formalize Mathadi work and eradicate its most unacceptable 
features. Despite the inability of Mathadi workers’ unions to institutionalize 
collective bargaining, they were strong enough politically and economically to 
obtain a new form of regulation that is tripartite in design and action. effec-
tive worker representation, in this case by unions, has been critical to the Act’s 
success. The involvement of the social partners in the Mathadi Boards has 
been a key part of the transformation of what was previously an unacceptable 
form of work.
The Mathadi Act provided a model of tripartite regulation of informal 
employment in sectors in which capital is not mobile but rooted, the work 
takes place in a fixed location, and the relationship between the workers 
and labour users is direct (ibid., p. 313). This model of regulation has been 
adapted for groups of informal self-employed workers as such as transport 
workers in Kerala (ibid., p. 311) and bidi workers, who roll bidis (cigarettes) 
and cigars, in Gujarat (Budlender, 2013) and Maharashtra (Agarwala, 2013, 
p. 53).93 At a minimum, this regulatory model provides welfare funds for 
unorganized workers, and has been successful in providing these workers and 
their families with access to health and medical care, housing, and educa-
tion (ibid.). Therefore, if designed properly, regulation that targets low-paid, 
unsafe, and insecure informal employment can contribute to the elimination 
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of unacceptable forms of labour by improving wages, increasing security, and 
providing access to social protection and medical assistance. Another benefit 
of this form of regulation is that it promotes social dialogue, mobilizes labour 
market actors as partners in regulation, and develops the capacity of workers 
to organize. Researchers with Women in Informal employment: Globaliz-
ing and Organizing (WIeGO) have proposed similarly innovative regulation 
for informal workers as diverse as fish and forest workers and waste pickers 
(Sankaran and Madhav, 2013). 
 Expanding labour law and collective bargaining:  
Domestic workers in Uruguay
Sometimes expanding labour law to vulnerable groups of workers, like agri-
cultural and domestic workers, can, especially when combined with worker 
self-organization or tripartist arrangements and innovative labour inspection 
initiatives, contribute to the elimination of unacceptable forms of work. The 
example of the regulation of domestic work by traditional techniques of la- 
bour law – minimum standards and collective bargaining – in Uruguay is a 
good example of how to target and transform unacceptable forms of work.94
Uruguay does not have a general labour law or labour code, and instead 
labour legislation consists of a series of laws referring to specific workers and 
topics.95 
Although domestic workers in Uruguay were entitled to a range of social 
benefits, including disability, old-age and survivor pensions (since 1942), 
maternity benefits and family allowance (since 1980), and medical coverage 
and sick pay (since 1984), they were explicitly excluded from the minimum 
wage until 1990 when a minimum wage was set for them by an executive 
decree. It was only in 2006 that a specific law was passed declaring that domes-
tic workers were entitled to the same general labour and social security rights 
as other workers. The Sindicato Único de Trabajadoras Domésticas (SUTD), 
which is the only union representing domestic workers,96 played a crucial role 
in the campaign for equal legal rights for domestic workers. 
The 2006 law defined domestic work “as that performed in a household 
by a person in a dependency relationship in order to provide care and house-
work to one or various persons or one or various families, without these tasks 
resulting in a direct economic profit for the employer”.97 It set a minimum 
work age of 18 years and recognized domestic workers’ rights to an eight-
hour work day, 44-hour work week, nine-hour rest period during the night 
for live-in workers, rest periods during the work day, a 36-hour weekly rest, 
tripartite negotiation both of wages and job categories, and severance pay after 
90 days of work, additional compensation in the case of dismissal during preg-
nancy, the issuance of a pay slip, unemployment insurance, labour inspection, 
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and a choice between private and public health institutions for medical care. 
In 2007, a regulatory decree was issued, which provided for overtime pay, 
paid sick leave, the right of live-in workers to food and lodging, and the right 
of employers to deduct a maximum of 20 per cent from wages for room and 
board and a maximum of 10 per cent where only meals are offered.98 Most sig-
nificantly, the wage council for domestic service was created on 7 July 2008.
The tripartite group working on the Domestic Work Sector at the Wages 
Council of Uruguay consists of representatives from the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security, the SUTD, and the employers’ association Liga de Amas 
de Casa (LACCU). It negotiates collective agreements that cover domestic 
workers. Through the collective bargaining process, domestic workers have 
obtained: wage increases, work clothes and equipment, a seniority bonus, 
additional compensation for night work, a bonus for work done in a location 
other than the normal household, compensation for a reduction in work hours 
or work days, full payment of work days that are suspended by the employer, 
and an additional paid holiday, 19 August, designated as Domestic Work-
ers’ Day.99 The parties also agreed to comply with ILO Conventions Nos 87, 
98 and 154, which would promote and facilitate the union’s activities (Gold-
smith, 2013, pp. 10, 11). The most recent collective agreement is in force until 
December 2015, and it includes wage increases.100
In 2009, the Banco de Previsión Social (BPS, Social Security Institute) 
implemented an innovative publicity campaign to raise awareness about 
domestic workers’ rights and to increase their registration for social security. 
Some inventive techniques in the campaign included information pamphlets 
(aimed at employers) in the form of tags to hang on the doorknobs of employ-
ers’ homes, with the message “The domestic worker in this house is enrolled 
in the Social Security Institute”, television spots, and socio-dramas on buses. 
In 2010 and 2011, labour inspectors visited over 9,000 homes to find out 
whether domestic workers were registered for social security.101 The inspec-
tors requested documents but did not enter into the households. Rather than 
utilizing inspection to sanction employers, the IGTSS officials use it as an 
opportunity to educate them about their obligations and workers’ rights, thus 
encouraging them to comply with the law. 
Since 2006, the number of domestic workers who make contributions to 
the BPS increased by 45.6 per cent, largely due to the BPS media campaign 
(Goldsmith, 2013, p. 3). However, the level of social security coverage is still 
only about 40 per cent. There are several strategies employers have adopted to 
avoid compliance with the law. Some employers order their domestic work-
ers to tell labour inspectors that they are relatives. Others hire Bolivians and 
Peruvians through employment agencies in those countries. Although covered 
by the same laws and collective agreements as their Uruguayan counter-
parts, these workers are often unaware of their rights. enhancing the levels of 
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formalization and social security coverage are among the main challenges for 
the promotion of decent work for domestic workers in Uruguay.
Between 2006 and 2010, the number of persons employed in domestic 
work increased from 105,572 to 120,164 (ibid., p. 2). Almost 99 per cent of 
all domestic workers are women, and they are disproportionately of African 
descent. Collective bargaining has contributed to the increase in wages and to 
registration in the BPS. Uruguay was the first country to ratify the Domestic 
Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), and it is among the countries with most 
advanced legislation in terms of protecting domestic workers.
What accounts for the success of the bringing domestic workers within 
the scope of labour law for improving these workers’ wages and formalizing 
their work? A crucial factor is the tripartite wage council system, which was 
able to build upon and formalize the existing domestic workers’ union and 
the organization representing the employers of domestic workers. Tripartite 
negotiations enabled the government and social partners to tailor general 
labour law provisions to domestic workers through collective agreements. In 
effect, the wage council for domestic service leveraged the social partners in 
the sector and the existing labour law framework in order to establish an effec-
tive form of regulation for vulnerable workers engaged in informal work. The 
significance of a single, strong membership-based organization of domestic 
workers, the SUTD, cannot be overemphasized. Moreover, institutions such 
as the BPS and the IGTSS, demonstrated a great deal of dynamism by adopt-
ing innovative regulatory techniques. 
This example from Uruguay illustrates how extending and adapting 
labour law to domestic work can be an important method of “formalizing” 
informal forms of employment, or what McCann and Murray (2014) char-
acterize as the “reconstructive” role of labour law.102 The Domestic Workers 
Convention provides an important example of the continuing relevance of 
labour law for formalizing informal employment and eliminating some of 
the most unacceptable forms of work. Moreover, since child labour is an un- 
acceptable form of work, the Domestic Workers Convention’s emphasis on age 
restrictions for the employment of children as domestic workers is a critical 
component of any strategy to eliminate UFW.103 In the proper context, the 
extension of labour law to previously excluded occupations and sectors can be 
used to tackle those features of work that make it unacceptable. 
Institutional dynamism: The case of minimum wage regulation 
It has been suggested above that the potential for “institutional dynamism” 
– the influence of regulatory norms beyond their formal parameters – should 
be integrated into policies to reduce UFW. Mainstream narratives on the eco-
nomic impact of regulation have depicted labour law regimes as static and 
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constrained (see Deakin, 2011; Lee and McCann, 2011). This literature has 
assumed that the influence of legal standards is determined by their formal 
boundaries, whether textual or institutional. Thus, for example, formal legal 
standards are routinely assumed to be irrelevant to workers across informal 
economies (see, e.g. World Bank, 2005). In contrast, the notion of institu-
tional dynamism suggests that labour law norms can reach into informal 
settings (external dynamism) and host useful interactions between a range of 
regulatory frameworks (internal dynamism).
Minimum wage regulation provides a potent illustration of these twin 
dynamics in both advanced industrialized and low-income countries.104 The 
regulation of wages meets Weil’s criterion of prioritization in its focus on low-
paid work. It advances Dimension 3 (Income) of the multidimensional model 
of UFW. Further, the regulatory target is one of the D3 fundamental indica-
tors, inadequate remuneration.
The pertinence of the external dynamism of labour law norms is high-
lighted by the research that tracks the influence of the minimum wage in 
the informal economy. This work has found the minimum wage to exercise a 
significant influence in informal settings (see e.g. Lemos, 2009; Boeri, Gari-
baldi and Ribeiro, 2011; Dinkelman and Ranchhod, 2012; Groisman, 2014). 
Recently, for example, Groisman (2014) investigated the minimum wage in 
Argentina using data from the Argentinian Permanent Household Survey 
(ePH). Groisman found the minimum wage to have no significant impact 
on employment. Nor did he find that minimum wage laws propel workers 
into informal employment, as was until recently widely assumed in inter- 
national policy discourses (e.g. World Bank, 2011). Further, Groisman found 
the Argentinian minimum wage to have had a substantial impact on the 
wages of informal workers. He concluded that the statutory standard oper-
ates as a reference wage in the informal sector, where it serves as a basis for 
wage determination. By illustrating the external dynamism of minimum wage 
regulation, then, this line of research also suggests a significant policy role 
for the minimum wage: it is available to integrate into formalization and 
poverty-alleviation strategies in low-income countries (see also Dinkelman 
and Ranchhod, 2012). 
The potential of the internal dimension of institutional dynamism to 
reduce UFW is also emerging from the research on minimum wage regu-
lation. This policy option emerges from the relationship between statutory 
minimum wages and collective bargaining regimes. It has been observed that 
where collective bargaining systems are stronger, less reliance is placed on 
the statutory minimum wage (Lee, 2012). The dynamic relationship between 
these two regulatory mechanisms is illustrated in figure 3.2, which shows how 
the relationship between minimum wages and collective bargaining systems 
can influence the minimum wage level in a hypothetical wage distribution.
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 Figure 3.2  The dynamic relationship between minimum wages  
and collective bargaining
Source: Lee and McCann (2014).
For regulatory policy on UFW, it is particularly significant that these 
institutional relations exhibit further dynamism depending on the strategies 
of the actors involved in wage determination. This aspect of internal dyna-
mism has been explored in the work of Grimshaw, Rubery and Bosch (2014). 
They note the growing evidence that minimum wage laws improve pay equity 
through the impact of these laws on low-wage employment, gender pay inequal- 
ity and wage compression in the lower half of the wage structure (on gender 
equity, see also Rubery and Grimshaw, 2011). Drawing on cross-national com-
parative research in europe, Grimshaw, Rubery and Bosch (2014) found that 
strong (dual or inclusive, Gallie, 2007) industrial relations systems support the 
higher value minimum wages that enhance pay equity. Countries with strong 
collective bargaining coverage and a high-value minimum wage experienced 
the lowest incidence of low-wage employment. The authors suggest two routes 
to this goal: through the association of strong industrial relations models with 
more compressed wage distributions or through trade unions that are in a 
strong position to campaign for higher minimum wage levels. 
Particularly significant in the recent research on minimum wages are the 
insights into “ripple effects” (or “spill-over effects”): the extent to which min- 
imum wage increases affect wages above the minimum level. empirical studies 
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have tended to relay the size of ripple effects as a function of the minimum 
wage level (Lee and Sobeck, 2012). With an awareness of institutional inter-
actions, however, minimum wage effects become a function of the industrial 
relations system in which they are embedded. In europe, Grimshaw, Rubery 
and Bosch (2014) found ripple effects to have a substantial effect in increasing 
wages in low-wage sectors. Again, they point to available strategies for policy 
actors: they conclude that strong unions with defined pay equity strategies 
can heighten these effects (see also Freeman, 1996). More specifically, strong 
ripple effects are triggered where bargaining outcomes peg either the sectoral 
minimum wage or the entire wage grid to the minimum wage. 
Ripple effects are equally worth integrating into policy-making in low- 
income countries. even where the relative level of the minimum wage is low, 
ripple effects can be substantial where the minimum wage – and especially 
the magnitude of an increase – is used by workers’ organizations as a basis for 
wage negotiation. This strategy is evidenced in a number of Asian countries, 
including the Philippines, China and Viet Nam (Lee and Gerecke, 2013). In 
these countries, workers who already earn more than the new minimum wage 
rate have used it as a benchmark for wage demands, compensating for limited 
union strength.
These policy experiments suggest the relevance to the elimination of 
UFW of institutional dynamism in minimum wage regulation. Centrally, the 
minimum wage research raises a case for sustaining, developing, and extend-
ing collective bargaining institutions, in particular in low-income settings. 
Returning to Weil’s criteria for strategic regulation, such strategies would 
fulfil the deterrence criterion. In particular, the goal of strengthening col- 
lective bargaining is a path to achieving compliance with statutory norms 
without exclusive reliance on state-led enforcement techniques. The collective 
frameworks thus alleviate some of the pressure on constrained state resources, 
and the interaction of statutory regulation and collective bargaining in min- 
imum wage regulation is revealed as a form of hybrid public–private regula-
tion. An awareness of the potential for institutional dynamism also integrates 
the sustainability criterion by signalling the need for capacity building of social 
partner organizations. With regard to Weil’s final criterion – the potential for 
system-wide effects – it can be suggested minimum wage regulation would be 
likely to be a meaningful point of leverage in many countries. This point of 
leverage is multilayered: initiatives are likely to be needed at both the national 
level (statutory minimum wages) and the primary bargaining levels, whether 
sectoral, industrial, etc. These entry points for improving low-wage work could 
be expected to have knock-on effects across the economy as a whole. More 
broadly, finally, it can be suggested that policy actors should remain alert 
to the potential for dynamic effects of labour regulation in other regulatory 
arenas (working time, maternity protection, etc.).
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 The resurgence of day labour in industrialized countries:  
“Zero hours contracts” in the United Kingdom
The casualization of working relations in industrialized countries and related 
resurgence of day labour are beginning to surface in policy debates on labour 
market regulation. The concern is working arrangements that are beyond the 
reach of labour law regimes, even those regimes that encompass non-standard 
work laws. A key illustration is the evolving debate in the United Kingdom 
on the specific regulation of “zero hours contracts” (see BIS, 2014).
The terminology of “zero hours contracts” (ZHC) is widely used in the 
United Kingdom to denote working relationships more often characterized 
as “casual work”: arrangements in which workers are required to report for 
work as and when required by the hirer without any guaranteed hours or 
income (Burchell, Deakin and Honey, 1999). Casual work appears to have 
increased. Based on a survey of 5,000 businesses, the Office for National Stat- 
istics (ONS) has estimated that 1.4 million employees work under contracts 
that do not guarantee a minimum number of hours (“no guaranteed hours 
contracts”, or NGHC) (ONS, 2014).105 NGHC are particularly prevalent in 
certain sectors. In accommodation and food services, 45 per cent of businesses 
make some use of NGHC, as do more than 20 per cent of businesses in health 
and social work (ibid., p. 11, figure 4). NGHC are also more commonly used 
by large companies than small businesses: nearly half of businesses with 250 
or more employees make some use of NGHC, as compared with 12 per cent 
of businesses with fewer than 20 employees (ibid., p. 10, figure 3). Labour 
Force Survey data show that individuals employed on zero hours contracts106 
are more likely to be women, in full-time education, and in the under-24 and 
over-65 age groups (ibid., pp. 14–15, figures 6 and 7).
The limited research evidence on the conditions of casual work in the 
United Kingdom suggests a profoundly disadvantageous working experience 
for many workers. Qualitative research reveals that unpredictable working 
hours and wages in casualized working relations, including ZHC, can inhibit 
access to education and training, and that the resulting financial and social 
uncertainty cause reduced psychological well-being by triggering anxiety and 
stress (Burchell and Wood, 2014). Casual workers who work unpredictable 
and often very long and unsocial hours, coupled with a fluctuating income, 
have also been found to encounter difficulties in building a meaningful pri-
vate life (Bone, 2006).
Another key disadvantage is the exclusion of casual workers from labour 
rights. Coverage of UK employment law extends primarily to “employees”: 
workers recognized in law to have a “contract of employment”.107 Casual work-
ers face limited coverage under labour law statutes because of a requirement 
imposed by the courts that a contract of employment must involve “mutuality 
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of obligation”: an obligation on the hirer to offer work and on the worker to 
accept it (Brodie, 2005; Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005; Davies, 2007). When 
workers are formally entitled to refuse to work, the courts generally hold that 
a contract of employment exists only when these workers are engaged in a 
stint of labour. There is no mutuality of obligation – and therefore no con-
tract of employment – between engagements (see Davies, 2007; McCann, 
2008). This requirement excludes casual workers from key employment rights 
that are attached to qualifying periods, including protection from unfair dis-
missal, redundancy payments, parental leave, and the right to request “flexible 
working” (changes to hours or location of work). The legislation requires that 
employment during qualifying periods be continuous. Casual workers tend 
not to have continuity of employment, do not meet the qualifying periods, 
and are therefore excluded from protection. The outcome is that individuals 
whose working arrangements are designed to ensure that they take on a high 
degree of risk have been excluded from the protection of labour law (Deakin 
and Wilkinson, 2005), even where they have worked for their employers for 
substantial periods of time (McCann, 2008) and when their formal contrac-
tual terms do not reflect the reality of their working relationships (Pitt, 1985).
The material and legal disadvantages associated with casual work are 
beginning to be addressed by the UK courts and in specific legislation. The 
case law has recently shifted towards protecting certain enduring working 
relationships even when they are formally designated as casual. In 2011, the 
UK Supreme Court in Autoclenz108 held that a group of car valeters, who 
were designated as self-employed in their written contracts, were in reality 
under continuing obligations to offer and personally to perform work, and 
were therefore employees (see further Davies, 2009; Bogg, 2010 and 2012). 
Autoclenz therefore protects workers whose arrangements are disguised as 
casual work. More broadly, the decision also signalled a more receptive stance 
on the part of the courts towards the policy objectives of protective labour 
legislation that takes into account “the relative bargaining power of the par-
ties” (para. 35). However, the decision centrally targets disguised standard 
employment rather than genuinely casual work. 
A framework for specific statutory regulation is also being introduced. 
This regulatory strategy has so far focused on one dimension of casual work: 
the “exclusivity” of the relationship (where the hirer requires the worker to 
perform services exclusively for the hirer). The objective is to prevent casual 
workers from being prevented from working for another hirer through the use 
of “exclusivity clauses” (BIS, 2014). Legislation presently before Parliament 
will prohibit employers from preventing “zero hours” workers from working 
for another hirer.109 This legislative strategy fulfils Weil’s prioritization criterion 
by targeting unacceptable working arrangements. Day labour is a fundamen-
tal indicator in the Security dimension (D4) of the multidimensional model 
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(see Chapter 2). The initiative responds to the increasing significance of casual 
work in this national setting and acknowledges one of the risks involved in 
this form of labour.
yet Weil’s other criteria – deterrence, sustainability, and system-wide 
effects – cannot be met by an approach focused solely on the exclusivity dimen-
sion of casual work. Centrally, this reform overlooks the broader dynamics 
of casualization. Freedland (2014) has pointed out that the legislation will 
neglect the long-standing problem of the employment status of casual work-
ers, and therefore the exclusion of these workers from labour rights. Casual 
working relations, more broadly, are not exclusively a matter of contractual 
arrangements: they are also a function of the arrangement and predictability 
of working hours (McCann, 2012; McCann and Murray, 2014). A broader 
conception of casual work sustains strategies that would address casualization 
even where the working relationship is framed within an enduring contractual 
relationship (captured by the ONS notion of NGHC). Regulatory options in- 
clude requiring that NGHC workers be guaranteed a set number of hours or 
income and a minimum period of notice of being required to work (ewing, 
1996, pp. 95–96). McCann and Murray (2014) have recently suggested 
mechanisms that would curb casualized work: prohibiting casual/ZHC in 
vulnerable work, such as domestic work, decent notice of work schedules and 
overtime; incentives for employers to arrange working hours on a continuous 
basis; and compensation for workers who are called out to work for very short 
periods. A consultation on legislation in Northern Ireland also has sought 
views on a right to request guaranteed hours or fixed-term working after a 
period of continuous employment; an entitlement to a minimum payment in 
lieu of work where no work is provided; and an entitlement to a set number of 
annual hours (DeLNI, 2014).
even in legislation centred on exclusivity, there are limitations on the 
regulatory model so far used in the United Kingdom. This conventional 
“command and control” model pairs statutory allocation of obligations with 
an individualized enforcement mechanism. It is therefore unlikely to have 
system-wide effects among a vulnerable segment of the labour force, who are 
unlikely to have the capacity effectively to enforce their legal rights. This limi-
tation seems to be acknowledged in a second government consultation, which 
highlights concerns that employers could easily sidestep the exclusivity ban, 
including by offering contracts that guarantee as little as one hour of work 
(BIS, 2014). The government is currently seeking views on mechanisms for 
tackling avoidance of the exclusivity ban and routes of redress for the affected 
workers.
yet, the second consultation hints at a more promising regulatory model 
for deterrence and system-wide effects. It is suggested that business represen- 
tatives and trade unions should consider working together, with government 
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support, to develop autonomous sector-specific codes of practice on the fair 
use of zero hours contracts (ibid., pp. 15–16). The content of these codes could 
include clauses on when it is appropriate to use a zero hours contract; how to 
promote clarity, e.g. in job advertisements or contracts; the rights and respon-
sibilities of the individual and the employer; best practice in work allocation; 
and notice of work schedules or cancellation of work. This model, then, in- 
corporates social dialogue among interested stakeholders. effectively designed, 
it may hold some promise towards Weil’s model of effective regulation by tar- 
geting sectors in which casual work is high and potentially curbing the num-
ber of jobs offered on a zero hours basis. 
General observations
As these examples illustrate, non-state actors also have a vital role to play in 
detecting and eliminating unacceptable forms of work. Membership-based 
organizations throughout the developing world represent individuals in a 
range of informal employment including street vending, transport (especially 
taxis and micro-buses), waste picking, and domestic work. Such organizations 
provide a public voice for individuals who find themselves in unacceptable 
forms of work. Firms also have an interest in identifying and eliminating 
unacceptable forms of labour as it not only provides competitors with an 
unfair advantage, it tarnishes the reputation of all the firms in sectors in which 
UFW predominate. 
The unacceptable forms of work often involve several simultaneous 
violations of labour law relating, for example, to wages, hours of work, occu-
pational safety and health, the payment of social security contributions, and 
the prohibitions against child and forced labour. Thus, labour inspection ser-
vices play an indispensable role in combating unacceptable forms of work. 
Not only are they the government bodies with the authority to investigate 
breaches of labour regulations in workplaces, labour inspectors can also play 
an important educative role by working with firms and workers to encourage 
compliance. Developing effective models and techniques of enforcement in 
order both to ensure compliance with labour standards and to prevent the 
emergence of UFW in the first place is absolutely critical (Weil, 2014; Howe, 
Hardy and Cooney, 2014).
eliminating and transforming unacceptable forms of work demands 
multifaceted responses that cut across ministerial boundaries, as well as close 
cooperation with the social partners and a wide range of civil society actors. 
The objective of the prevention, transformation, and elimination of UFW 
needs to be incorporated in different strands of government policy (including 
employment, social protection, poverty reduction, migration, and industrial 
relations), in addition to being the subject of specific national laws, policies, 
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or action plans. Labour market institutions have a vital role to play in devel-
oping and achieving sustainable and system-wide solutions. A clear national 
regulatory framework should set out an integrated approach that addresses the 
most unacceptable forms of work, the action required for their elimination or 
transformation, and the mechanisms for effective coordination between the 
many stakeholders. It is also imperative to involve the social partners in the 
coordination, design, implementation, and monitoring of strategies designed 
to target and combat the most unacceptable forms of work. 
Conclusion
This chapter built upon the multidimensional model of UFW developed in 
Chapter 2, which links the dimensions of unacceptability to indicators devel-
oped from the relevant international labour standards in order to provide a 
common system of coordinates for identifying unacceptable work across a 
wide range of different social and economic contexts. The multidimensional 
model of UFW is designed to aid policy-makers, regulators, and social part-
ners in diagnosing which forms of unacceptable work to target in a specific 
context, and the predictive model discussed in section 3.1 can be used to dis-
cern patterns and practices that are common to UFW. The remainder of the 
chapter focused on how to develop a programmatic approach to eliminating 
the most unacceptable forms of work, and it drew upon the wider literature 
concerning integrated and development-friendly labour regulation, which it 
adapted to eliminating UFW. 
A strategic approach to tackling UFW, which emphasizes the import- 
ance of involving local labour market actors and institutions, entails iden-
tifying which forms of unacceptable work to earmark, and the techniques 
of regulation that are suitable and effective. Such an approach suggests that 
unacceptable forms of work should be targeted not only in terms of their 
severity, but also in light of whether intervention can affect behaviour in the 
long term and achieve system-wide effects. In developing regulatory strategies 
in light of these criteria, it is important to be attentive to existing points of 
leverage that enable interventions to change the conditions that produce 
UFW. Policy-makers are also advised to consider the dynamic capacities of 
labour and labour market actors in order to generate system-wide effects. 
Three examples of regulatory initiatives that have been successful in 
addressing UFW and one that appears to be less promising were discussed 
in section 3.4 in order to illustrate the types of interventions that are consid-
ered strategic in light of the criteria developed in this chapter. The first two 
successful examples both involved informal work performed by vulnerable 
populations, although one example is from a lower-middle income country 
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(India) and the other from an emerging economy (Uruguay). Although they 
used different regulatory techniques (developing a unique form of regula-
tion for Mathadi workers, and extending labour law to domestic workers), 
both initiatives leveraged existing institutions (especially social partners) and 
adopted a sector-wide approach. The third example, minimum wage legis-
lation, illustrates how strategically calibrated statutory minimum wages can 
have ripple effects both beyond formal employment and in favour of pay 
equity for women workers. The less promising model, on day labour, is drawn 
from an advanced industrialized country (United Kingdom), although it 
also targets a vulnerable segment of the labour force. yet the model depends 
on a conventional regulatory mechanism (“command and control”) that is 
unlikely to have system-wide effects or much deterrence value. More compel-
ling approaches are under discussion that would involve the social partners 
and potentially target sectors in which this form of UFW is prominent or 
particularly disadvantageous.
A focus by policy-makers on points of leverage and on institutional dyna-
mism, it has been suggested, is most likely effectively to target UFW and to 
generate substantial and sustained effects. The aim of future research should 
therefore be to test these capacities in the context of concrete interventions on 
UFW in a range of settings. 
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Notes
Chapter	1	–	Discourses	of	unacceptability
1. The ILO’s work has been centred on the four strategic objectives since 
the Organization’s March 1998 budget proposal (ILO, 1999). See most 
recently, ILO (2013b).
2. UN Statistics Division, “Official List of MDG Indicators”, available 
at: http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/. Four “Indicators for Monitoring 
Progress” towards Target 1.B are identified: 1.4 Growth rate of GDP per 
person employed; 1.5 employment-to-population ratio; 1.6 Proportion 
of employed people living below $1.25 (PPP) per day; 1.7 Proportion of 
own-account and contributing family workers in total employment. 
3. United Nations economic and Social Council (eCOSOC) Committee 
on economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CeSCR), General Comment 
No. 18: The Right to Work: Article 6 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. e/C.12/GC/18 
(6 February 2006).
4. See further http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/program/dwcp/. 
5. Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention, 1948 (No. 87); Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949 (No. 98).
6. Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29); Abolition of Forced Labour 
Convention, 1957 (No. 105).
7. Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138); Worst Forms of Child 
Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182).
8. equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100); Discrimination 
(employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111).
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9. The 2008 Declaration follows its 1998 antecedent and the 1944 Dec-
laration of Philadelphia as the third “major statement of principles and 
policies” since the founding of the ILO. On the 2008 Declaration gen- 
erally, see Maupain (2009).
10. Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, 2008, Part I.A(ii).
11. The indicators were subsequently endorsed by the 18th International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians in 2008.
12. A standards-based approach to identifying unacceptable forms of work 
has been adopted by the ILO/World Bank Better Work programme. The 
programme monitors and evaluates compliance with labour standards in 
global supply chains in the garment sector in select countries (Cambodia, 
Haiti, Indonesia, Jordan, Lesotho, Nicaragua and Viet Nam). The Better 
Work Compliance Assessment Tool (CAT) assesses factory compliance 
with (1) the core standards identified in the 1998 Declaration and 
(2) working conditions standards in a country’s domestic labour law 
framework (on compensation, the employment contract, workplace 
relations, occupational safety and health, and working time). See further 
http://betterwork.org/global/.
13. Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention, 1921 (No. 14), Article 2(1); Weekly 
Rest (Commerce and Offices) Convention, 1957 (No. 106), Article 6(1).
14. Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention, 1928 (No. 26); 
Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 131).
15. Forty-Hour Week Convention, 1935 (No. 47).
16. Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981 (No. 156).
17. Thus Findlay, Kalleberg and Warhurst’s (2013) suggestion that the 
eU Temporary Agency Work Directive can substantially mitigate the 
outsourcing of labour neglects a substantial scholarship.
18. See also Hasan and Jandoc (2010), Section 3.
19. Council Decision of 21 October 2010 on guidelines for the employment 
policies of the Member States (2010/707/eU). 
20. Guideline 7. The guideline also requires that “[t]he quality of jobs and 
employment conditions” be addressed.
21. http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1039&langId=en.
22. Ibid.
23. Kountouris (2012, p. 24) identifies “three different, though not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, approaches to conceptualizing precarious work 
relations. A first one that sees precariousness as essentially dominating 
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particular sectors of the labour market. A second approach that associates 
precariousness with non-standard work. And a third one that focuses more 
on the dimensions and contexts of precariousness, and as potentially 
applying beyond atypical work relations.” 
24. Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia are middle-income economies; 
India and Viet Nam are rapidly developing; and in Sri Lanka sustained 
development was hampered by a lengthy civil war. 
25. The countries studied were Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
26. Remuneration for part-time work is rarely high enough to enable a woman 
with dependent children to live independently (Fudge, 2005).
27. Social reproduction is a term typically used by feminist political econo-
mists to refer to the daily and generational reproduction of the working 
population (Fudge, 2011). 
28. Precarious work is not further defined although it features throughout 
the report, often as a synonym for vulnerability. 
29. Fudge cites Dunmore v Ontario (Attorney General) [2001] 3 R.C.S. 1016, 
at para. 117, quoting Delisle v Canada (Deputy Attorney General) [1999] 
2 S.C.R. 989, at para. 67.
30. Pollert’s definition of a “vulnerable worker” embraces employees who have: 
1. earnings below median hourly pay; and  
2.  pay and conditions that are not directly affected by union agreements 
(Hudson, 2006, p. 7). 
31. International Classification by Status in Employment (ICSe) as revised 
at the 15th International Conference of Labour Statisticians in 1993 
(ILO, 1993a). 
32. “Own account workers” are defined as “those workers who, working on 
their own account or with one or more partners, hold the type of jobs 
defined as “a self-employment job” … [i.e. jobs where the remuneration is 
directly dependent upon the profits derived from the goods and services 
produced], and have not engaged on a continuous basis any employees to 
work for them” (ibid.).
33. “Contributing family workers” are defined as “those workers who hold 
‘self-employment jobs’ as own-account workers in a market-oriented 
establishment operated by a related person living in the same household” 
(ibid.).
34. The two statuses are drawn from among the six ICSe “status categories”. 
The other employment statuses are: (1) wage and salary workers 
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(employees); (2) self-employed workers with employees (employers); 
(3) self-employed workers without employees (own-account workers); 
(4) members of producers’ cooperatives; and (5) workers not classifiable 
by status (ibid.). The ILO has recognized the limitations of this definition: 
that some wage and salaried workers might also assume substantial 
economic risk and that some own-account workers may not be vulnerable 
(ILO, 2009a).
35. The PSI estimate of its own definition of vulnerability covers employees: 
(1) in the bottom third of the hourly income distribution; and (2) whose 
pay and conditions are not determined by a union agreement (Hudson, 
2006, p. 6, table 1). 
36. The TUC estimated the magnitude of “vulnerable employment” by 
first taking into account the number of workers identified by the UK 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) as low-paid workers who are low skilled or 
engaged in temporary or home work (1,546,643 in total): (1) workers with 
no qualifications who are paid less than GBP 6.50 per hour (942,157); 
(2) temporary workers who are paid less than GBP 6.50 per hour 
(excluding those with no qualifications) (551,562); (3) workers with home 
as a base who are paid less than GBP 6.50 per hour (excluding those with 
no qualifications and those who are temporary) (52,924) (TUC, 2008, 
pp. 23–24). On the assumption that a substantial number of workers are 
not included in the LFS figures, the TUC added a figure of 500,000 
workers to account for: (1) undocumented migrant workers (430,000); 
and (2) the informal economy (1.75 per cent of GDP) (ibid., p. 24). The 
TUC suggested that its estimate is likely to under-represent vulnerable 
employment. It suggests that low-paid migrant workers who have a right 
to work in the United Kingdom are likely to be undercounted by the LFS 
and characterized its estimate of undocumented migrant and informal 
workers as “very conservative” (ibid., p. 23).
37. Bewley and Forth explain that “adverse treatment” is defined by reference 
to a range of legal and non-legal rules (statutory rights, company rules, 
moral standards). They approach “a broad concept of ‘adverse treatment’ 
which encompasses any contravention of the explicit or implicit rules of 
engagement under which the employment relationship has either been 
conceived or has developed” (2010, p. 3).
38. Mowla adopts the ILO definition of vulnerable employment (see note 31 
above).
39. In the early 1970s, when the term was coined, the focus was on informal 
productive units or enterprises in the traditional sector in Ghana and 
Kenya, and what they contribute to the economy and growth, which 
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came to be known as the production approach (ILO, 1972; Hart, 1973). 
This approach was characterized as dualist as it separates the formal and 
informal sectors. In the mid-1980s, however, attention shifted to changes 
in the nature of work that were occurring in developed economies 
(Castells and Portes, 1989). Subsequently labelled the structuralist 
approach, it emphasized the links between informal and formal economic 
activities, and focused on changes in production and the ways in which 
firms pursue flexible forms of labour, such as casual labour, contract 
labour, outsourcing, home working, and other forms of subcontracting 
that offer the prospect of minimizing fixed non-wage costs. The legalist, 
or orthodox, view, typically associated with Hernando De Soto (1989), 
argued that the informal sector was a site of entrepreneurial activity and, as 
such, a vital and necessary part of the economy. Regulatory requirements 
imposed barriers to entry and imposed costs that were economically 
inefficient and resulted in their being ignored. More recently, an approach 
combining elements of the other approaches emerged (Bacchetta, ernst 
and Bustamante, 2009; Chen, 2007; Fields, 2005). This view holds 
that different sectors and segments exist in various combinations, in 
accordance with the different realities and conditions of countries and 
regions (ILO, 2013d, pp. 3–4; Chen, 2012). 
40. Co-published in 2002 by the OeCD, IMF, ILO and CIS STAT (Interstate 
Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States) as a 
supplement to the System of National Accounts, SNA 1993 (see OeCD 
et al., 2002).
41. Children in child labour include those in the worst forms of child 
labour and children in employment below the minimum age, excluding 
children in permissible lightwork, if applicable. According to the ILO’s 
report Marking progress against child labour, “child labour excludes those 
children who are working only a few hours a week in permitted light 
work and those above the minimum age whose work is not classified as 
a worst form of child labour, including ‘hazardous work’ in particular. 
Hazardous work by children is defined as any activity or occupation that, 
by its nature or type, has or leads to adverse effects on the child’s safety, 
health, and moral development. In general, hazardous work may include 
night work and long hours of work; exposure to physical, psychological, 
or sexual abuse; work underground, under water, at dangerous heights 
or in confined spaces; work with dangerous machinery, equipment and 
tools, or which involves the manual handling or transport of heavy loads; 
and work in an unhealthy environment which may, for example, expose 
children [to] hazardous substances, agents or processes, or to temperatures, 
noise levels, or vibrations damaging their health. Hazardous work by 
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children is often treated as a proxy for the Worst Forms of Child Labour” 
(ILO, 2013g, p. 16).
42. For the overall 5–17 years age group, child labourers amount to 
77.7 million in Asia and the Pacific, 59.0 million in sub-Saharan Africa, 
12.5 million in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 9.2 million in the 
Middle east and North Africa.
43. The ILO’s mandate to combat forced labour began in 1930 with the 
adoption of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), which 
prohibits all forms of forced or compulsory labour. In 1957, it was 
supplemented by Convention No. 105, which requires the abolition 
of any form of forced or compulsory labour in five specific cases listed 
in Article 1. As of August 2014, 177 countries had ratified Convention 
No. 29, while 174 had ratified Convention No. 105. These Conventions 
protect rights that are considered to be fundamental and are contained 
in the Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. In 
addition, the United Nations has adopted a number of human rights 
instruments that contain standards and principles related to forced 
labour. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) prohibits 
slavery and servitude (Article 4) and provides that everyone has the right 
to free choice of employment (Article 23(1)). The International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (1966) also prohibits slavery and servitude 
(Article 8(1)), and specifically provides that no one “shall be required to 
perform forced or compulsory labour” (Article 8(3)(a)), subject to a series 
of exceptions (Article 8(3)(b) and (c)) that are similar to those provided for 
in Convention No. 29). The International Convention on the Protection 
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
(1990) (Article 11(2)) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (2006) (Article 27(2)), both include specific prohibitions 
of forced or compulsory labour. Moreover, the prohibition of forced or 
compulsory labour in all its forms is considered to be a peremptory norm 
of international human rights law, which is therefore absolutely binding 
and from which no derogation is permitted. 
44. Protocol to Convention No. 29 – Protocol to The Forced Labour 
Convention, 1930, adopted by the International Labour Conference at 
its 103rd Session, Geneva, 11 June 2014; Forced Labour (Supplementary 
Measures) Recommendation, 2014 (No. 203) – Recommendation on 
supplementary measures for the effective suppression of forced labour, 
adopted by the International Labour Conference at its 103rd Session, 
Geneva, 11 June 2014.
45. Slavery Convention, signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926 and amended 
by the Protocol, New york, 7 December 1953, Article 1(1).
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46. UN General Assembly, Protocol to Suppress, Punish and Prevent Traf-
ficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, Supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
15 November 2000. 
47. Record of Proceedings, International Labour Conference, 14th Session, 
Geneva, 1930, p. 691; see also Forced labour, General Survey of 1968, 
para. 27; Abolition of forced labour, General Survey of 1979, para. 21.
48. See, for example, Pakistan – RCe, 1996, p. 90; see also report of the 
Commission of Inquiry appointed under art. 26 of the Constitution of 
the ILO to examine the observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour 
Convention, 1930 (No. 29) (ILO, Official Bulletin, Special Supplement, 
Vol. LXXXI, 1998, Series B, para. 206). Most national legislation has es- 
tablished a minimum age limit for concluding a labour contract, which 
may coincide with the age at which compulsory school attendance ends. 
However, employment that is likely to jeopardize health, safety, or morals 
is generally prohibited for persons below 18 years of age, in conformity 
with the relevant ILO Conventions Minimum Age Convention, 1973 
(No. 138), Art. 3, para. 1; Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 
1999 (No. 182), Arts 1, 2 and 3(d).
49. In the Trafficking Protocol (see note 46 above), trafficking is defined 
in Article 3 to consist of three basic elements: first, the action (of 
recruitment, etc.); second, the means (of the threat or use of force or 
other forms of coercion, etc.); and, third, the purpose of exploitation. 
The Committee of experts (ILO, 2013h, p. 12) has observed that the 
definition of “trafficking in persons” in the Trafficking Protocol allows 
for a link to be established between the Protocol and the Forced Labour 
Convention, 1930 (No. 29), and emphasizes that trafficking in persons 
for the purpose of exploitation (which is specifically defined to include 
forced labour or services, slavery or similar practices, servitude and 
various forms of sexual exploitation) is encompassed by the definition of 
forced or compulsory labour in Article 2(1) of Convention No. 29. The 
Committee highlights that the definition found in the earlier standards 
requires “specific action against trafficking in persons for the purposes of 
forced or compulsory labour” (Article 1(3) of the Protocol). 
50. See the ILO and eU’s Operational indicators of trafficking in human 
beings, Results from a Delphi survey implemented by the ILO and the 
european Commission, March 2009, revised September 2009, available 
at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/
documents/ publication/wcms_105023.pdf. See also Resolution II con- 
cerning further work on statistics of forced labour, Report of the 19th 
International Conference of Labour Statisticians, ICLS/19/2013/3, p. 66.
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51. The ILO’s indicators include: abuse of vulnerability; deception; restric-
tion of movement; isolation; physical and sexual violence; intimidation 
and threats; retention of identity documents; withholding of wages; debt 
bondage; abusive working and living conditions; and excessive overtime. 
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52. The model has also been informed by the valuable discussions at the 
expert Workshop on the Possible Use of the Delphi Methodology to 
Identify Dimensions and Descriptors of Unacceptable Forms of Work, 
ILO, Geneva, 11–12 November 2013.
53. Conventions classified by the ILO as to be revised, outdated, shelved or 
withdrawn are excluded, as are three that are revised by later Conventions: 
the Maternity Protection Convention, 1919 (No. 3), revised by the 
Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183); the Fee-Charging 
employment Agencies Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 96), revised by 
the Private employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181); and the 
Social Policy (Non-Metropolitan Territories) Convention, 1947 (No. 82), 
revised by the Social Policy (Basic Aims and Standards) Convention, 1962 
(No. 117). Conventions that solely govern seafarers, the fishing industry 
and dockworkers are also excluded. For reasons of space, the ILO’s (non-
binding) Recommendations are not included. The Recommendations 
are highly relevant, however, in particular those whose content is not 
extensively reflected in a binding standard, such as the Social Protection 
Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202) (Dimension 8), and the HIV 
and AIDS Recommendation, 2010 (No. 2000) (Dimension 9). For a 
review of the approach of the ILO supervisory bodies to the application 
of the ILO Conventions, see Roelandt (2014).
54. Workers are subject to forced labour in terms of the Forced Labour 
Convention, 1930 (No. 29), and its 2014 Protocol, and the Abolition 
of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105). Also relevant are the 
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182), Article 3; 
the Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), Article 3(2)(b); 
compulsory personal services exacted from members of indigenous and 
tribal peoples in terms of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 
1989 (No. 169), Articles 11 and 20(3)(c); and requirements on domestic 
workers to reside in the household of their employer or to remain in the 
household or with household members during periods of daily and weekly 
rest or annual leave, Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), 
Article 9(a), (b).
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55. The worker is not subject to a coherent and periodically reviewed 
national policy on occupational safety, occupational health and the 
working environment in terms of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Convention, 1981 (No 155), and its 2002 Protocol, and Promotional 
Framework for Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 2006 
(No. 187), or to a national system and national programme on 
occupational health services in terms of Convention No. 187 or to a 
coherent and periodically reviewed national policy on occupational 
health services in terms of the Occupational Health Services Convention, 
1985 (No. 161). The worker does not benefit from the requirements 
of the Radiation Protection Convention, 1960 (No. 155); Hygiene 
(Commerce and Offices) Convention, 1964 (No. 120); Occupational 
Cancer Convention, 1974 (No. 139); Working environment (Air 
Pollution, Noise and Vibration) Convention, 1977 (No. 148); Asbestos 
Convention, 1986 (No. 162); Safety and Health in Construction 
Convention, 1988 (No. 167); Chemicals Convention, 1990 (No. 170); 
Prevention of Major Industrial Accidents Convention, 1993 (No. 174); 
Safety and Health in Mines Convention, 1995 (No. 176); and Safety and 
Health in Agriculture Convention, 2001 (No. 184). Also relevant are the 
Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81) and Protocol; Migration 
for employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97), Articles 5 and 8; 
Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Convention, 1969 (No. 129); Nursing 
Personnel Convention, 1977 (No. 149), Article 7; Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), Article 20(3)(b); Night Work 
Convention, 1990 (No. 171); Home Work Convention, 1996 (No. 177), 
Article 7; Private employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181), 
Article 11(g), (h); Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183); 
and Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), Article 13.
56. Workers do not receive an adequate living wage, Preamble to the ILO 
Constitution. Including that there is no minimum wage system in terms 
of the Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 131); Minimum 
Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention, 1928 (No. 26); and, as relevant, 
the Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery (Agriculture) Convention, 1951 
(No. 99); Plantations Convention, 1958 (No. 110), Articles 24 and 
25; and Social Policy (Basic Aims and Standards) Convention, 1962 
(No. 117), Article 10. Also, as relevant, public contracts do not include 
clauses to ensure that the workers concerned receive wages that are not 
less favourable than those established for work of the same character in 
the trade or industry concerned in the district where the work is carried 
out in terms of the Labour Clauses (Public Contracts) Convention, 1949 
(No. 94), Article 2; independent producers and wage earners are not 
subject to measures to secure conditions that give them scope to improve 
Unacceptable forms of work
86
their living standards by their own efforts or to measures that maintain 
minimum standards of living that take into account essential family 
needs including food and its nutritive value, housing, clothing, medical 
care and education, Social Policy (Basic Aims and Standards) Conven- 
tion, 1962 (No. 117), Article 5; measures have not been considered for 
the promotion of the productive capacity of agricultural producers and 
the improvement of their standards of living and for the elimination of 
the causes of chronic indebtedness in terms of Convention No. 117, Art- 
icle 4(a). Also relevant is that migrant workers may be granted, in addi- 
tion to their wages, benefits in cash or in kind to meet any reasonable 
personal or family expenses resulting from employment away from their 
homes, Social Policy (Basic Aims and Standards) Convention, 1962 
(No. 117), Article 14(3).
57. Workers are paid in an illegitimate form or through an illegitimate 
process in terms of the Protection of Wages Convention, 1949 (No. 95), 
Articles 3, 4, 5 and 13; Social Policy (Basic Aims and Standards) 
Convention, 1962 (No. 117), Article 11(2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7); and, as 
relevant, the Private employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181), 
Article 12; workers are subject to restrictions on how they dispose of their 
wages, Convention No. 95, Articles 6 and 7, or to illegitimate deductions, 
attachments or assignments, Articles 8–10, or workers are not informed of 
their conditions in respect of wages or of any changes in the particulars of 
their wages, Article 14; the maximum amounts and manner of repayment 
of wage advances are unregulated in terms of the Social Policy (Basic Aims 
and Standards) Convention, 1962 (No. 117), Article 12; workers are not 
protected on employer insolvency in terms of the Protection of Workers’ 
Claims (employer’s Insolvency) Convention, 1992 (No. 173); and, as 
relevant, the Private employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181), 
Article 11(i). Also, as relevant, workers in hotels and restaurants do not 
receive basic remuneration that is paid at regular intervals, regardless of 
tips, Working Conditions (Hotels and Restaurants) Convention, 1991 
(No. 172), Article 6(2), and the sale and purchase of the employment 
of these workers is not prohibited, Article 7; temporary agency workers 
are charged fees or costs by employment agencies in terms of the Private 
employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181), Article 7, and are 
not subject to the necessary measures to ensure adequate protection in 
relation to minimum wages, Article 11(c); plantation workers are not 
subject to the provisions of Part IV of the Plantations Convention, 1958 
(No. 110); and domestic workers are not subject to the provisions of the 
Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), Article 12, and fees 
charged by private employment agencies are deducted from domestic 
workers’ remuneration, Article 15(1)(e).
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58. employment is terminated without a valid reason connected to 
the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the operational 
requirements of the employer, Termination of employment Convention, 
1982 (No. 158), Division A; employment is terminated on the grounds 
that worker has family responsibilities in terms of the Workers with 
Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981 (No. 156), Article 8; or during 
pregnancy or while the worker is on maternity leave and following her 
return to work except on grounds unrelated to the pregnancy or birth 
of the child and its consequences or nursing, in terms of the Maternity 
Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183), Article 8.
59. employment is terminated before a worker has an opportunity to defend 
himself/herself against allegations, he or she does not have the opportunity 
to appeal to an impartial body, he or she alone bears the burden of proving 
that the termination was not justified, or there is no provision for suitable 
remedies in terms of the Termination of employment Convention, 1982 
(No. 158), Part II, Divisions B and C, or employment is terminated 
for reasons of an economic, technological, structural or similar nature 
without the employer having provided workers’ representatives in good 
time with the relevant information or given them an opportunity for 
consultation on measures to avert or minimise the terminations and on 
measures to mitigate the adverse effects of the termination in terms of 
Part III, Division A. 
60. employment is terminated without a reasonable period of notice or 
compensation in lieu, unless the worker is guilty of serious misconduct, 
or without severance allowance or other separation benefits, benefits from 
employment insurance or assistance or other forms of social security or a 
combination of allowance and benefits in terms of Convention No. 158, 
Part II, Divisions D and e.
61. Including that there is no adequate provision for the progressive develop-
ment of systems of education, vocational training and apprenticeship with 
a view to the effective preparation of young persons of both sexes for a use-
ful occupation in terms of the Social Policy (Basic Aims and Standards) 
Convention, 1962 (No. 117), Article 15, or for training on new techniques 
of production in terms of Article 16; no policy promotes the granting of 
paid educational leave for training, general, social and civic education or 
trade union education in terms of the Paid educational Leave Convention, 
1974 (No. 140); workers are not subject to comprehensive and coordinated 
policies and programmes of vocational guidance and training in terms of 
the Human Resources Development Convention, 1975 (No. 142). Also, 
as relevant, workers with family responsibilities are not subject to meas-
ures in the field of vocational guidance and training compatible with 
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national conditions and possibilities to ensure that these workers become 
and remain integrated in the labour force and can re-enter the labour force 
after an absence due to their responsibilities in terms of the Workers with 
Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981 (No. 156), Article 7; members 
of indigenous and tribal peoples do not enjoy opportunities at least equal 
to those of other citizens in respect of vocational training measures, or 
that measures are not taken to promote their voluntary participation in 
these programmes in terms of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Con-
vention, 1989 (No. 169), Articles 21 and 22; temporary agency workers 
are not subject to measures that ensure adequate protection in relation 
to access to training, Private employment Agencies Convention, 1997 
(No. 181), Article 11(f); nursing personnel are not provided with educa-
tion and training appropriate to the exercise of their functions or with 
career prospects likely to attract persons to the profession and to retain 
them in the profession in terms of the Nursing Personnel Convention, 
1977 (No. 149), Articles 2 and 3, or with conditions at least equivalent to 
those of other workers in educational leave, Article 6(d).
62. Including that the State does not approve the principle of a 40-hour 
week and the taking or facilitating of measures to secure that end and, as 
relevant, that workers in industry, commerce and offices work for more 
than 48 hours a week in terms of the Hours of Work (Industry) Con- 
vention, 1919 (No. 1), and Hours of Work (Commerce and Offices) 
Convention, 1930 (No. 30); that public contracts do not include clauses 
ensuring that hours of work are not less favourable than those established 
for work of the same character in the trade or industry in the district 
in terms of the Labour Clauses (Public Contracts) Convention, 1949 
(No. 94), Article 2; that workers in hotels and restaurants are not entitled 
to reasonable normal hours or to overtime provisions, Working Conditions 
(Hotels and Restaurants) Convention, 1991 (No. 172), Article 4(2) or to 
reasonable minimum weekly rest periods, Article 4(3); that temporary 
agency workers are not subject to the necessary measures to ensure adequate 
protection in relation to working time and other working conditions in 
terms of the Private employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181), 
Article 11(d); and that nursing personnel are not entitled to conditions 
at least equivalent to those of other workers in hours of work, including 
the regulation and compensation of overtime, inconvenient hours and 
shift work, weekly rest and paid annual holidays in terms of the Nursing 
Personnel Convention, 1977 (No. 149), Article 6(a), (b), (c).
63. The Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention, 1921 (No. 14); Weekly Rest 
(Commerce and Offices) Convention, 1957 (No. 106); and, as relevant, 
the Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), Article 10(2). Also, 
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as relevant, domestic workers are obliged to remain in the household 
or with household members during periods of weekly rest, Domestic 
Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), Article 9(b).
64. Including, as relevant, that workers in industry, commerce and offices have 
fewer than eight hours’ daily rest, Hours of Work (Industry) Convention, 
1919 (No. 1) and Hours of Work (Commerce and Offices) Convention, 
1930 (No. 30); that workers in hotels and restaurants do not have 
reasonable minimum daily rest periods, Working Conditions (Hotels and 
Restaurants) Convention, 1991 (No. 172); and that domestic workers are 
obliged to remain in the household or with household members during 
periods of daily rest, Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), 
Article 9(b).
65. Committee of experts on the Application of Conventions and Rec- 
ommendations RCe – General Report, 1998, para. 107; Eradication of 
forced labour, General Survey concerning the Forced Labour Convention, 
1930 (No. 29), and the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 
(No. 105), Report III (Part 1B), International Labour Conference, 96th 
Session, 2007, paras 132–134.
66. Night work is performed by the worker without the protections required 
by the Night Work Convention, 1990 (No. 171), or the Night Work 
(Women) Convention (Revised), 1948 (No. 89), and Protocol of 1990 to 
the Night Work (Women) Convention (Revised), 1948.
67. Holidays with Pay Convention (Revised), 1970 (No. 132), and, as rele- 
vant, the Working Conditions (Hotels and Restaurants) Convention, 1991 
(No. 172), Article 5(2). Also, as relevant, workers in hotels and restaurants 
work on public holidays without appropriate compensation in time or 
remuneration, Working Conditions (Hotels and Restaurants) Convention, 
1991 (No. 172), Article 5(1); and domestic workers are obliged to remain 
in the household or with household members during periods of annual 
leave, Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), Article 9(b).
68. Including, as relevant, that workers in hotels and restaurants have 
insufficient advance notice of their working schedules to enable them to 
organize their personal and family lives, Working Conditions (Hotel and 
Restaurants) Convention, 1991 (No. 172), Article 4(4).
69. Including Convention No. 172, Article 4(4), and that workers are not 
subject to policies and programmes of vocational guidance and vocational 
training that are designed to improve their ability to understand and, 
individually or collectively, to influence their working and social envir- 
onment in terms of the Human Resources Development Convention, 
1975 (No. 142), Article 1(4).
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70. Including that breastfeeding workers have insufficient rest breaks, 
Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183), Article 10.
71. Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Con-
vention, 1948 (No. 87); Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949 (No. 98); and, as relevant, the Right of Association 
(Agriculture) Convention, 1921 (No. 11); Right of Association (Non- 
Metropolitan Territories) Convention, 1947 (No. 84); Plantations Con- 
vention, 1958 (No. 110), Part IX; Workers’ Representatives Conven-
tion, 1971 (No. 135); Rural Workers’ Organisations Convention, 1975 
(No. 141); Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No. 151); 
Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154); Private employment 
Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181), Articles 4 and 11(a), (b); and 
Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), Article 3(2)(a), (3).
72. Including that nurses are not involved in the planning of nursing ser- 
vices or in decisions that concern them in terms of the Nursing Person- 
nel Convention, 1977 (No. 149), Article 5.
73. Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138); Worst Forms of Child 
Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182).
74. Workers are not entitled to protection in terms of the Social Security 
(Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 102); employment Injury 
Benefits Convention, 1964 [Schedule I amended in 1980] (No. 121); 
Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors’ Benefits Convention, 1967 (No. 128); 
Medical Care and Sickness Benefits Convention, 1969 (No. 130); employ-
ment Promotion and Protection against Unemployment Convention, 
1988 (No. 168); and, as relevant, the Workmen’s Compensation (Agri-
culture) Convention, 1921 (No. 12); equality of Treatment (Accident 
Compensation) Convention, 1925 (No. 19); equality of Treatment (Social 
Security) Convention, 1962 (No. 118); Nursing Personnel Convention, 
1977 (No. 149), Article 6; Maintenance of Social Security Rights Con-
vention, 1982 (No. 157); Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 
(No. 169), Articles 24 and 25; Private employment Agencies Conven-
tion, 1997 (No. 181), Article 11; Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 
(No. 183), Article 6; and Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), 
Article 14.
75. Workers are subject to discrimination in terms of the Migration for 
employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97), Article 6, Right to 
Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), Article 1; 
Discrimination (employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 
(No. 111); Social Policy (Basic Aims and Standards) Convention, 1962, 
Article 14; Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 
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1975 (No. 143); Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981 
(No. 156), Article 3; Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 
(No. 169); Home Work Convention, 1996 (No. 177), Article 4; Maternity 
Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183), Article 9; and Domestic Workers 
Convention, 2011 (No. 189), Articles 10 and 14. Also, disabled workers 
are not subject to a national policy on vocational rehabilitation and 
employment in terms of the Vocational Rehabilitation and employment 
(Disabled Persons) Convention, 1983 (No. 159); part-time workers are not 
entitled to the same protection as full-time workers in respect of the right 
to organize, the right to bargain collectively, the right to act as workers’ 
representatives, occupational safety and health, and discrimination in 
employment and occupation, or receive a basic wage lower than that of 
comparable full-time workers, or do not enjoy conditions equivalent to 
comparable full-time workers with respect to statutory social security 
schemes, maternity protection, termination of employment, paid annual 
leave and paid public holidays and sick leave in terms of the Part-Time 
Work Convention, 1994 (No. 175); temporary agency workers are subject 
to discrimination by private employment agencies, Private employment 
Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181), Article 5, or migrant workers 
recruited or placed by private employment agencies do not receive 
adequate protection from abuses in terms of Article 8.
76. equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100). Also relevant are the 
Migration for employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97), Art- 
icle 6 (1)(a)(i); Social Policy (Basic Aims and Standards) Convention, 1962, 
Article 14 (2); Part-Time Work Convention, 1994 (No. 175), Article 5; 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), Article 20(2 (b); 
and Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), Article 11.
77. Including that workers are not protected from sexual harassment, 
ILO Committee of experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations General Observation, Convention No. 111, 2003, 
p. 463, and, as relevant, the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 
1989 (No. 169), Article 20(3)(d). Also, as relevant, domestic workers are 
not effectively protected from all forms of abuse, harassment and violence, 
Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), Article 5.
78. Including that the basic human rights of migrant workers are not 
protected, Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 
1975 (No. 143), Article 1; and that indigenous and tribal peoples do 
not enjoy the full measure of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
without hindrance or discrimination, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention, 1989 (No. 169), Article 3.
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79. Including, as relevant, that restrictions are placed on the transfer of mi- 
grants’ earnings and savings, Convention No. 97, Article 9; that workers’ 
personal data are not protected by employment agencies in terms of the 
Private employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181), Article 6; and 
that domestic workers are not entitled to decent living conditions that 
respect their privacy, Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), 
Article 6, and are not entitled to keep in their possession their travel and 
identity documents, Article 9(c).
80. Including that the efforts of migrant workers and their families to 
preserve their national and ethnic identity and cultural ties with their 
countries of origin, including the possibility for their children to be 
given some knowledge of their mother tongue, are not assisted and en- 
couraged, Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 
1975 (No. 143), Article 12(f); and that no action is taken to promote 
the full realization of social, economic and cultural rights with respect to 
the social and cultural identity, customs and traditions and institutions 
of indigenous and tribal peoples, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Con- 
vention, 1989 (No. 169), Article 2(b).
81. Including, as relevant, that workers belonging to indigenous and tribal 
peoples, including seasonal, casual and migrant workers in agricultural 
and other employment and those employed by labour contractors, do 
not enjoy the protection afforded by national law and practice to other 
workers in the same sectors, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 
1989 (No. 169), Article 20(3)(a); that workers in hotels and restaurants 
are excluded from national-level minimum standards, including those 
relating to social security entitlements, Working Conditions (Hotels and 
Restaurants) Convention, 1991, Article 3; and that domestic workers do 
not enjoy minimum wage coverage, Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 
(No. 189), Article 11. 
82. Including that workers are not subject to a system of labour inspection in 
terms of the Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81), and its Protocol 
of 1995, and, as relevant, the Labour Inspectorates (Non-Metropolitan 
Territories) Convention, 1947 (No. 85), the Labour Inspection (Agriculture) 
Convention, 1969 (No. 129), and Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention, 1989 (No. 169), Article 20(4). Also, workers are not subject 
to a system of labour administration in which a competent body draws 
attention to defects and abuses in conditions of work and working life and 
terms of employment and submits proposals on means to overcome them, 
in terms of the Labour Administration Convention, 1978 (No. 150), Art- 
icle 6, or such systems do not include activities relating to the conditions 
of work and working life of categories of workers who are not, in law, 
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employed persons, such as e.g. self-employed workers who do not engage 
outside help, occupied in the informal sector in terms of Article 7; measures 
are not taken to prevent unauthorized deductions from wages and to restrict 
the amounts deductible from wages in respect of supplies and services 
forming part of remuneration to their proper cash value, Social Policy 
(Basic Aims and Standards) Convention, 1962 (No. 117), Article 8(b) 
and (c). Also, as relevant, the State does not systematically seek to determine 
whether there are on its territory migrants who are subject to conditions 
that contravene international multilateral or bilateral instruments or 
agreements or national laws or regulations in terms of the Migrant Workers 
(Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143), Articles 2 and 6; 
no coordinated and systematic government action is taken to protect the 
rights of indigenous and tribal peoples or to guarantee respect for their 
integrity in terms of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 
(No. 169), Article 2, in applying laws and regulations to these peoples, no 
due regard is taken of their customs or customary laws in terms of Articles 
8, 9 and 10, they are not safeguarded against the abuse of their rights or able 
to take legal proceedings for the effective protection of these rights in terms 
of Article 12, and they are not subject to special measures to ensure effective 
protection with regard to recruitment and conditions of employment in terms 
of Article 20; the respective responsibilities of employers and intermediaries 
in home work are not determined in terms of the Home Work Convention, 
1996 (No. 177), Article 8, there is no system of inspection to ensure 
compliance with laws and regulations applicable to home work, Article 9, 
and adequate remedies, including penalties where appropriate, are not 
provided for and effectively applied where laws and regulations are violated, 
Article 9; plantation workers are not subject to the protections contained in 
Part XI of the Plantations Convention, 1958 (No. 110); migrant domestic 
workers who are recruited in one country for domestic work in another do 
not receive a written job offer or contract of employment that is enforceable 
in the country in which the work is performed prior to crossing national 
borders in terms of the Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), 
Article 8, domestic workers do not have effective access to courts, tribunals 
or other dispute resolution mechanisms under conditions that are not less 
favourable than those available to workers generally, Article 16, and the 
State does not establish effective and accessible complaint mechanisms and 
means of ensuring compliance with national laws and regulations for the 
protection of domestic workers or develop and implement measures for 
labour inspection, enforcement and penalties, Article 17. 
83. Including that temporary agency workers are not subject to adequate 
machinery and procedures for the investigation of complaints, alleged 
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abuses and fraudulent practices concerning the activities of private 
employment agencies in terms of the Private employment Agencies Con-
vention, 1997 (No. 181), Article 10, temporary agency workers are not 
subject to necessary measures to ensure adequate protection in freedom 
of association, collective bargaining, minimum wages, working time 
and other working conditions, statutory social security benefits, access 
to training, occupational safety and health, compensation in cases of 
occupational accidents or diseases, compensation in cases of insolvency 
and protection of workers’ claims, maternity protection and benefits, 
and parental protection and benefits in terms of Article 11, including 
by determining and allocating the respective responsibilities of private 
employment agencies and of user enterprises in relation to collective bar-
gaining, minimum wages, working time and other working conditions, 
statutory social security benefits, access to training, protection in the 
field of occupational safety and health, compensation in case of occupa-
tional accidents or diseases, compensation in the case of insolvency and 
protection of workers’ claims and maternity protection and benefits, and 
parental protection and benefits in terms of Article 12; and that there 
are no adequate machinery and procedures for the investigation of com-
plaints, alleged abuses and fraudulent practices concerning the activities 
of private employment agencies in relation to domestic workers in terms 
of the Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), Article 15(b), 
the State does not provide adequate protection for and prevent abuses of 
domestic workers recruited or placed in its territory by private employ-
ment agencies, including by specifying the respective obligations of the 
agency and household or providing for penalties, including the prohibi-
tion of private employment agencies that engage in fraudulent practices 
and abuses, Article 15(c), and the State does not consider, where domestic 
workers are recruited in one country for work in another, concluding bi- 
lateral, regional or multilateral agreements to prevent abuses and fraudu- 
lent practices in recruitment, placement and employment, Article 15(d).
84. Including that no measures are taken to ensure that employers and work-
ers are informed of minimum wages rates in terms of the Social Policy 
(Basic Aims and Standards) Convention, 1962 (No. 117), Article 10(3), 
that where workers are paid wages at less than these rates they are not 
entitled to recover the amount by which they have been underpaid in 
terms of Article 10(4); that employers are not required to keep registers 
of wage payments, to issue to workers statements of wage payments or to 
take other appropriate steps to facilitate the necessary supervision under 
Convention No. 117, Article 11(1), and measures are not taken to inform 
workers of their wage rights, Article 11(8)(a). Also, as relevant, workers 
belonging to indigenous and tribal peoples are not fully informed of their 
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rights under labour legislation and of the means of redress available to 
them in terms of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 
(No. 169), Article 20(3)(a), and have not had made known to them their 
rights and duties, especially in regard to labour, economic opportunities, 
education and health matters, social welfare and their rights under the 
Convention, Article 30; and domestic workers are not informed of their 
terms and conditions of employment in an appropriate, verifiable and 
easily understandable manner and preferably, where possible, through 
written contracts in terms of the Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 
(No. 189), Article 7, and domestic workers who are recruited in one coun-
try for domestic work in another do not receive a written job offer or 
contract of employment that is enforceable in the country in which the 
work is to be performed prior to crossing national borders, Article 8.
85. Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183).
86. Workers are not subject to maternity protection in terms of the Maternity 
Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183), and, as relevant, the Private 
employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181), Article 11(j), and 
Nursing Personnel Convention, 1977 (No. 149), Article 6(e).
87. Including, as relevant, that temporary agency workers do not receive 
adequate protection in relation to parental protection and benefits, Private 
employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181), Article 11(j).
88. Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981 (No. 156), 
Article 8.
89. Including that workers with family responsibilities are not subject to 
a national policy that enables them to exercise their right to engage 
in employment without being subject to discrimination and, to the 
extent possible, without conflict between their employment and family 
responsibilities, Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981 
(No. 156). Also, as relevant, workers in industry, commerce and offices 
are not entitled to weekly rest granted simultaneously to all staff that 
coincides with the days already established by the traditions or customs 
of the country or district and respecting the traditions and customs of 
religious minorities in terms of the Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention, 
1921 (No. 14), and Weekly Rest (Commerce and Offices) Convention, 
1957 (No. 106); in the planning of economic development there is no 
effort to avoid the disruption of family life or of traditional social units 
in terms of Social Policy (Basic Aims and Standards) Convention, 1962 
(No. 117), Article 3(2), and terms and conditions of employment do 
not take account of the normal family needs of workers in employment 
that involves living away from their homes, Article 6; that indigenous 
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and tribal peoples are not subject to special measures to safeguard the 
persons, institutions, property, labour, cultures and environment of these 
peoples in terms of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 
(No. 169), Article 4, do not have the right to decide their own priorities 
for the process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, situations 
and spiritual well-being and the lands they occupy or use or to exercise 
control over their own economic, social and cultural development in 
terms of Article 7, and the rights of ownership and possession of the lands 
they traditionally occupy are not respected in terms of Articles 14–19; 
and workers in hotels and restaurants are not subject to sufficient advance 
notice of working schedules to enable them to organize their personal and 
family lives, Working Conditions (Hotels and Restaurants) Convention, 
1991 (No. 172), Article 4(4). 
	Chapter	3	–	Tackling	unacceptable	forms	of	work:		
The	spectrum	of	unacceptability	and	strategic	regulation
90. This approach is reflected in the Worst Forms of Child Labour Con- 
vention, 1999 (No. 182). Article 4(1) requires governments to consult 
with organizations of employers and workers to identify “work which, by 
its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm 
the health, safety or morals of children” (among the worst forms of child 
labour identified in Article 3(d)).
91. Maharashtra Mathadi Hamal and other Manual Workers (Regulation of 
employment and Welfare) Act, 1969. Available at: http://mahakamgar.
gov.in/MahLabour/lc-mathadi-boards.htm. The discussion of the regu- 
lation of Mathadi workers draws on Marshall (2014) and Agarwala 
(2013). 
92. The Mathadi unions and workers continue to resort to strikes and in- 
dustrial action in order to obtain wage increases and enforce their rights. 
93. One focus of bidi workers’ struggles has been to gain recognition as 
employees of the large formal sector bidi factories.
94. Uruguay is a middle-income country with lower poverty rates and less 
income inequality than most other countries in the region. In 2013, 
approximately 17 per cent of all employed women in Uruguay were 
domestic workers. This figure has remained fairly constant since the 
1990s. This discussion draws upon Budlender (2013), Goldsmith (2013) 
and ILO (2013f). 
95. Until 2008, there were two channels for setting wages in Uruguay: 
tripartite negotiation in the Consejos de Salarios (Wage Councils) and, 
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for those occupational groups that did not participate in the Wage Coun- 
cils, presidential decrees.
96. It was founded in 1985, although it has roots in older domestic worker 
organizations that date to the mid-1960s, and it is the only membership-
based organization that represents domestic workers in Uruguay.
97. Law 18.065.
98. In addition to defining the terms of Law 18.065, Decree 224/007 expli- 
citly excluded rural domestic service personnel (referring basically to do- 
mestic workers who are employed by the owners of farms and ranches).
99. There are other provisions in both of the collective agreements that 
strengthen clauses in the 2006 labour law and the 2007 regulatory decree 
(such as overtime pay) or other recent laws that theoretically covered 
domestic workers (Law 18.345, special paid leaves for study, family deaths, 
adoption, marriage).
100. It set adjustment rates according to three salary bands, included a 
commitment to define the categories that are part of the sector until 2015, 
and created a premium for domestic workers who have not been unduly 
absent from work. See http://www.ilo.org/travail/areasofwork/domestic-
workers/WCMS_212212/lang--en/index.htm.
101. During the first year, the Inspección General del Trabajo y de la Seguri- 
dad Social (IGTSS – General Inspectorate for Labour and Social Security) 
limited the campaign to Montevideo and Canelones and focused upon 
registration with and payment to the BPS. During the second year, it 
expanded the campaign to four other departments and covered other 
issues such as payment of wage increases, holiday pay, yearly bonus, and 
the availability of work clothes and equipment. The inspectors did not 
enter the households, so they did not require a judicial order. They asked 
the employer (and if he or she was unavailable, the worker) to answer a 
series of questions regarding work conditions and benefits and to show 
pay slips and documents from the BPS that would allow them to detect 
violations. They found that there was at least some degree of lack of 
compliance in 80 per cent of the cases, most frequently regarding some 
aspect of social security (Goldsmith, 2013, p. 20).
102. McCann and Murray develop a notion of “framed flexibility” for the 
regulation of the working time of domestic workers, which is “tendered 
as a resource for the design of measures at a range of regulatory levels, 
and in diverse national settings” (McCann and Murray, 2014, p. 336). 
These measures are particularly attuned to the “existing labour practices 
and embod[y] incentives towards regulation” (ibid., p. 337). The Framing 
Standards are designed to standardize (or formalize) hours of work in 
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order to prevent excessive hours and prohibit on-call work or zero hours 
contracts. 
103. Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189) – Convention concerning 
decent work for domestic workers (entry into force: 5 Sep. 2013), Article 4: 
“1. each Member shall set a minimum age for domestic workers consistent 
with the provisions of the Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138), 
and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182), 
and not lower than that established by national laws and regulations for 
workers generally. 
 2. each Member shall take measures to ensure that work performed by 
domestic workers who are under the age of 18 and above the minimum 
age of employment does not deprive them of compulsory education, or 
interfere with opportunities to participate in further education or voca-
tional training.”
104. The discussion in this section draws on Lee and McCann (2014).
105. The estimate was that around 1.4 million employee contracts do not 
guarantee a minimum number of hours that provided work in the 
survey reference period of the fortnight beginning 20 January 2014. The 
ONS also provided an initial estimate of a further 1.3 million employee 
contracts under which employees were not guaranteed a minimum 
number of hours that did not provide work in the survey reference period. 
The ONS intends to take further research into these contracts (ONS, 
2014). These figures do not include workers classified as engaged on a self-
employed basis. It therefore potentially fails to catch workers who could 
be designated as employees by the courts.
106. In the LFS, “zero-hours contracts” are defined as “where a person is not 
contracted to work a set number of hours and is only paid for the number 
of hours they do” (ONS, 2014, p. 3).
107. See e.g. the definition of “employee” in the employment Rights Act 1996 
(UK), s 230.
108. Autoclenz v Belcher and others [2011] UKSC41.
109. Zero hours contracts are defined as contracts under which “(a) the 
undertaking to do or perform work or services is an undertaking to do 
so conditionally on the employer making work or services available to 
the worker, and (b) there is no certainty that any such work or services 
will be made available to the worker”, Small Business, enterprise and 
employment Bill, Section 139(2).
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